S. HRG. 99-90

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

HEARING

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

SPECIAL HEARING

Congressional Witnesses
Department of Justice
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Nondepartmental Witnesses
United Nations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-391 O WASHINGTON : 1985

S181-40

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:47 a.m., in the Main Courtroom, U.S. Court of International Trade, New York, NY, Hon. Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (Wisconsin), chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Kasten and Alfonse M. D'Amato (New York).

Also present: Representative Charles B. Rangel (New York).

CONGRESSIONAL PANEL

STATEMENTS OF:

HON. ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
HON. ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK
HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KASTEN

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee is holding a special hearing on international narcotics control. We will be taking a slightly different approach at this hearing in that we will examine at the same time, domestic effects of illicit narcotics, most of which originate outside the shores of the United States.

Our subcommittee has jurisdiction over the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters at the Department of State, which administers a program of approximately $56 million aimed at assisting and encouraging other nations to control drug production and drug trafficking.

Earlier this fall, Secretary of State George Shultz indicated in a statement he made in Florida, that narcotics control was one of his highest priorities. It is also a high priority of the Vice President and a high priority of this administration.

As many of you know, President Reagan, through the Vice President, has given great emphasis to this problem. I believe that the testimony we will receive today will indicate that we are not winning this battle and that what is necessary is not only an increased emphasis in foreign policy circles to get other countries to realize that this matter is their problem also, but more important, that the U.S. domestic law enforce-

ment mechanisms and penalties show that we are in fact serious about trying to effectively fight this problem.

In other words, what we are trying to do today is to reemphasize this battle on both fronts, the domestic as well as the international.

We have brought this hearing to the city of New York because the effect of illicit narcotics in the United States is probably felt more in this city than anywhere else in the United States, except perhaps in some areas of Florida.

I would like specifically to commend Senator Al D'Amato for asking for this hearing. Senator D'Amato has been in the forefront of this issue and is a very valuable member of this subcommittee, not only with respect to international narcotics matters, but also on a national level with respect to a number of very important foreign policy questions. Senator D'Amato has developed a very solid reputation in Washington not only as a member of this subcommittee but as a U.S. Senator, and especially from an angle that when he takes on an issue, he won't let go of it until he has been successful.

So, Senator, I thank you again for suggesting this hearing, which I am sure will be very helpful to the subcommittee and, undoubtedly, to other Members of Congress and, hopefully, to the administration.

HEARING FORMAT

The format we will follow this morning will be to ask current drug users to testify first. Then we will ask remaining witnesses to form a panel. Your prepared statements have been reviewed by the staff and prepared statements will be made a permanent part of the record. They will be inserted in the record in their entirety. We ask that each of the witnesses make a brief oral summary of their statement.

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Today we will hear from, after our first witnesses, the Honorable William Buffum, the Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs; the Honorable Jon Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters for the Department of State; and a number of other individuals, including Vice Adm. Paul Yost, Commander of the Atlantic Area of the Coast Guard; Frank Monastero, Assistant Administrator for Operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration; and Thomas Sheer, Special Agent in Charge of the Criminal Division in New York of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Before beginning with this testimony, I would like to ask if Senator D'Amato or if Congressman Rangel has an opening statement. Senator D'Amato?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR D'AMATO

Senator D'AMATO. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you from the bottom of my heart on behalf of all New Yorkers, and indeed, more than just New Yorkers, people who are concerned with this epidemic of drugs, for taking the time to hold this hearing and coming to New York. With your able leadership and stewardship of this important

subcommittee, we are able to do so much to focus on the international narcotics trade and the problem it presents to our Nation.

I want to thank and welcome Congressman Charles Rangel, a dear friend and colleague of ours in the House, whose able leadership as chairman of his Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has been without peer. He is second to no one in this Nation in terms of his dedication and in terms of his awareness of the problem. His committee couldn't be in finer hands. Certainly, he has given me a great deal of insight into this incredible problem.

I have a lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman. But not to detract from the hearing, I ask that this statement be included in the record as if read in its entirety.

Once again, let me thank you and Congressman Rangel for your capable leadership and for your devotion to what I think is probably the most pressing problem that this country faces.

LOSS OF DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY

We hear about budget deficits. We hear about arms negotiations. They are certainly important. But when the quality of life in our Nation is eroded to the point where people do not feel safe using public transportation or public facilities, when they feel trapped in their own homes as victims, when they are afraid to conduct their small businesses and are forced to operate behind shuttered grates and doors, I think that is testimony we have lost domestic tranquility.

One of the major congressional duties is to promote domestic tranquility. That is what our Bill of Rights in the Constitution is all about. So we had better turn our attention to identifying the problems. We should not only identify them, but we must also deal with them in an effective manner. Cutting off aid to those countries which supply our Nation with illicit drugs is one option. However, I think we have found greater success in helping to mobilize those countries on an affirmative basis. We have successes in Italy and some of the countries in Central and South America, to begin to eradicate production of illicit drugs and to crack down on the drug kingpins who control narcotics trafficking.

The United States has to do its part, of course. We have to demonstrate that we have a commitment, that our judicial system responds, and that our law enforcement system reacts to the crisis.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my good friend and colleague, Mr. Rangel, for his being here and his continuing leadership in this critical area.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection your entire statement will be made part of record.

[The prepared statement of Senator D'Amato follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALFONSE D'AMATO

U.S. Senator From New York

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, Senator Kasten, for holding this important hearing today and I want to commend you for your most fine and able leadership as chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. I also want to welcome Congressman Rangel, chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, and all our witnesses who have agreed to testify today.

Level of Narcotics Entering U.S. From Foreign Countries

This hearing will address the often frustrating problem of reducing the level of narcotics coming into the United States from other countries. All of the 5 to 10 tons of heroin and all of the 60 tons of cocaine used in this country each year originates in a foreign country. Twenty million Americans use marijuana regularly, up to 10 million use cocaine, and about 600,000 are addicted to heroin. This means that up to 10 percent of our population are regular drug abusers, and these numbers are growing. Sixty percent of all crime is drug-related. The only way to combat illegal drug use in America is to attack both our own demand for drugs and the foreign supply of illicit drugs. That is why the speech by Secretary of State Shultz on September 14 in Miami declaring narcotics control to be a State Department priority is most welcome and encouraging.

We cannot permit the gangsters that control the international drug trade to continue to threaten American lives, whether in this country or overseas. Last November 19 agents working under contract to our Government in Peru were slaughtered by Peruvian drug dealers. The following month our American Embassy in Colombia was bombed and death threats against our Ambassador forced him to leave Colombia.

Reduction of Foreign Aid

If necessary, when all else fails, I do support cutting off aid to those countries that do not cooperate in the effort to cut their production of dangerous drugs, extradite drug kingpins, interdict drug smuggling, and combat drug money laundering.

Reasons for Successful Programs

But I also believe that the effectiveness of such a negative approach in the long run is limited. Any success we have had in reducing drug production and increasing drug law enforcement in Colombia, Pakistan, Mexico, Turkey, and elsewhere is directly tied to two central facts:

(1) The first fact is that we have begun to succeed in convincing the countries of the world that drug abuse is every bit as much their problem as it is ours. The drug producing countries are now finding that their own addict populations are large and growing. Drug abuse is also spreading in Canada, in the developed nations of Western Europe, and in the developing nations of Asia.

(2) The second, and equally important, fact is that we in the United States have learned that we cannot preach what we do not practice ourselves. When we permit smoke shops to proliferate in our neighborhoods, drugs to be sold openly on our streets, and drug dealers to go free with lenient sentences while drug-crime continues unabated, these facts are widely reported worldwide and give foreign countries very effective arguments against implementing any drug eradication plans we may have for them.

Strengthening Legislation and Law Enforcement Agencies

But when we pass legislation, as we in the Congress did last year, strengthening our law enforcement agencies, increasing our drug interdiction capabilities, abolishing parole, and providing for preventive detention for repeat drug offenders, our diplomatic hand is strengthened significantly.

It is to stress the importance of this point that our first witnesses today are not the officials of the State Department or the United Nations. They are current and former street level drug dealers. They are ex-convicts. How we deal with our own law enforce-

ment problem has the most direct bearing on the effectiveness of our diplomatic efforts overseas.

Methods for Reducing Drug Production in Foreign Countries

The American people demand more than rhetoric on the subject of crime and drug abuse. They demand a program and a commitment to put that program into full force and effect. That is why I propose the following three points to reduce drug production in foreign countries.

We need:

(1) A fully funded State Department drug eradication effort to support and strengthen those eradication programs that are succeeding. We also need to expand our efforts dramatically worldwide;

(2) A more forceful effort by the Secretary of State to involve both the drug producing countries and the drug consuming countries must become an absolute priority;

(3) The third point is an increased emphasis on domestic drug law enforcement and a worldwide informational effort to tell the nations of the world about American law enforcement initiatives.

Having said this, we must never minimize the influence our foreign aid gives us in our dealings with other countries.

The United States holds a powerful instrument of persuasion in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign aid we dispense each year. Pakistan, for example, will receive $627 million in assistance from the United States in this fiscal year alone.

This amount excludes any international monetary fund assistance that Pakistan may receive. Even though Pakistan does have an opium eradication program in place, a major part of our heroin imports continue to come from that country. I realize that Pakistan is in an extremely sensitive area of the world, but our aid is substantial enough that we can demand of Pakistan a much more comprehensive effort to control opium production and combat opium and heroin smuggling.

Hawkins-Rangel-Gilman Amendment

Congress has given the administration an important tool to strengthen our diplomatic efforts for international narcotics control. The Hawkins-Rangel-Gilman amendment, enacted in November 1983, requires the termination of U.S. assistance to nations which do not take adequate steps to control and eradicate narcotics trafficking. The State Department must use this legislation to convince and induce other nations to adopt truly effective antidrug policies.

Over the past few years, we have witnessed some increased international cooperation. Record amounts of seizures are being reported.

Successful Programs in Italy and Colombia

Our relations with two nations stand out as recent examples of successful diplomacy in the war on drugs: They are Italy and Colombia. Italy has been most diligent in its efforts to crack down on the drug czars who are responsible for smuggling so much of the heroin coming into this country. The numerous arrests and raids by Italian police have put record numbers of Italian drug dealers in prison, and Italy is a leader in the effort to combat drug money laundering and in extraditing major drug smugglers.

In Colombia, the government of President Betancur has continued to be cooperative in the face of armed opposition, bombings, and numerous death threats. I was very pleased to learn on Sunday that Colombia has agreed to extradite four of its citizens for prosecution in the United States on drug trafficking charges.

Continued Problems in Paraguay

Unfortunately, this commitment is not shared by all of Colombia's Latin neighbors. Last week we learned that Paraguay has not destroyed several tons of ether and other chemicals used in making cocaine out of cocoa leaves. This suggests that high level government officials in Paraguay may be involved in drug trafficking. Even though our

direct aid to this nation is nominal, other pressures must be used to ensure that these chemicals are promptly destroyed.

Even our hard won gains in Mexico, Turkey, Pakistan, and Colombia have been negated by the continued increase in the supply of illicit drugs finding their way onto our city streets and into our suburban and rural communities. The pushers on the streets of New York City are certainly not affected by the multimillion-dollar effort the United States has put toward international drug control. In fact, prices for narcotics have gone down, even while supplies have continued to meet a demand that continues to increase.

WORLDWIDE OPPOSITION TO ANTINARCOTICS EFFORTS

Worldwide antinarcotics efforts are being met with ruthless and powerful opposition. This violence will continue, and we must be better prepared to fight back. Many communist and terrorist states are strongly connected to drug trafficking. There is solid evidence that Bulgaria, Cuba, and Nicaragua are exporting illicit drugs to the United States. Syria and the P.L.O. also traffic in narcotics to raise money for their terrorist actions.

The recent seizure and destruction of 10,000 tons of marijuana in Mexico illustrates the severity of the crisis we face. Large as it might seem, this amount was 8 times greater than the official estimate of total Mexican production for an entire year.

The current U.S. contribution to the international war on drugs is $100 million, but the estimated value of the drug trafficking trade in America has been estimated at $100 billion per year. The cost to our society is devastating.

It is a primary responsibility of our diplomats to make nations which are involved in drug trafficking aware that narcotics control is a major priority of the United States. Drug traffickers are enemies not only of the United States but also of the nations in which they operate. We must increase our efforts to obtain the support of all drug exporting nations in attacking the international drug trade.

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses concerning what is being done, what more needs to be done, and what Congress must do to help obtain a greater commitment from the nations of the world to a meaningful international war on drugs.

INTRODUCTION OF REPRESENTATIVE RANGEL

Senator KASTEN. We are fortunate to have with us today Congressman Charles Rangel. He doesn't need any introduction in this group. I had the opportunity of serving with Charlie as a Member of the House of Representatives a number of years ago. Not only is he a Congressman from the city of New York, but he is also chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in the House of Representatives. In that role, Congressman Rangel has been a leader in working with the administration, the Congress, and with a number of groups outside of the Government in trying to get a handle on these very, very difficult problems.

Congressman Rangel, it is a great pleasure for us to have you join us here today. Do you have any remarks you would like to make before we begin the testimony?

OPENING STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RANGEL

Mr. RANGEL. Chairman Kasten, I want to join my friend and colleague, Senator D'Amato, in welcoming you, but most importantly, to thank you for bringing your committee and your prestige to the city and the State of New York. I know that it has been at the encouragement of Senator D'Amato; no piece of legislation and no issue that would have any effect on the State of New York passes without his

scrutiny. And certainly this has been an epidemic in which his leadership has caused us to be proud of his stewardship in the Senate.

Your coming to the city and State of New York means a lot to us because we have been hit hard over the last couple of decades, and it doesn't look as though our problems have lessened. Every country that the United States has taken in as a friend and given assistance to, whether through economic assistance or military assistance or technical assistance, we expect a bumper crop from. And yet, while we used to be just a target of the scum of the earth, these communists, these terrorists, these insurgents, we find now more and more democracies, as we have known it, found themselves being held hostage to the very same type of terror we have known on the streets of New York.

Our courts are overcrowded. Our jails are overcrowded. Our old folks and young folks alike walk the streets in fear of their lives because of this deadly disease.

So it is fitting and proper you would call these hearings at this appropriate time as we start with a new administration and certainly hoping that these hearings will give a higher priority to this most important issue. We start with a new Assistant Secretary of State in charge of these narcotic areas. We start with a new Attorney General. We start with a new Ambassador to the United Nations. And indeed, in many of the countries that we fear will have bumper crops in Bolivia, in Colombia, we even start with new ambassadors because the terrorism has caused them to be in fear of their lives.

So when a great country like the United States cannot feel secure in having its representatives there to protect our interests, then it is time, I think, for the House and Senate to provide that leadership to make certain that the same fear we have for the spread of communism exists in the spread of this poison. It has shown what it can do in terms of assassinating high public officials in some of the greatest countries in the world. It doesn't look like we are that far removed from that type of terror even in our own great Nation.

So, Senator, let me thank you very much, coming from a State like Wisconsin, to have the sensitivity and compassion to bring this to the State of New York, and certainly Senator Al D'Amato for encouraging you to do it. It means a lot to us. It means a lot to the people, that even if we don't get all of the answers today, at least the American people in this great part of the country will know that we have a concern and we haven't forgotten the problem. Thank you very much.

Senator KASTEN. Congressman, we thank you, and once again I want to thank you for your leadership. We want to continue to work together with you. We thank you for your strong efforts.

Your prepared statement will be inserted at this point in the record.

[The statement of Representative Rangel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THIS INVITATION FROM SENATOR ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR. OF WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, TO JOIN WITH HIM AND SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO OF NEW YORK TO LOOK INTO THE ILLICIT PRODUCTION AND TRAFFIC OF HEROIN FROM SOUTHWEST ASIA AND THE PRODUCTION AND TRAFFIC OF COCAINE AND MARIJUANA FROM SOUTH AMERICA AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES.

CHAIRMAN KASTEN IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR SELECTING NEW YORK CITY AS THE SITE OF THIS IMPORTANT HEARING. THE EXPERTS TELL US THAT AT LEAST HALF OF ALL THE HEROIN THAT ENTERS THE UNITED STATES IS SMUGGLED IN VIA NEW YORK AIRPORTS AND THE SEAPORT.

IMPORTANT QUANTITIES OF COCAINE ARE ALSO SMUGGLED DIRECTLY INTO THE NEW YORK CITY AREA VIA ITS AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS FROM SOUTH AMERICA. THE BULK OF THE 200 TONS OF HASHISH ENTERING THE UNITED STATES FROM PAKISTAN, LEBANON AND MOROCCO IS SMUGGLED VIA NEW YORK. VESSELS SMUGGLING MARIJUANA FROM COLOMBIA AND JAMAICA ARE ALSO UNLOADING THEIR DRUG CARGOS ALONG THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY AND CONNECTICUT AREA.

WE ARE ALSO TOLD THAT HALF OF THE OF MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ACTIVE HEROIN ADDICTS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA. ALSO THAT THE

CONSUMPTION OF COCAINE, MARIJUANA AND ALL OTHER NARCOTIC AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS IS EQUALLY HEAVY IN THIS AREA.

NEW YORK REMAINS THE NATION'S PRIMARY CENTER FOR THE IMPORTATION AND NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS. AN EFFECTIVE NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT PERFORMANCE BY THE DEA, CUSTOMS AND COAST GUARD, ASSISTED BY THE FBI, THE IRS AND THE INS AND IN TURN SUPPORTED WITH VIGOROUS PROSECUTIONS BY THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS' U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICES CAN HAVE A MEANINGFUL IMPACT IN DISRUPTING AND CURTAILING THE TRAFFIC AND ABUSE OF NARCOTICS NOT ONLY IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES.

RUTHLESS AND RESOURCEFUL INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE TARGETED THE UNITED STATES JUST AS THEY HAVE ALL OTHER ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WHERE AFFLUENCE CREATES A MARKET FOR ALL TYPES OF CONSUMER GOODS INCLUDING NARCOTICS.

WE HAVE BEEN FAILING MORE THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR EFFORTS TO HAVE THE DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES SUPPRESS THE ILLICIT PRODUCTION AND TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES.

THIS SITUATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS OF 1961 OBLIGES THEM TO: (1) LICENSE AND RESTRICT THE LEGAL PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS TO MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES; (2) TO ERADICATE ALL UNLICENSED CULTIVATION; (3) TO SUPPRESS ILLICIT MANUFACTURE

AND TRAFFIC; AND (4) TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER IN ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF THE CONVENTION.

THE MORE WE FAIL IN OUR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC CONTROL EFFORTS THE GREATER IS THE NEED FOR AN INCREASED AND INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO SUPPRESS THE SMUGGLING AND INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTICS IN THE UNITED STATES. NO WHERE DO WE HAVE A GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCCESS THAN IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA.

OF COURSE THE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION IS TO STEADILY AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE NARCOTIC SUPPLIES FROM ABROAD AND SIMULTANEOUSLY INCREASE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF THE KEY POINTS OF DRUG SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTION, SUCH AS NEW YORK, MIAMI, LOS ANGELES, SAN FRANCISCO AND DETROIT AND ALONG OUR SOUTHWEST BORDER.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD WITH GREAT INTEREST TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES. I WOULD HOPE THEY SHALL BE ABLE TO INFORM US WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THE DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES, SUCH AS PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN IN SOUTHWEST ASIA INVOLVED WITH OPIUM AND HEROIN, AND WITH COLOMBIA, PERU AND BOLIVIA WITH REFERENCE TO COCA AND COCAINE PRODUCTION. I AM ALSO INTERESTED IN HEARING RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEASURES THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN RELATIVE TO MARIJUANA PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING FROM COLOMBIA, JAMAICA AND BELIZE.

IN ADDDITION, I AM HOPEFUL THE WITNESSES WILL INFORM US ON WHAT EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO INTENSIFY NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION WITH THE PRODUCER AND TRANSIT

COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT ENABLE US TO INCREASE THE NUMBER AND VOLUME OF DRUG SEIZURES AND PROSECUTIONS BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD IN THE TRAFFIC AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS AN ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM WHERE IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE RESULTS CAN BE ACHIEVED AND BRING SOME MEASURE OF CURTAILMENT TO THE ENORMOUS NARCOTIC TRAFFIC AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES.

AGAIN I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO SENATOR KASTEN AND TO MY COLLEAGUE FROM THE GREAT STATE OF NEW YORK, SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING. IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLDSTEIN, SOCIOLOGIST, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES

ACCOMPANIED BY:

SAM

KEVIN

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

Senator KASTEN. I would now like to begin the hearing with testimony from two current drug users that we have before us. Gentlemen, you have heard a lot from the politicians on this side of the table. We have made our speeches. But clearly our job is not simply appropriating $56 million to help foreign countries deal with the source. You are here because we want to talk also about the problem as it affects this city, as it affects individuals.

We thank you for joining us here today. Would you go forward with a brief statement?

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. My name is Paul Goldstein. I am a sociologist. For the last 12 years, I have worked with the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services or its not-for-profit research service, Narcotic and Drug Research Center. I have done studies on the relationship between drug use and prostitution, a 5-year economic study of drug users in East Harlem, and studied the methadone program. I am currently doing a study on drug use in the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The two gentlemen who will testify after I complete these brief introductory remarks are both subjects in the Lower East Side study.

They will be introduced with code names, Sam and Kevin. These are not their real names.

I was asked to say something about the relationship between drugs and violence. What I would like to do in some very brief introductory remarks is locate that relationship in a general rubric of health consequences of drug use.

DRUG PROBLEM AMONG ADULT POPULATION

I believe violence to be one of the most significant consequences of drug use. It is estimated 2.5 million Americans, about 2 percent of the adult population, has serious drug problems. The direct impact of this drug problem includes high rates of absenteeism, thefts, accidents in both school and the workplace, high rates of suicide, vehicular deaths, and violence primarily among young people. Drug use can also lead to a variety of chronic ailments, infections such as hepatitis or AIDS, or precipitate acute reactions, such as overdose or psychosis.

HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG ABUSE

The health consequences of drug use are especially serious because most users are young people. Certain indicators of negative impact, such as loss of years of life or work productivity, are very high because whole adult lifetimes may be lost. Infectious diseases related to drug use originate from bacterial infection caused by injection from unsterile equipment. Commonly injected drugs include heroin and cocaine. Because hypodermic needles are not generally available, they rent or share equipment or works with other users. Consequently, they rapidly transmit infection.

These infections result in chronic and acute illnesses, such as serum hepatitis, abscesses, carditis, and AIDS. These illnesses have rates disproportionately higher in the IV-drug-using population than in the general population. These are often transmitted to nondrug users through blood transfusions or other nondrug contacts.

Serum hepatitis, bacterial infection, abscesses, carditis, and AIDS alone accounted for over 31,000 years of life lost in 1980, assuming an average lifespan of 65 years. Poisoning or overdosing drugs resulted in nearly 100,000 hospitalizations and about 44,000 years of life lost in 1980.

HEALTH COSTS

Health costs related to poisoning or overdose are high: almost $130 million in hospital costs alone in 1980. The group at greatest risk for morbidity or mortality in drug poisoning or overdose is the young. Forty-four percent of the reported poisoning or overdose cases for 1980 were under 24 years old.

VIOLENCE AND DRUG USE

OK, now I will move into the area of violence. Drugs and violence are related in three possible ways: psychopharmacologically, economically compulsive, and systemically.

The psychopharmacological model suggests some persons as a result of short- or long-term injection of drugs become excitable, irrational, and ultimately violent. Barbiturates, stimulants, and alcohol are the most relevant drugs in this category.

The economically compulsive model suggests that some drug users engage in violent crime, such as robbery, in order to support costly drug use. Heroin and cocaine are the most relevant drugs in this category.

Systemic violence refers to the aggressive patterns of interaction within the system of drug use and distribution. Included here are territorial disputes between rival drug dealers, robberies of drug dealers and usually violent retaliation, elimination of informers, punishment for selling adulterated or phony drugs, or for failing to pay one's debts.

Systemic violence can arise from the distribution of any drug. Children have been stabbed to death in the streets by other children in disputes over a $5 bag of marijuana.

HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE

Health consequences of drug-related violence are enormous. Looking at homicide, in 1980, over 67,000 years of life were lost from drug-related violence. A recent report submitted by ADARM estimated that 10 percent of the homicides and assaults nationwide are the result of drug use. In 1983, the New York City police department released their 1981 homicide analysis. The report contains the following findings: 24 percent of the known homicides in 1981 in New York City were labeled drug-related by the NYPD; drug-related homicides were the second most common form of homicide, following only the general category of dispute; handguns were used more often in drug-related homicide than in any other form of homicide 84 percent of the time.

Robbery-related homicide, which ranks second in this regard, handguns were used 61 percent of the time. In 94 percent of the drug-related homicides, the victim and perpetrator were friends or acquaintances.

Similar findings were reported in Miami, FL.

In the United States, in 1980, over 2,000 homicides and over 460,000 assaults were estimated to result from drug-related causes. Further, in more than 140,000 of the assaults, the victim sustained physical injury. These injuries led to nearly 50,000 days of hospitalization in 1980.

That is the end of my prepared remarks. If there are no questions, I would introduce the two gentlemen I brought with me.

INTRODUCTION OF ACCOMPANYING WITNESSES

Senator KASTEN. I would ask that you do introduce the gentlemen accompanying you. I think that although there may be questions based on your testimony, it might work in a more orderly way if the subcommittee could listen to the gentlemen who you have brought with you, and then the subcommittee may address questions to any and all of you at the same time. So if you would proceed and introduce Sam and Kevin.

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. OK. Kevin, I will introduce you as someone I have known for about 3 months now. I know you have some interesting things to say to us.

Senator KASTEN. I will repeat what you just said. I am not sure if everyone heard. You said you were going to introduce Kevin?

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. I will introduce Kevin, who is from the Lower East Side.

Senator KASTEN. A person you have known and have been working with for roughly 3 months.

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. That is right.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN

KEVIN. My story is I grew up on the Lower East Side. I have been using heroin——

Senator D'AMATO. Put the microphone closer in front of you, Kevin.

KEVIN. I grew up on the Lower East Side. I have been using heroin for over 20 years. When I first started, I used to sniff. I started dealing at a real young age. I thought I was a gangster. I was, you know, a tough guy. I really didn't understand that I had a habit until the first day I didn't have the drug. I denied I had a habit. I wound up having a pretty big one.

Money got tough. It kind of led into doing crimes and various other things of violence to make my money.

That is basically my story now.

Senator KASTEN. How old are you now?

KEVIN. When I first started?

Senator KASTEN. What is your age now?

KEVIN. I am 35.

Senator KASTEN. You are 35 years old.

Doctor, do you want to introduce Sam also?

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. OK. Sam, why don't you just go ahead.

STATEMENT OF SAM

SAM. My story basically is I am 38 years old. I grew up in Senator D'Amato's home district on Long Island. I went to a local high school. I went to college in upstate New York. I started shooting drugs in my first year of law school in New England. I have been using drugs now about 16 years.

The first 12 years or so that I used drugs I had no habit. I never did it every day until around 1980. I was working full time from the time I finished law school until around 1980 or 1981, and when I stopped working full time, I supported myself by the customers that I would cop drugs for.

I have committed no crimes of violence or theft or any other crimes. The only crimes I have committed is possessing and selling drugs. Most of the people that were my customers when I was still copping for them, when I lived in the heart of the Lower East Side, were white suburban working people from both Long Island and New Jersey. By copping for them and charging them more than the cost of the drugs, plus a fee for going, I supported mine and my girlfriend's habit.

Since I moved out of the heart of the Lower East Side, I have reduced my drug use greatly and intend to stop shortly and resume working.

VIOLENCE AND NARCOTICS USE

There is no question that there is much violence connected with narcotics use. I see it in my neighborhood all the time. I have seen it in my work. Before I stopped working, I worked in the area of criminal defense and defended many people over the years who were accused of crimes that were drug related in one way or another.

My personal experience has been limited as to violence, and most of the people that I would obtain drugs for were people who were working full time and would come in anywhere from one to three times a week from the suburbs to obtain drugs. Also, sometimes when they

started using too frequently, they would get onto methadone programs and, you know, they would get too far behind in their bills as well as using too much drugs and their lifestyle mandated that they get off of drugs at least temporarily in order to maintain their lifestyle. The money that they were earning was going toward drugs rather than household bills and living expenses.

I don't have anything else to say.

Senator KASTEN. I would just like to say personally that we appreciate your testimony, both of you, and I know that this certainly isn't the easiest thing in the world to do. But hopefully by your being here today and your testimony and answering questions, we will be able to make one small step toward recognizing the problems that someone at age 15 or at age 14, right this moment, on Long Island or in New York City, is going to be faced with, and hopefully their decisions will be affected in a small part by what we are doing here today.

AVAILABILITY OF DRUGS IN NEW YORK CITY

I would like to ask each of you the same question. We are in the business of trying to stop the production and the distribution of drugs essentially at the source. This subcommittee is dealing with an appropriation of roughly $56 million in this fiscal year, which is to help with eradication programs in foreign countries. But I would like to turn that upside down, if I could, and ask each of you about how you would describe, as specifically as you can, the availability of drugs in the city of New York today—in January 1985.

I would like to begin, if I could, with Kevin. We will then go to Sam. And then, doctor, if you would conclude. How would you describe, as specifically as you can, even by types of drugs, the availability of drugs in the neighborhoods of this city today?

KEVIN. Well, you have to excuse me for a minute. I am a little bugged out with all of this and the cameras and the lights. If I am a little shaky, please understand.

Senator KASTEN. All of us are a little shaky. I guess some of us on this side of the lights have gotten a little more used to the glare and all the other things. We want to make you feel as comfortable as you can be.

KEVIN. The reason for the screen is we are not going to give some great expose, but we really don't need the hassle in the neighborhood. I would rather not have my face known.

PRESSURE POINT

With availability of drugs, on the Lower East Side, granted, "Pressure Point" kind of put a stop on it, but all it really did was put it undercover more. It was bound to happen before "Pressure Point." It was an Arab bazaar on the Lower East Side. On one corner you would have 500 people copping. They would be yelling out brand names. It was unbelievable.

Now it is more like an undercover thing. Also, it is giving credibility to a middleman now. Before people could go and cop it themselves, but now they usually have some place they go and meet somebody who will charge them $15 for a $10 value. He is like the middleman. He will make money on the deal that way.

This way people feel safe. They stay out of the area. If you are white, you look pretty much like you are from Jersey, or if you have a car with Jersey plates, the police would definitely stop you and search you in the Lower East Side.

That just seems to be the system there. Everybody just goes along with it.

AVAILABILITY OF DRUGS

Availability of drugs? It is always still there. Just instead of copping it on the street, you might have to go into a hallway. In a funny kind of way, it has made things a little more dangerous on the East Side. Where you had the safety of numbers when you were buying drugs in the street, you don't have that any more. You might have to go into a dark hallway. You might wind up getting ripped off or stabbed or hurt. The loss of the drugs is minor. You might get a knife in your ribs. That is more dangerous.

I don't think that they can ever stop the drug flow in the Lower East Side. It is the American dream: I have a product and I am willing to sell it, and you have the money and you are looking to buy it. I don't think we have enough law enforcement agents to stop that. I think maybe if we gave some kind of education, we could stop people from wanting to buy it, and then maybe we would stop it.

You talk about $56 million to fight drugs. That might be 1 percent of what they are making. I don't think you guys have a chance.

Senator KASTEN. Sam?

QUALITY OF ILLEGAL DRUGS

SAM. Well, I would say this: When I first started using in the late 1960's and early 1970's, I used to hear stories from older users about how the quality had fallen and insignificant highs were obtainable from the drug and how back in the early 1960's and late 1950's the drugs were so much better and how many people could get high on 50 cents worth or a dollar's worth of heroin.

Just from the time I started, the quality of drugs has gradually eroded, if you take into account the price. I mean inflation hits everywhere. Increased governmental pressure, certainly seizing more shipments, and so on, has lowered the quality more than upped the price. However, there is still the effect of the last few years which has been a reduction in quality but not of any great significance. I would say maybe what you buy for $10 now is 60 to 80 percent as strong as it was 4 years ago.

Actually, it becomes dangerous for a seller to sell drugs that are really high quality because people get used to a certain amount of $10 bags that they do as their standard amount and if they sold something

really good, they would have people OD'ing and OD deaths, and not only loss of customers for the sellers but also that would bring increased police pressure to a given area.

HEROIN AND COCAINE AVAILABILITY IN SUBURBS

Heroin is available. Cocaine is available on the Lower East Side, although the quality of cocaine is much better in the suburbs than it is in the Lower East Side. But the Lower East Side is the only place I know of where you can get $5 and $10 bags. In the suburbs you are buying quarter grams for $25 and up.

There are all other kinds of drugs available, but I am not involved in any others of any significance

DRUG AVAILABILITY IN NEW YORK NEIGHBORHOODS

Senator KASTEN. Sam, thank you.

Doctor, how would you describe the availability of drugs in the neighborhoods of New York today?

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. I don't think anybody in any neighborhood of New York who wants to purchase drugs would have any trouble purchasing drugs. You have heard, they may not be satisfied with the quality of drugs they are getting, but they don't have any trouble finding it.

Actually, I have very little to add to what Sam and Kevin have already said. The only point I might dispute with Sam just a little bit is that OD's would in any way deter someone from copping from that particular dealer. It has been my experience if word gets around that someone has OD'd off a particular dealer's wares, everyone goes out for that dealer. Addicts are looking for a good high. If this dealer gets known as having potent stuff, even if people have died from it, other users will seek out that dealer and try to get the drugs from him.

SAM. All I said is OD deaths means a loss of a customer. He is right about the people would seek him out for quality.

KEVIN. Personally, I have seen people bring a guy out of an OD just to find out where he copped.

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato?

TYPES OF DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE

Senator D'AMATO. I am wondering, in the area of violence, you all have testified that there is tremendous correlation between drugs and violence. I am wondering if you might describe the kinds of violence that you have seen. I am not asking whether you participated, but that violence which you yourself have seen, or know about in terms of drug trafficking.

KEVIN. Ripoffs I guess would be the most violent. Also understand, if I have a business, I don't want any violence around because it brings heat. The bottom line is they are trying to make money. You don't need the heat. You don't want the violence. You try to put a stop to it. Most of the people I know try to put a stop to it as much as possible.

SAM. I would agree that the most common violence is ripoffs. When neighborhood people in the Lower East Side see a lone white person, and the Bronx up until recently was no place a white person would be for the most part, although there are some local persons who were white, they are a target if they are alone.

There are ripoffs of people, you know, uninvolved in the drug trade for people to get money in order to purchase drugs, although I have witnessed very little of that. I have seen the consequences when I was working in the criminal defense area.

I saw one time when at a shooting gallery when somebody OD'd and they couldn't bring him out of it easily. They didn't want the heat of the dead body in the shooting gallery, so they threw this presumably dead body—it might not have been dead yet—out of the third floor window into the back yard of a building.

There are all kinds of random violence, arguments among street people, chronically short of everything, and when one has anything, others will try and take it from them.

ADDICTS' FEAR OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Senator D'AMATO. Let me ask you one other question. Is there any real fear of the criminal justice system when dealing in drugs? Does that deter drug addicts, dealers? You have come through the system—at least Kevin has. Is there a feeling they can beat the system?

We had a hearing here 2 weeks ago on this issue. One person who has been dealing, selling, must have copped out 20-some-odd times, I believe he served a total of 14 days over a period of several years. He got the system down to where he is in, out, and then released for time served. They keep him in a lockup 2 or 3 days and then he comes before the judge.

As I have begun to put more and more time into this area, it seems to me that this is more the rule. The general rule is those who are arrested for selling or for possession, are right back out on the street, and the justice system is a shambles. Does it deter anybody?

SAM. If you are talking about low-level possession arrests or even low level sales arrests, I mean it would deter me personally from some things, but a lot of neighborhood people who see this as their only way to economic gain, it is part of the business to them, getting busted. The sentences generally on low-level possession sales are not deterrents.

But to the ones who get into any significant amounts, one or two steps above the street dealer, it is definitely a deterrent to a lot of activity on their part.

Senator D'AMATO. Kevin, do you have any thoughts on that?

KEVIN. I don't know about dealers and stuff like that. But on the part of copping, I don't even think I think about it. You know, you are worried. I think a lot of guys fear more losing the drugs than taking the bust.

Senator D'AMATO. Doctor, do you have anything to add?

ORGANIZED DRUG DEALING OPERATIONS

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. The original question that was raised about some instances of violence, I was doing interviews for a lot of years. I have interviewed people who have been bandaged, had broken arms, broken legs. One story I could relay is a subject I interviewed up in East Harlem. He was called up there a lieutenant. Different neighborhoods have different words. Within this particular drug dealing operation, he was a lieutenant, which meant that he ran about five or six street dealers for three men who were putting up the money to back this operation and making the major profits.

A common reason for violence in the drug trade is it is called messing up the money: when individual street dealers are not returning to their superiors with the amount of money that they are supposed to return with.

The responsibility in this operation for those five or six street dealers was the lieutenant. He had been very lax in fulfilling that responsibility. So one day one of the money men sent two soldiers who were on the payroll. They picked up the lieutenant. The lieutenant was very worried at that point. He said he thought they were going to take him out and kill him.

They took him out and found one of the street dealers guilty of messing up money. The two soldiers jumped out of the car, beat him over the head with pipes, knocked him out, and they then positioned the body so the torso was on the sidewalk and the legs in the street and they ran the car over his legs a few times. This was a warning to the lieutenant that you had better supervise this operation a little bit more rigorously or this may happen to you.

He did supervise the operation a little bit more rigorously at that point for a few months. One day he was high, sitting on a stoop in East Harlem, and a young boy walked by with a radio, and from the other witnesses who were there at time, some of his friends, they said just as a spoof, he went and confronted this young boy and said give me the radio, and the young boy pulled out a knife and stabbed him to death.

This is the sort of daily activity that goes on in these neighborhoods. In the first case we had an example of what I would call systemic violence and the latter part is probably what I would call psychopharmacological violence. In this case, the lieutenant was just messed up a little from being high and did some something that was inappropriate and paid the ultimate penalty for it.

I can also say some of the activities that both of these gentlemen engage in, copping drugs for others, is fraught with risk. There are ripoff people waiting for them. Sometimes you have to beat off a ripoff artist to protect your customer.

In the Lower East Side and East Harlem, dealers will frequently police their blocks, keep their blocks safe for their customers to come in and out. Because if the blocks are too hazardous, the customers won't come in, and they lose business.

Senator KASTEN. Congressman Rangel.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me thank both of you for having the courage and taking the time to come here when you don't benefit from it, but it does help us.

I think both of you in your testimony have made it abundantly clear that fear of arrest is not a deterrent for doing what you do. Certainly the greatest fear is among those involved in the illegal trafficking.

TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION FOR DRUG USERS

Let me ask, for those of you who have had enough of it and want to get out of the system, what do you believe is available to you in terms of treatment and rehabilitation and job training?

KEVIN. In rehabilitation? I see here all they really want to do is stick you on a methadone program, load you up on a legal drug, and then they forget about you or they keep you loaded up on methadone and they have control over you. Then you have to show up every day to get your medicine.

COUNSELING PROGRAMS

I don't really think that is a good system, a maintenance program. I believe methadone has its use, maybe for detox, but you are going to have to do a lot more than that. I think counseling is real important. And the way the money is being cut back on such programs, I don't understand how our Government says they want to stop drug abuse but they keep cutting the money for treatment. I think counseling is a real big thing. I think that is the way we should go. You have to make a person want to stop. Until you do that nothing is going to work, in my opinion.

Mr. RANGEL. Sam?

SAM. Along that same theme, I remember there was a Dr. Doyle and a Dr. Neiswinder who were the originators of methadone for treatment of heroin addiction in this country. Both of them forced the New York City Methadone Society to remove their names from the list of advisors to the program because their original concept was 6 months on methadone maximum, but maybe in extreme cases a year, and intensive counseling of various kinds, and they feel that the methadone program in New York City has been a warehousing program to keep addicts so they don't need daily money to get drugs. They get their methadone. But very little else is done.

These are an M.D. and Ph.D. whose papers brought about methadone treatment in this country. Other than that, as Kevin said, no treatment program is going to work at all until the person wants to stop. Methadone is a method of not stopping and becoming functional in a normal society. But many people get on methadone to become functional, and, for whatever reasons, go back to using drugs when they no longer care to report to a program anywhere from two to six times a week.

EFFECT OF METHADONE PROGRAMS

Mr. RANGEL. Do a lot of people go on methadone programs to reduce their habits rather than to get off of drugs completely?

SAM. Some do. Generally if you are on anywhere from a moderate to a large dose of methadone, it takes so much of the inferior street heroin to feel anything, it is economically not feasible to do it.

AVAILABILITY OF DRUG-FREE TREATMENT CENTERS

Mr. RANGEL. How about the availability of drug-free treatment centers?

SAM. They are available, but my personal opinion of them is they brainwash people into feeling a certain way about drugs in a very restricted environment, and when they go back to the neighborhoods that a large majority of drug users come from, which are the Lower East Side and parts of Harlem and various other places, a large majority then will revert because they are no longer in that structured environment where the brainwashing took place. Much the same as prisoners coming out of jail go back to their old neighborhood, old friends, old methods of surviving, and "recidify" as a result.

Mr. RANGEL. Do you see much methadone on the street?

SAM. Yes; but I find that just as many times when somebody is not into committing crimes and can't get the money together to cop drugs, they can get enough money together to cop methadone. It might not be medically too sound, but practically it avoids a lot of crime.

SUCCESS OF METHADONE PROGRAM

Mr. RANGEL. Do you know of many cases where heroin addicts have gone into treatment, received methadone, been rehabilitated, and then gone on to get a good job?

SAM. I know of cases where they have been on a methadone program for a long number of years, and they will still be on methadone and go out to work. I know a few who have been on methadone and stopped drugs altogether.

Mr. RANGEL. What do you think the average is?

SAM. The average is, I think, people get on methadone, get off, work for awhile, go back to drug use for awhile, then they get either physically or economically strung out. They might go back to methadone for awhile.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of you.

COUNSELING ISSUE ON METHADONE PROGRAM

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. If I could add one thing about the counseling issue on the methadone programs that was brought up, we currently in New York have counselor-patient caseload ratios of 60 to 1. That is a function of inadequate budgets for this program. We have an inadequate presence of physicians in the programs, given the range of health problems experienced by intravenous users. These programs are desperately needed to reduce counselor-client ratios to where the coun-

selors can really counsel. At 60 to 1, they cannot really counsel. We need more physicians and more medical treatment in those programs.

SUCCESS RATE OF DRUG-FREE PROGRAMS

Senator D'AMATO. If I might just ask one quick question. This Wednesday I am going to Dayton to visit with Monsignor Bryant. What is the effect on someone who goes through that program? Dayton is credited as being one of the better rehabilitation programs. Congressman Rangel touched upon the problem of recidivism. What is the rate of success in a statewide treatment program of that nature? Are there better results with certain programs than with others?

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. I personally have not studied drug-free programs. Doug Lipton will be testifying later today and would be better equipped to give you those figures.

I can say from the people I have spoken with on the streets, many of them have had very brief experiences in therapeutic communities. One of the essences of the drug-using lifestyle is a desire for freedom, sort of a lack of structure in life. A lot of people find it really hard to do a 9 to 5 regular job, you know that sort of structure, and the TC's tend to be very highly structured and very authoritarian. Most of the people I have spoken to on the streets are out of there pretty quickly. I have heard, but I am certainly no expert, that many would have had success with the TC's if they could have stayed within that TC, that it may be successful while you are there, but it is difficult to get back out and start living a normal life.

SAM. When I worked in the criminal defense area, if I remember correctly, we got some statistics. These programs publish that they have success rates of 90 percent, but that is for people who complete what they call their 5-year program, which means like anywhere from 1 year to 2 years living totally within the confines of a house or possibly slightly outside work, and then they are considered like junior counselors at some point, senior counselors afterward. They might succeed, but it is 90 percent of the people who complete the 5 years. If you take everybody who enters these programs, the success rate is somewhere like 8 to 5 percent; somewhere in that range.

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you.

REMARKS OF APPRECIATION TO WITNESSES

Senator KASTEN. I would like to, on behalf of the committee, thank the three of you for your testimony here this morning. All of us understand that this isn't the easiest job for you or for any of us. We greatly appreciate it.

I am hopeful because of the work that Senator D'Amato, Congressman Rangel, and others of us are doing, that you are doing, and you are helping today, that we will be able to make a small contribution. We thank you for your testimony here today.

It is my understanding that you will be exiting from a side door. I would simply like to remind the people with cameras in the room to

continue to abide with the guidelines and rules we have established here. This is unusual that we have been able to have this kind of an open dialog. I hope all of you will respect the difficulty under which these gentlemen find themselves.

We thank you for your testimony, and we greatly appreciate you being here today.

Departmental Panel

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

STATEMENT OF JON R. THOMAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

INTRODUCTION OF PANEL WITNESSES

Senator KASTEN. Our next panel will consist of Mr. Buffum, Mr. Thomas, Adm. Yost, Mr. Monastero, and Mr. Sheer. If all of you gentlemen would come forward and take your places at the witness table.

We will take a brief break as we arrange the witnesses.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator KASTEN. The committee will come to order.

As I said in my opening statement, we have already received copies of your written statements, and we would ask that each of you briefly summarize your written statements. You are going to have to move the microphones back and forth a little bit in order to help us and also to help the media. The large microphone to your right, Mr. Thomas, is the one that you have to get close to in order for all of us to hear you.

We will begin the testimony with Jon Thomas, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters at the Department of State.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin my testimony on a personal note. I think it is fitting that my first congressional testimony as Assistant Secretary of State should be made in the Court of International Trade whose new Justice, Dominic DiCarlo, a good friend of many people represented in this room, as my predecessor in the arena of international narcotics matters, provided dedicated leadership which has led to the progress we have achieved in the past 4 years. I know that serving on this court he will continue his dedication to public service in this new career.

I started my new position on October 10, 1984, having no doubt about the concerns of Congress and your expectations for our success. I know that President Reagan's steadfast efforts against drugs will be as strong or stronger this second term. I can also assure you that the Secretary of State will keep this issue as one of his high priority foreign policy agenda items.

In my testimony, I have shared with you my appraisal of the prospects for improved international narcotics control. I have addressed our continuing and in some cases worsening problem, and I have identified new and encouraging opportunities I see for more effective action.

WORLDWIDE DECLARATION FOR ACTION ON ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFICKING

I believe there is currently a more intensive worldwide declaration for action being expressed at this time by more nations with a greater sense of urgency than during any previous period. Drug abuse is rampant throughout the community of nations. Security concerns among producer and trafficking nations, increasing violence, corruption, and corrosion of democratic institutions have spurred many nations to seek new initiatives. The greatest force we can harness to combat international narcotics trafficking is this collective desire to rescue our societies, our institutions, and especially our children from this dread phenomenon.

But no nation can cope with the drug abuse problem by relying only on its own treatment, prevention, and domestic enforcement programs.

The demand for drugs is so widespread and the supply of illicit drugs so great, that only a comprehensive, rigorously pursued international strategy and alliance will suffice.

Because of the severity and complexity of the narcotics problems, some people say that the situation is hopeless. In my opinion, nothing could be further from the truth. As I told the National Federation of Parents when I took office, in a speech I gave to their national convention, recent events give reason to be optimistic that the current approaches of the international community are making significant progress. We do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that we will gain control.

NEW INTERNATIONAL GOALS

Let me sum up what more needs to be done as we start this new administration, and I start my term as Assistant Secretary.

BOLIVIA

Bolivia must bring a substantial portion of its illicit coca acreage under control, enforced by eradication where necessary, enhanced by alternative development opportunities where feasible. That process begins with an appropriate, firm commitment of necessary troops and police to the Chapare and restoration of law and order in that region.

PERU

We are encouraged by signs that the Government of Peru will imminently resume full control activity in the Upper Huallaga Valley, after an unfortunate pause. The killings in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the lawlessness which permeates Tingo Maria are proof that narcotics control and terrorism must both share a high priority with the Government of Peru.

CARIBBEAN

Every consideration, including its economic and civil health, as well as its need to curb an escalating domestic drug abuse program, argues that Jamaica must soon undertake a more vigorous campaign to eradicate narcotics crops and curb imports of cocaine. Likewise, Belize should reinstitute the highly effective aerial eradication of marijuana it employed in 1983.

BURMA-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

Burma must find more effective ways of curbing the world's largest production of illicit opium. The prospect of government eradication must become a certainty if opium control is ever to succeed in Thailand. While Pakistan continues its laudable suppression of opium cultivation, Pakistan and neighboring nations curbing the flow of opium products out of Afghanistan and suppressing the numerous heroin labs which operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border. We have firm programs or offers to assist similar action agendas by every major source nation supplying our illicit drug market to participate in multilateral programs to help these and still other countries achieve control.

CROP CONTROL

We must apply pressure at all points in the grower-to-user narcotics chain—through crop control, through increased seizures of both drug products and financial assets, through intensified investigation and prosecution of traffickers, and through effective treatment and prevention of drug abuse.

International strategies must give top priority to crop control, which are bans on cultivation and production, enforced when necessary by eradication, and by enforcement programs operating as close to the source as possible.

There is a need for other governments to raise the foreign policy priorities assigned to narcotics control. Assistance should be sought by drug producing nations and provided by donor countries with clearly defined crop control objectives.

Governments of producing nations must demonstrate the political will to undertake effective crop control and interdiction program. That demonstration must include the commitment of social and political as well as material resources and adoption of laws which facilitate control objectives.

CORRUPTION IN DRUG PRODUCING NATIONS

The corruption that has plagued control efforts in most source countries must be stamped out. There is unquestionably great need for those programs which we think are best pursued internally, that seek to reduce demand for drugs through treatment and prevention. But above all, we must make common cause in a more vigorous, more widespread, and more united alliance to control international narcotics production and trafficking.

Thank you very much.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Thomas, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Jon Thomas follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JON R. THOMAS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

MR. CHAIRMAN:

Although I have testified on this matter before Congress on various occasions in my previous position as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, this will be my first official testimony as Assistant Secretary since being sworn in on October 10, 1984. I have started my new position knowing, from numerous consultations on both sides of the aisle, Senate and House, that there can be no doubt of the seriousness and concern Congress attaches to this issue and the expectations you have for our success. In addition, I know that President Reagan's steadfast efforts against drugs will be as strong, or stronger, this second term. You pointed out in your letter of invitation how pleased you are with the solid commitment Secretary Shultz made to narcotics control in his well received speech in Miami last September 14. I can assure you the Secretary will keep this issue as one of his high priority foreign policy agenda items. Thus, I am secure in the knowledge that I have begun my new responsibilities with the full range of support that I need.

In my testimony today, I will share with you my appraisal of the prospects for improved international narcotics control, address our continuing and in some cases worsening problems, and identify new and encouraging opportunities I see for more effective action.

As we begin this new Administration, as well as the 99th Congress, it is appropriate for me to attempt to lay out a realistic picture of our opportunities and challenges. While I

do not want to underestimate the difficulties ahead, I do want to comment on what we see as a new spirit of improved bilateral and multilateral cooperation that increasingly justifies an optimistic appraisal of our long-term prospects.

I believe there is currently a more intensive worldwide declaration for action being expressed at this time by more nations, with a greater sense of urgency, than during any previous period. Today, drug abuse is rampant throughout the community of nations. Security concerns among producer and trafficking nations, increasing violence, corruption, and corrosion of democratic institutions, have spurred many nations to seek new initiatives. I believe that the greatest force we can harness to combat international narcotics trafficking is this collective desire to rescue our societies, our institutions, and especially our children from this dread phenomenon. Joint actions, especially increased multilateral actions, can enhance and make more effective our national and bilateral efforts.

Granted, there will continue to be an expanding need for our narcotics control programs and bilateral assistance projects. But, no nation can cope with drug abuse by relying only on its own treatment, prevention and domestic enforcement. No single nation can resolve the international production or trafficking problems.

The demand for drugs is so widespread, and the supply of illicit drugs so great, that only a comprehensive, rigorously pursued international strategy and alliance will suffice.

Because of the severity and complexity of the narcotics problems, some people say that the situation is hopeless. Nothing could be further from the truth. Recent events give reason to be optimistic that the current approaches of the

international community are making significant progress in establishing the base for potential control of production and distribution of major illicit substances. I choose these words carefully; we do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that we will gain control.

We have been encouraged in recent years with many signs of progress in Latin America, Southwest and Southeast Asia.

It would be appropriate to begin with Turkey, where a crop control program enforced by a strong government, with support from the international community, led to a complete suppression of illicit cultivation. That ban continues to be effective today because of that same strong dedication. And, when the production of opium spread to Mexico, there was an equally strong response. However, as impressive as these efforts have been, there are strong indications that the Mexican program has been less effective over the past two years and that corruption is playing a major role in this decline. We are pleased that President de la Madrid has stated clearly his intention to strengthen the eradication campaign against both opium and marijuana. The Mexicans call their efforts the "permanent campaign", recognizing that fighting narcotics requires a constant readiness and a long-term sustained effort. This is true now and will continue to be true in all nations where drug production and trafficking are problems.

The Mexican Government has also supported inter-regional activities, providing helicopters and crews to assist the Government of Belize with the herbicidal eradication of marijuana, and recently providing the Colombian Government with technical assistance on aerial marijuana eradication.

The very impressive Colombian campaign against narcotics, which has been increasingly effective over the past three

years, moved into a decisive new phase on July 5 when the National Police of that country began to test the aerial eradication of marijuana with the herbicide glyphosate. More than 5,000 acres have been sprayed, and the Colombians, who anticipate an even more comprehensive program in 1985, are well on their way toward achieving control of cannabis production. They are continuing their strong effort to control cocaine production as well, and have recently begun the testing of several herbicides in search of a more comprehensive method of eradicating the coca bush. The Colombians have made a strong effort to suppress cocaine refining, including the major raid at Caqueta last March which resulted in the seizure of 10 metric tons of cocaine and the destruction of 14 laboratories. Since the assassination of Justice Minister Lara last April, Colombian police have staged more than 1,500 raids resulting in 1,425 arrests, and the destruction of about 50 cocaine laboratories. And, President Betancur, has begun implementing his pledge, taken at considerable political and personal risk, to extradite traffickers to the United States for trial. Last Saturday, four of these traffickers were flown to Homestead Air Force Base and have now been arraigned for trial in Florida and in Washington, D.C.

In August President Siles of Bolivia ordered Bolivian military as well as police units into the Chapare region, where coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking have expanded dramatically in recent years. These security measures are the prerequisite for future coca control and eradication efforts in that area. The Bolivian Government has also mounted raids against traffickers in the Beni, another important narcotics trafficking center. But, the drive has bogged down, and our efforts to reinvigorate this enforcement program have been

strongly affected by the weakness of the Bolivian government, which is concentrating on a so-far losing effort to rescue a deteriorating economy. We are disappointed by Bolivia's faltering efforts and commitment to narcotics control, and we see this as one of our major problems to confront.

By mid-year, Peru had increased its eradication of coca bushes in the Upper Huallaga Valley to nearly 4,900 acres, compared to 1,700 acres eradicated in all of 1983. This program is continuing despite increased violence in the Valley by narcotic traffickers as well as by terrorists. However, we are looking to the Peruvian government for a renewed commitment to crop control and to the protection of workers in the eradication program whose lives have been threatened, which is essential for the program to succeed. The brutal killing of 19 workers in the eradication program in November is evidence of how serious a threat the traffickers see the program to be.

A great deal more needs to be done in Bolivia and in Peru to begin to deal adequately with the many narcotics related problems. We and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control have responded to requests to assist projects to extend both coca control programs and rural development assistance to the other major growing areas of Peru and Bolivia.

While events in Colombia have given rise to hopes that major progress is being made against narcotics trafficking in Latin America, they have also generated well-founded concerns that drug traffickers will seek new bases in other countries.

Panamanian Defense Forces this past May discovered and destroyed a large cocaine complex which had been constructed by Colombians traffickers in Darien province, and also destroyed some large plantings of coca in that area which is adjacent to the Colombian border. Panamanian authorities intercepted large

quantities of ether used to refine cocaine, which was bound for that laboratory complex as well as laboratories in Colombia.

Brazilian National Police have had to step up their activities in the Amazonas region, where traffickers are encouraging tribal groups to expand their traditional plantings of coca, and are establishing cocaine laboratories. Similarly, Argentina has been obliged to devote increasing resources to deal with the rising number of cocaine laboratories which have been established within its borders during the past two years.

Venezuela has adopted stronger anti-narcotics laws and the government has increased its cooperation with the Colombian National Police on narcotics trafficking and related problems in their common border region. This government has recognized the narcotics problem and stands ready to confront it.

A variety of programs have been launched in the Caribbean and Central America, including efforts to improve radar surveillance and interdiction capabilities in the Bahamas and to improve on interdiction in Jamaica.

As enforcement activities have improved in certain Latin American countries, we have seen a shifting in the smuggling routes and tactics of narcotics trafficking organizations. A similar pattern of shifting sources has been seen in Southwest Asia, where the substantial reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan are being unfortunately overshadowed by uncontrolled production in Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, narcotics production has dropped dramatically from 800 metric tons in 1979 to an estimated 45 tons in 1983. Narcotics control programs are operating in the Malakand, Gadoon-Amazai and Buner areas with assistance from the United States and the United Nations, and the Government has embarked on a Special Development and Enforcement Plan, under the

auspices of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to extend its ban on opium cultivation into the remaining major opium growing areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. We were especially encouraged by the response of international donors to this program.

The Thai Government increased its commitment in 1984 to controlling opium cultivation in civilian-police-military command villages in return for development assistance, and eradicated 800 acres in what we hope was a demonstration of future Thai intentions. The Army has disrupted trafficking and refining activities along the border with Burma, through military operations against trafficking groups.

In 1984, the Government of Burma conducted effective military operations against narcotics traffickers in the Shan and Kachin States which resulted in the seizure of quantities of narcotics, chemicals, refining equipment and weapons. The Burmese also eradicated more than 10,000 acres of opium poppy cultivation this past season.

A key element in worldwide advances in narcotics control has been the expanding role of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control under the effective leadership of Dr. Giuseppe DiGennaro. The Fund is now developing projects in support of coca control in South America, marking a long-needed involvement by the United Nations and indirectly by European donors in a problem which affects Europe as well as the United States. This United Nations activity was largely made possible by a pledge of $40 million over five years by the Government of Italy. The Fund has also received pledges of more than $11 million from Italy, the United States, and United Kingdom, with other pledges in the offing, for the Special Development and Enforcement Program in Pakistan. Other key donors to source

country programs include the Federal Republic of Germany, Saudia Arabia, Sweden and Norway and others. The major donors support the Fund's leadership in the policy that all United Nations drug development projects will contain drug enforcement provisions, and agree that economic assistance should be linked and must be linked to commitments by recipient governments to eliminate illicit narcotic crops by specified dates.

However, while progress is being made, we are faced with numerous challenges.

Worldwide production of illicit opium, coca leaf and cannabis is many times the amount currently consumed by drug abusers. Some governments do not have control of the narcotics growing regions, and prospects in several countries are dampened by corruption, even government involvement in the narcotics trade. Markets, refining areas and trafficking routes shift, and new production sources emerge even as we achieve success in eradicating current crops, most prominently evidenced by the transitions from country to country of the centers of heroin and cocaine production.

As I said in my remarks here in New York November 15 to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, we need to forge a true international alliance of concerned nations to meet these challenges and others. The world requires narcotics control programs in all the significant producer countries, supported by increased assistance from the international community. But, we also need for more nations to apply their political resources to this problem. We must capitalize on today's opportunities to expand and improve narcotics control.

There are greater incentives on the part of drug exporting countries to act, and to move swiftly. Virtually every source and many transit countries have suffered the problems of

economic dislocations, institutional instability and crime related to narcotics trafficking. Several have also been besieged by political problems, including armed insurgencies supported by profits from the drug trade. These countries increasingly understand that they are the first beneficiaries of successful narcotics control programs.

In a major address on narcotics on September 14 of this year, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that the growing narcotics network was part of a trend toward international lawlessness that has been increasing ominously over the past two decades. He called narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and similar kinds of outlaw behavior "the modern versions of piracy." The Secretary noted there is ample evidence showing that these different types of lawlessness are linked, adding that the world has good reason to suspect that narcotics smugglers are being aided by certain governments, that they are getting protection and are being provided with safe havens and support in shipping drugs to the United States and other countries. Clearly the complicity of these governments in the drug trade, and government complicity in terrorist acts, are matters of grave concern, and I believe the increasing awareness of these adverse and other effects are improving the prospects for narcotics control.

One of the more encouraging signs in the battle against narcotics is the increased attention governments are placing on the need for bilateral and regional cooperation in anti-narcotics activities.

In August of last year, several leaders from Latin America traveled to Quito for the inauguration of President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador. It is very noteworthy that, in meetings among themselves, and with Vice President Bush the first topic was not the issue of financial debt, nor regional

military security, but narcotics control. What emerged from these meetings is what we might refer to as the "Spirit of Quito" -- that is, the recognition among many Latin American nations that they must now stand together and work together to wipe out this scourge which threatens their societies.

The United States believes that strong regional cooperative efforts are the key to lasting progress against narcotics abuse and trafficking in Latin America, throughout our hemisphere, and in the world at large. Thus, we strongly support the spirit coming from the meetings at Quito and Mar del Plata which called attention to the need for increased international action to deal with the multiple political, economic, and social problems caused by narcotics trafficking.

Leaders of Latin American governments have recognized that drugs constitute a threat not only to the health of their citizens but also to their societies and democratic systems. Now, they say, "We have had enough."

We welcome the personal leadership taken by many Latin American leaders, and we support their strengthened commitment against narcotics trafficking and production and the very welcome address on narcotics control by the Secretary General in November, the first speech of its kind.

Similarly, this emerging spirit is reflected in the suggestions of our colleagues from South America to strengthen existing international institutions and encourage governments to improve national legal and social frameworks to deal more effectively with drug trafficking. We look to existing institutions, like the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to achieve an immediate impact in meeting the narcotics challenge.

The United States stands ready to help the governments and

peoples of Latin America, Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia to work together for the common good. We believe that national and bilateral efforts must be complemented by strengthened regional cooperation in all global sectors. Recently, we have offered to provide appropriate financial and technical support to improve regional narcotics enforcement information exchanges in Latin America as well as development of regional programs to create heightened public awareness of the personal dangers of drug consumption and the social and economic costs of the illicit drug trade. For several years now, we have supported the special drug abuse initiatives of the Colombo Plan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, and encourage the work of the Council of Europe's drug abuse and trafficking organization, the Pompidou Group and others who approach this problem on a multinational basis. We are also proud of our efforts these past four years to reduce drug demand here in the United States, where a very effective national awareness program led by Mrs. Reagan has dramatically heightened community responsiveness. We are encouraged by the spread of the parents movement, so vital in our country, to other societies. In all of these endeavors, we enjoy a spirit of cooperation with our Congress, which has been most unequivocal in seeking a linkage between narcotics control and development assistance.

In concluding, let me sum up what more needs to be done, on a country-specific basis, and in terms of the broader diplomatic initiative that supports our supply control effort.

Bolivia must bring a substantial portion of its illicit coca acreage under control, enforced by eradication where necessary, enhanced by alternative development opportunities where feasible. That process begins with an appropriate, firm

commitment of necessary troops and police to the Chapare and restoration of law and order.

We are encouraged by signs that the GOP will imminently resume full control activity in the Upper Huallaga Valley, after an unfortunate pause. The killings in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the lawlessness which permeates Tingo Maria are proof that narcotics control and terrorism must both share a high priority with the Government of Peru; indeed, the narcotics traffickers have adopted the ways of the terrorists.

Every consideration, including its economic and civil health as well as its need to curb an escalating domestic drug abuse problem, argues that Jamaica must soon undertake a more vigorous campaign to eradicate narcotics crops and curb imports of cocaine. Likewise, Belize should reinstitute the highly effective aerial eradication of marijuana it employed in 1983.

Burma must find more effective ways of curbing the world's largest production of illicit opium. The prospect of government eradication must become a certainty if opium control is to ever succeed in Thailand. While Pakistan continues its laudable suppression of opium cultivation, Pakistan and neighboring nations must find ways of curbing the flow of opium products out of Afghanistan and suppressing the numerous heroin labs which operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border. We have firm programs or offers to assist similar action agendas by every source nation.

On a broader scale, the grower-to-user narcotics chain which stretches across five continents must be broken through a comprehensive program of international control. We must apply pressure at all points in the chain -- through crop control; through increased seizures of both drug products and financial

assets; through intensified investigation and prosecution of traffickers; and through effective treatment and prevention of drug abuse.

International strategies must give top priority to crop control -- bans on cultivation and production, enforced when necessary by eradication, and by enforcement programs operating as close to the source as possible.

An effective international strategy should offer financial and technical assistance for effective narcotic control projects. We must improve our knowledge of all aspects of the problem and exchange information to improve coordination of policy and effort. The people and governments of illicit drug producing countries must become more aware of the problems they export to other countries -- and the domestic problems they are creating within their own societies.

There is a need for other governments to raise the foreign policy priority assigned to narcotics control, to integrate narcotics into their bilateral relations, and to upgrade the level at which narcotics matters are considered in foreign ministries around the world.

Assistance should be sought by drug producing nations and provided by donor countries with clearly defined crop control objectives if we are to achieve success. We should recognize the need to link this assistance with crop control agreements.

Governments of producing nations must have and demonstrate the political will to undertake effective crop control and interdiction programs. Part of that demonstration of will must be the commitment of social and political as well as material resources, and promulgation and adoption of laws which facilitate control objectives.

The corruption that has recently undermined control

efforts in Mexico, and plagued control efforts in most source countries, must be stamped out by strong and determined governments.

And we need a higher level of awareness throughout the international community. We need to communicate through the world press the kind of intensive efforts that are being made. That awareness is increasing and it shows in many programs, including not just improved interdiction and eradication but in the decisions of governments to consult with their people on solutions.

There is unquestionably that great need for those programs, which we think are best pursued internally, that seek to reduce demand for drugs through treatment and prevention. My testimony for obvious reasons stresses supply reduction through international controls. Be assured that our program is one part of a complete strategy for addressing the drug problem, a strategy that gives high prominence and priority to our nationwide efforts to reduce demand.

Above all, we must work together, in our alliance at the national, regional and international levels, through bilateral and multilateral programs. We must make common cause in a more vigorous, more widespread, and more united effort to control international narcotics production and trafficking.

UNITED NATIONS

POLITICAL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BUFFUM, UNITED NATIONS UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS

DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Senator KASTEN. Let me remind you to summarize your statements. We have before us your written testimony. We will go through the entire panel. Then the subcommittee will address questions to the entire panel.

Our next spokesman on this panel is Ambassador William Buffum, United Nations Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs. Ambassador Buffum.

U.N. SYSTEM EFFORTS ON DRUG CONTROL

Ambassador BUFFUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I first of all express my deep pleasure at the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and congratulate you, sir, and your colleagues, and in fact the U.S. Government, on the strenuous efforts it is making to deal with the surge in drug abuse and trafficking.

May I say at the outset that it is completely consonant with the drug control strategy which has been adopted by the U.N. General Assembly for a 5-year period beginning in 1981. I would say further that without this kind of activity, success in implementing that strategy would be completely impossible.

RESTRICTED ACTIVITIES OF UNITED NATIONS

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, from your service at the United Nations, the United Nations is not an international government; it is an international organization of 157 sovereign member states. It is an institution that really can do only what its members are prepared to have it do and support in its efforts to accomplish these objectives, which are identical with your own.

My written statement is already provided. It is a rather comprehensive overview of the different types of activities in which the U.N. system is engaged. So responding to your request, I might make just a few very general remarks at the outset.

U.N.-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL LAW

I would say that, first of all, perhaps one of our major contributions toward limiting drug traffic is the establishment of international law which provides a common framework in which governments can cooperate and deal with this abuse. There are numerous conventions, of which I am sure the subcommittee is aware. Indeed, at the last General Assembly, the Commission on Narcotics and Drugs, meeting in Vienna next month, is being asked to review the terms of those conventions as a matter of top priority and to examine whether new elements should be introduced into the international legal system which would facilitate the work of law enforcement officers; for example, as the forfeiture of profits from drug trafficking.

U.N. ASSISTANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

We also assist, though I would concede in a rather modest way, in law enforcement efforts. As you are well aware, the United Nations has no independent law enforcement competence of its own. Such efforts would intrude very, very deeply on national sovereignty, and governments have thus far never been willing to concede that type of authority to international organizations.

However, having said that, I might just recap very briefly a few of the things we do try to accomplish in a facilitative way. We sponsor regional meetings regularly of law enforcement officers. So far these have been concentrated largely in the Middle East and the Far East areas. As a result of the initiatives in the General Assembly last fall, we look forward to convening a major international conference in 1986 of the heads of law enforcement agencies of all countries.

FUNDING FOR DRUG CONTROL

We also provide, mostly from the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, specific technical assistance to countries who need outside help. In terms of the total program in which the United States is involved, I think the combined effort in this field runs to something like $100 million a year. Our efforts are admittedly modest.

U.N. DRUG BUDGET

The average budget of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control for the first 12 years of its existence was only $6 million. Last year that increased by 50 percent to $9 million. This year we anticipate devoting something like $18 million to increased cooperation in this field, of which most will go to technical assistance to governments for such items as providing patrol boats to the Government of Burma, vehicles and communications equipment to Pakistan and Egypt and elsewhere.

I could run down these items in detail, but I think the committee's time would preclude that.

U.N. DRUG CONTROL DIVISIONS

The scope of the operations is so great that in the few minutes which I presume you wish to devote to oral presentations I cannot do justice to them. However, I wish to call your attention in the written statement to the number of efforts made not only by our three main elements dealing with this subject—the Division of Narcotics Control, Commission on Narcotics and Drugs, and International Staff of the Narcotics Control Board—but to our efforts in eliciting all the major U.N. specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, to devote more of their resources to drug control programs.

COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

To accomplish this it is going to be essential that the main member states of those autonomous organizations should also let it be known in their parliamentary bodies that the attachment of a higher degree of priority to drug-related programs is something which the members would like to see. This is something, if I may say very directly, that would assist us in U.N. headquarters in New York in providing for a more effective systemwide approach to the problem.

NEW VIEW OF DRUG PROBLEM BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Finally, not to monopolize the time of the other panelists, I would just like to confirm the impressions which Assistant Secretary Thomas has already given you about the change in the international atmosphere in dealing with drug-related problems in the international community as a whole.

I believe, quite frankly, that the 39th session of the General Assembly this past fall has marked a watershed in the approach of the U.N. system to dealing with these problems. We saw before the General Assembly in plenary a parade of leaders, particularly from Latin America, who indicated, and this is a new phenomenon, that the problems related to drugs have become a top priority concern of these countries. They confirmed this attitude both in private and in public. We are very encouraged that this particular group of nations from Latin America took major initiatives in the relevant committee of the United Nations in promoting a renewed and a more vigorous commitment to getting the international system more heavily involved, more effectively involved, and cooperating in this.

As the written testimony will show, this involves a number of components which the subcommittee may wish to review at its leisure.

I find personally, Mr. Chairman, having been involved in this only very, very recently, that we have a new momentum in this field which is going to permit the U.N. system to play a more extensive and more effective role in seeking to cope with what has become one of the great tragedies, one of the great social tragedies, of modern times.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Ambassador Buffum, we thank you. I would like to say that we ought to be a bit more encouraged by your statement.

[The prepared statement of William Buffum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. BUFFUM
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS
UNITED NATIONS

Senator Kasten,
Members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee,

1. At the outset I wish to thank you for the kind invitation to appear before this Committee and provide its members with information on the efforts of the United Nations concerning the growing illicit drug trade.

2. Before discussing the details of our various programs, I must emphasize the framework in which our efforts take place. The United Nations is an international organization of sovereign Member States. It has no independent sovereignty of its own and can do as much or as little as its Member States wish it to do.

3. Having said that, I believe it is fair to say that through the increasing willingness of Member States to work through the UN in this arena, and through the efforts of a dedicated international staff we are making increased progress in a common effort to deal with the scourge of illegal drug trafficking and use.

4. The current views of the United Nations on the subject were most recently articulated by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on 28 November 1984 when he addressed the competent United Nations Committee of the UN General Assembly.

5. The Secretary-General asked to speak to the Committee to congratulate the members on the particular accomplishments made in the field of narcotics control at the present session which included: a Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse, provision for an International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs, and recommendations for a Draft Convention Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities (for texts of the resolutions concerned, see Annex 1).

6. The Secretary-General said, inter alia:

"Increasingly, the devastating effects of drug abuse are seen in developing countries as well as in the industrialized world, at all levels of society, and in all age groups of the population. As we approach International Youth Year, we must particularly be aware of the vulnerability of young people and of the tragedy involved where countless young lives are blighted or lost.

This scourge of drug abuse goes hand in hand with the growing trafficking of illicit drugs, the magnitude and implications of which are mind-boggling. These illegal activities are financed and operated by well-organized international criminals. They have become so pervasive and generate such vast profits that countries' economies are disrupted, legal institutions undermined, often with tragic loss of life, and the very authority of some States is seriously threatened. Thus, the situation we face is a deadly serious one. But we owe it to the innocent victims involved never to despair of bringing it under control. Central to the success of any effort to combat this crime is a recognition that this is a classic example of the type of problem which no nation can solve alone and which can only be dealt with through international co-operation. While increasing amounts of illicit drugs are being used in the countries of origin, the greatest proportion crosses national boundaries and becomes part of what is a wicked and widespread international conspiracy. In my view, these are precisely the type of problems, representing a dangerous threat to modern societies, which the United Nations system is uniquely equipped to deal with."

7. Pre-UN International Co-operation

International efforts to control the traffic in drugs antecedes the United Nations itself. In 1909 the first International Conference on Narcotic Drugs met in Shanghai, China. Deliberations there led to the first International Convention on Drug Control, The Hague Convention of 1912, establishing international co-operation in the control of narcotic drugs as a matter of international law. Several international conventions under the auspices of the League of Nations were also established to actively supervise agreements on drug traffic: the 1925 Convention which established a system of import certifications and export authorizations, as well as a statistical returns system; the 1931 Convention which attempted to restrict the manufacture of drugs to those required for medical or scientific purposes through a mandatory estimates system; and, the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. Control machinery was also created in the form of an Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, designed to assist the League's Council in monitoring drug abuse, a Permanent Central Opium Board and a Drug Supervisory Body. A Protocol adopted in 1946 later transferred these functions to the newly established United Nations.

8. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND)

After the founding of the United Nations, the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Goods became the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). Created in February 1946 by a resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Commission is the principal policy-making body for international drug control. Relevant international conventions assign important functions to the Commission. Its decisions and/or recommendations are submitted to the Economic and Social Council for approval or modification, and through this channel give rise to decisions and resolutions in the General Assembly. Meeting annually until 1969, and biennially in regular sessions since then, the Commission provides a continuous review of the global situation regarding the spread and use of drugs, basically by assisting the Economic and Social Council in supervising the application of international conventions and preparing new agreements and machinery to strengthen surveillance of drug abuse.

On 1 January 1984 the Commission was increased from 30 to 40 members. ECOSOC's action in enlarging it to its present size reflecte increasing governmental concern over the proliferation of drug abuse problems in many regions of the world and the need for broader international co-operation in seeking solutions. This scale of membership makes it possible to ensure equitable geographical representation and also to include States with special problems of illegal drug production and consumption. Usually, observers from some 30-50 other governments attend the Commission's sessions. There are also observers from other United Nations organs, specialized agencies and intergovernmental, and non-governmental consultative organizations.

The Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims and provisions of the conventions, and to make related recommendations. It may also draw the attention of non-parties to its own decisions and recommendations under the conventions. An important function of the Commission under both conventions relates to decisions on changes in the scope of controlled substances.

The Commission will convene in Vienna on 11 February 1985.

Among other items on a heavy agenda will be consideration, as a matter of priority, the preparation of a draft convention against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs referred to in the recent initiative of the General Assembly contained in resolution 39/141 of 14 December 1984.

9. The Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND)

The Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) acts as secretariat to the Commission, and serves as the central repository in the United Nations for professional and technical expertise in drug control. It is staffed by UN civil servants. The Division came into existence in 1946 to facilitate the implementation of the drug control treaties and to report regularly to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on successive programmes to halt drug abuse. Now based in Vienna, the Division is comprised of four operational sections: treaty implementation; supply and demand reduction; programme planning, co-ordination and information; and the United Nations Narcotics Laboratory, which carries out chemical research on drugs of abuse and assists developing countries in strengthening their own laboratories. Its work covers a wide variety of activities, including the provision of advisory and supportive services, fellowships and training and equipment and material and the formulation, implementation and evaluation of multi-sectoral drug control programmes in many regions of the world.

Within the context of the International Drug Abuse Control Strategy for 1982-1986, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1981, plans were devised to strengthen the Division's potential as an information clearing-house. This has been done through the expansion of its scientific literature collection; the introduction of electronic data processing; the establishment of closer working links between law enforcement training programmes and those specializing in the identification of drugs; the introduction of new training programmes which focussed on the most modern techniques of prevention, detection and prosecution of drug-related crimes. In addition, the Division has intensified its assistance to national laboratories through the selection and procurement of reference books and standard texts, as well as certain basic laboratory equipment. Special efforts have also been made to recast the format, frequency

and contents of the Division's regular publications so as to enhance more effective international efforts to reduce drug abuse and related problems. The Division has endeavoured to strengthen its co-operation with the specialized agencies and other units of the United Nations system, with regional intergovernmental bodies, and with non-governmental organizations so as to obtain the optimal utilization of its resources during a period of budgetary restraint. It prepares a report on international co-operation in drug abuse control annually at the request of the General Assembly.

10. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)

The Commission and Division work closely with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which is the successor to the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. Established in 1961, by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, it is also responsible to the Economic and Social Council. It consists of thirteen members elected, in their personal capacities for their competence and impartiality. In accordance with the conventions, its role is independent and quasi-judicial. With regard to licit activities, the Board endeavours to limit the availability of drugs exclusively for medical and scientific purposes, while at the same time endeavouring to ensure an adequate supply for legitimate needs. To this end it administers an estimates system, applicable to narcotic drugs; monitors international trade in drugs, and ascertains that drugs available in each country for medical purposes are accounted for at the main stages of production and manufacture. As for illicit activities, the Board is required to determine where such activities exist, and then to request explanations from or propose consultations with the Government concerned. It may also recommend that technical or financial assistance be granted to assist in rectifying the situation and, as a last resort, it may recommend a drug embargo against the defaulting country. The Board is also required to publish annual reports which provide comprehensive surveys of the drug control situation world-wide, identifying weaknesses in national control and treaty compliance, and offering suggestions for improvements.

In addition, the Board is concerned with strengthening international control measures over the movement of psychotropic substances.

Since there are large-scale diversions from licit channels of such substances as amphetamines and methaqualone, and no system for estimating annual requirements in the 1971 Convention, the Board proposed in 1980 that countries, on a voluntary basis, should submit assessments of their requirements for psychotropic substances, listed in Schedule II of the Convention, as well as quarterly statistics on imports and exports of these substances. As a result, 128 Governments are now providing the Board with such information and have enabled it to detect or to prevent many instances of diversion from licit trade.

The Board meets at least twice a year, usually in closed session. It has been provided with its own secretariat of international civil servants.

11. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)

To support programmes of drug control with financial resources considerably greater than those available from the regular budget of the United Nations, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was established by the General Assembly in 1970.

Over the thirteen years ending in December 1983, UNFDAC received contributions of approximately US$77 million. During this period, funds were allocated for supporting developing countries affected by serious drug problems, and providing them with the necessary technical assistance to set up effective drug control programmes. The focus was placed on pilot projects for crop substitution/rural development, preventive education, treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts, drug law enforcement and research. Experience has shown that UNFDAC-financed activities have had a catalytic effect in mobilizing national resources and drawing the attention of governments to drug abuse control needs.

Examples of the various programmes conducted by UNFDAC - at the request of individual Member States - are those carried out in the rural integrated development sectors in Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey. They have been modelled on crop substitution schemes. The first was launched in Thailand in 1973. In an area bordering Burma and Laos, which is part of the region commonly known as the Golden Triangle, opium poppies were replaced by cash crops such as coffee, flower seeds and vegetables, together with food plantations. Community

development activities were established and/or strengthened to improve the social, physical and educational conditions of the hill tribes which dwell in the area.

In 1982, UNFDAC adopted a new policy aimed at concentrating financial resources in comprehensive national and regional plans - referred to as Masterplans - which are based on exhaustive collections of information on needs. The Masterplan approach makes it possible to rank in a systematic way the priorities and to design a coherent series of projects responding to them. The Masterplan procedure is developed through: assessment of the existing and prospective needs in the field of drug abuse control in a country or region; the identification and assessment of all the narcotics control activities whether funded by national, bilateral or multilateral resources; the design of projects to be realized for ensuring full coverage of all the needs for complete control of drug abuse problems; fund-raising targeted to collect resources for the integrated execution of the Masterplan; involvement of potential assisting countries in the overall operations; and encouragement of receiving countries towards a serious and effective commitment.

At present, narcotics control Masterplans have been developed in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Pakistan and Thailand. The plans for the Andean countries concentrate on multi-sectoral projects encompassing crop substitution/agro-industrial development, prevention, rehabilitation, treatment and drug law enforcement. These plans are expected to be completed in five years. In Pakistan, UNFDAC is assisting the government in the design, implementation and co-ordination of projects included in a Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) which aims at eliminating opium poppy in the North West Frontier Province. The SDEP covers crop substitution activities in four Districts of the Province. The Government is drawing up plans for law enforcement activities to complement the integrated rural development work. UNFDAC has raised US$11.3 million of the US$14 million needed for the first project to be undertaken in the SDEP. The other projects will require at least another US$16 million for the next five-year period. Finally, a similar opium poppy control plan was developed for Northern Thailand with an estimated

external assistance input of US$52.4 million over five years. A US$4 million project, the first project under this Masterplan, will begin in January 1985.

UNFDAC's initiative for establishing on the basis of the Masterplan approach a new framework of international drug control co-operation was favourably considered by governments. At the end of 1983, the Government of Italy made a five-year commitment of US$40.9 million for UNFDAC's coca control Masterplans in the Andean Subregion. At the regular Consortium Meeting on Pakistan, organized by the World Bank in April 1984, the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America pledged a total of US$11.3 million to UNFDAC to begin implementing the Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Pakistan. In addition, the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pledged in May 1984 US$1.2 million for treatment and preventive education activities in Pakistan. Finally, a first integrated rural development/crop substitution project under the Masterplan for Thailand will start in January 1985, with an UNFDAC input of US$4.0 million which is derived from a Norwegian Government special-purpose contribution.

A number of other countries, including Burma and Egypt, are also receiving UNFDAC's support for fighting illicit production, trafficking and consumption of drugs.

The projects financed by UNFDAC are executed with the support of entities and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, in some instances, or by non-governmental organizations, and also directly by recipient governments.

12. Efforts to contain the spread of illicit drugs have not been restricted to the technical organizations discussed above. Some of the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system have also developed programmes in response to the increasing urgency and magnitude of narcotics-related problems. The agencies which have expressed the greatest interest in this problem are the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

13. The International Labour Organisation (ILO)

The ILO has developed an active involvement in a variety of programmes of rehabilitation and employee drug education, including seminars at the local, national and regional levels on methods of treating drug-dependent persons in the work place, pilot projects to expand awareness of what constitutes successful rehabilitation, and an assortment of documents on aspects of the vocational and social needs of drug dependents. Various technical schemes have also been conducted on a country basis recently, among them advisory missions to Burma, Ecuador, Pakistan and Thailand. An International Technical Documentation and Information Service on Drug-Dependent Persons has been established to collate and organize material of use in vocational rehabilitation.

14. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The major preoccupation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has been crop diversification. In collaboration with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, FAO has helped to formulate field projects with trust funds provided by UNFDAC. These projects encourage crop substitution; research and training programmes related to industrial crops; the promotion of vegetable and flower crops of high yield; assistance to farmers through field trials, demonstrations, marketing and credits to discourage the cultivation of narcotic crops. FAO also has primary responsibility in the agricultural sector for the Programme of Drug Abuse Control in Pakistan, a multi-disciplinary programme designed to reduce poppy cultivation, and to suppress illicit traffic in the country. It also has had a modest input into a similar programme in Burma. FAO has proposed that a project on the use and development of medicinal plants - many of which could be grown where drug crops now exist should be undertaken in the future - provided funding becomes available.

15. The World Health Organization (WHO)

The WHO has placed important emphasis on the problem of narcotic drugs. Within the context of its Mental Health Programme, WHO has undertaken a variety of activities in co-operation with Member States

or other agencies that have sought to reduce drug abuse or dependence through enhanced national, regional or international drug control systems. Drawing heavily on the expertise available in other WHO programmes, the WHO has developed a varied approach to the problems of drug control. For example, it co-operates closely with national administrations in assessing the extent of the problem and formulating methods of resolving it in the context of the most applicable technology available.

In a variety of countries throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, WHO has assumed a key role in developing the infrastructure necessary to combat drug abuse through the formulation of flexible and dynamic management systems that would prevent or reduce the non-medical use of drugs. This has included training schemes for key personnel, epidemiological surveys in rural and urban target areas and the introduction and evaluation of treatment facilities, all of which are expected, over time, to contribute knowledge about the nature of drug dependence problems. WHO has also fostered research and training schemes by working with scientists and institutions in individual countries on specific projects, by training specialists in areas like clinical research, epidemiology and programme planning and by exchanging information enabling Member States to select and adapt the experience of other countries which are most relevant to their particular needs.

16. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Since 1971, UNESCO has developed a variety of programmes relating to drug abuse. It is within the educational sector that most of UNESCO's narcotic-related activities have been undertaken, with financial resources coming both from UNESCO's regular budget and from UNFDAC. Programmes have been organized on both a country and a regional basis. In 1983, for example, special programmes were conducted in Argentina, Burma, Ecuador and Peru, while activities of a regional character took place in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Western Europe. For the most part these consisted of pilot projects or fellowships designed for the experimental testing of teaching methods that would enhance the role of education in drug rehabilitation

and the result so far has been encouraging. The Medium-Term Plan for 1984-1989, recently approved by the General Conference of UNESCO, provides for the continuation of these drug control activities.

17. Though most of the work of the United Nations in the drug control field has been concentrated in either the technical entities created with a specific mandate to overcome drug abuse or in one of the specialized agencies discussed above, a few other organizations and programmes have had an input to one degree or another. A brief reference should be made to them.

18. The Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs (CSDHA) has developed a keen interest in narcotics in recent years, particularly because of the close linkage between drug abuse, social disintegration and multiplying criminality. Because of the intimate interrelationship between crime and drug abuse, collaboration between the Centre's Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch and the Division of Narcotic Drugs, both of which are based in Vienna, has intensified lately, as has the focus on drug abuse by the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime, and the biennial special sessions of the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. The Seventh Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which will be held in 1985, the International Youth Year will devote particular attention to many of these problems, especially the relationship between urbanization, drug abuse and juvenile delinquency. Among the items which will be debated will be one on "Youth, Crime and Justice", and it is likely to produce new recommendations for dealing with the growing problem of drug abuse among young people.

19. Through its Office of Projects Execution, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has acted as executing agency for a number of UNFDAC programmes. Both Thailand and the Lao Peoples' Republic have also utilized UNDP Country Programme funds to supplement the limited resources provided by UNFDAC for drug abuse control measures.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has also expressed some interest in the problems of drug abuse among children, and special

attention will be given by it to the problems of youth and drugs within the broad context of various programmes for International Youth Year in 1985.

20. Other institutions in the United Nations system have also expressed an interest in some of these concerns. The United Nations Social Defence Institute (UNSDRI) which is located in Rome, Italy, has conducted comparative studies on the effectiveness of social and legal control measures in different countries on the interaction between criminal behaviour and drug abuse. Further research depends upon the availability of funds.

The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) in Japan; the United Nations Latin America Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) in Costa Rica, have also embarked upon research and training programmes which focussed on the relationship between illicit drugs and crime.

21. CONCLUSION

To sum up, I believe it is fair to say the UN system is making a significant contribution in dealing with problems of drug abuse in a variety of ways:

(1) By establishing international laws designed to inhibit trafficking in illicit narcotics;

(2) By assisting governments individually and collectively to control the demand for and supply of substances under international control;

(3) By discouraging illegal drug production through crop substitution and other means;

(4) By collecting and disseminating statistics on drug trade and seizures which help governments forecast trends in trafficking;

(5) By acting as a channel for information to assist law enforcement agencies and providing training in law enforcement techniques;

(6) By publicizing the extent and serious implications of drug-related abuses;

(7) By assisting developing countries, through our laboratory

and reference facilities to improve their ability to identify and restrict the flow of illicit drugs;

(8) By assisting Governments in applying medical techniques to reduce and treat drug dependence;

(9) By identifying measures which may be adopted by States to ensure the tracing, freezing, and forfeiture of the proceeds of drug crimes.

Although these efforts are significant, it must be admitted that given the magnitude of the drug trafficking problem, the UN has thus far been able to make only modest inroads in dealing with it. The reasons are essentially the following, and for the most part parallel difficulties faced by those States that are also working on the problem:

(1) The inability or unwillingness of some governments to take the drastic measures that would be required to eliminate illicit drug production, trafficking, and use;

(2) The vast profits involved in the drug trade, the ability of the traffickers to corrupt government officials, and their ability to shift production sites and methods of transportation fairly readily;

(3) The social conditions in various countries which are conducive to increased drug use, especially by young people.

On the other hand, one of the most encouraging developments is the growing awareness of the extent of the problem and of the real threat that it poses to societies world-wide. This awareness is manifested in the significantly greater attention being paid to the problem not only by intergovernmental organizations - both within and outside the UN system - but also, and perhaps most noteworthy, by national governments and local authorities.

Thus, despite the awesome dimensions of the problem, the time appears ripe for renewed, concerted efforts by all concerned to build on and expand the existing programs and activities. With the consent and assistance of governments, the United Nations system is prepared to contribute in every way possible to eliminating the scourge of drug abuse.

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/39/710
30 November 1984

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-ninth session
Agenda item 101

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST TRAFFIC IN DRUGS

Report of the Third Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Grzegorz POLOWCZYK (Poland)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 21 September 1984, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "International campaign against traffic in drugs: report of the Secretary-General" and to allocate it to the Third Committee.

2. The Third Committee considered the item at its 41st to 44th, 47th and 53rd meetings, on 15, 16, 19, 21 and 28 November. An account of the discussion of the Committee is contained in the relevant summary records (A/C.3/39/SR.41-44, 47 and 53).

3. The Committee decided to consider item 101 together with the relevant chapter of the report of the Economic and Social Council (agenda item 12) pertaining to the question of narcotics.

4. In connection with item 101, the Committee had before it the following documentation:

(a) International campaign against traffic in drugs: report of the Secretary-General (A/39/194);

(b) Drug abuse control activities in the United Nations system: note by the Secretary-General, transmitting the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Drug Abuse Control Activities in the United Nations System" (A/39/646);

(c) Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the representatives of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (A/39/407);

(d) Letter dated 15 August 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/421);

(e) Letter dated 2 October 1984 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/551 and Corr.1 and 2);

(f) Letter dated 2 October 1984 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs (A/C.3/39/8).

5. In connection with item 12, the Committee had before it the following documentation:

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(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council, chapter V, section D (A/39/3 (Part I)); 1/

(b) International co-operation in drug abuse control: report of the Secretary-General for 1984 (A/39/193);

(c) Strategy and policies for drug control: note by the Secretary-General (A/39/577).

6. At the 41st meeting, on 15 November, the Director of the Division of Narcotic Drugs, the Executive Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and the President of the International Narcotics Control Board made introductory statements.

II. CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT PROPOSALS

A. Draft resolutions A/C.3/39/L.30 and L.30/Rev.2

7. At the 42nd meeting, on 15 November, the representative of Venezuela introduced a draft resolution (A/C.3/39/L.30) entitled "International campaign against traffic in narcotic drugs", sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.

8. At the 53rd meeting, on 28 November, the representative of Venezuela, on behalf of the sponsors, now joined by the Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guinea and Guyana, subsequently joined by the Central African Republic, introduced a revised draft resolution (A/C.3/39/L.30/Rev.2) which contained the following revisions:

(a) In operative paragraph 2, after the words "to ask the Commission on Narcotic Drugs", the words "to prepare" were replaced by "to initiate preparation";

(b) In operative paragraph 3, after the words "to enable the Commission", the words "to prepare" were replaced by "to initiate the preparation of".

9. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.30/Rev.2 without a vote (see para. 16, draft resolution I).

B. Draft resolutions A/C.3/39/L.31 and L.31/Rev.1

10. At the 42nd meeting, on 15 November, the representative of Venezuela introduced a draft resolution (A/C.3/39/L.31) entitled "United Nations Declaration on the control of drug trafficking and drug abuse", sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.

11. At the 53rd meeting, on 28 November, the representative of Venezuela introduced a revised text of the draft resolution (A/C.3/39/L.31/Rev.1) sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Suriname, the United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, as well as India, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey in which paragraph 4 of the Declaration, which read:

> "The States Members of the United Nations should have at their disposal the necessary legal instruments against the drug traffic and should adopt the additional measures required to combat the new criminal manifestations of this shameful and abominable crime;"

was replaced by the following text:

> "States Members of the United Nations shall utilize the legal instruments against the illegal production of, illicit demand for, abuse of and illicit traffic in drugs and adopt additional measures to counter the new manifestations of this shameful and heinous crime;".

1/ To be issued as Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/39/3).

12. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.31/Rev.1 without a vote (see para. 16, draft resolution II).

C. Draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.33/Rev.1

13. At the 47th meeting, on 21 November, the representative of Bolivia introduced a draft resolution (A/C.3/39/L.33/Rev.1) entitled "International campaign against traffic in drugs", sponsored by Argentina, Australia, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela, subsequently joined by the Central African Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Jamaica and Nicaragua.

14. A statement by the Secretary-General on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution was circulated in document A/C.3/39/L.35.

15. At the 53rd meeting, on 28 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.33/Rev.1 without a vote (see para. 16, draft resolution III).

III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE

16. The Third Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

DRAFT RESOLUTION I

International campaign against traffic in narcotic drugs

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/168 of 20 December 1978, 35/195 of 15 December 1980, 36/132 of 14 December 1981, 36/168 of 16 December 1981, 37/168 of 17 December 1982, 37/198 of 18 December 1982, 38/93 and 38/122 of 16 December 1983 and other relevant provisions,

Aware of the dangers posed by the illegal production of drugs, the illicit demand, the illicit drug traffic and drug abuse, and of the need to pay renewed attention to these problems and to their pernicious effects,

Concerned at the increasing damage which the illicit drug traffic causes to public health, the economic and social development of peoples, and young people in particular,

Bearing in mind the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, of 11 August 1984, 2/ and the New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs, of 1 October 1984, 3/ in which profound alarm was expressed at the seriousness of the problem,

Recognizing the valuable contribution made by existing international legal instruments in their specialized areas, including the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, 4/ and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, 5/

Convinced that the wide scope of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and its consequences make it necessary to prepare a convention which considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole and in particular those not envisaged in existing international instruments,

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2/ A/39/407, annex.

3/ A/C.3/39/8.

4/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XI.3, p. 13.

5/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XI.3, p. 7.

Commending the important work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and the International Narcotics Control Board,

1. Reiterates that the struggle against the illegal production and demand and the illicit consumption and traffic in drugs deserves urgent, top-priority treatment;

2. Requests the Economic and Social Council, taking into consideration Article 62, paragraph 3, and Article 66, paragraph 1, of Chapter X of the Charter of the United Nations and Council resolution 9 (I) of 1946, to request the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate the preparation at its next session in February 1985, as a matter of priority, of a draft convention against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs which considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole and in particular those not envisaged in existing international instruments, and, to that end, to transmit to it the draft convention annexed to the present resolution as a working paper;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to propose to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs that it adjust the agenda of its thirty-first session, as approved by the Economic and Social Council in its decision 1983/115 of 24 May 1983, to enable the Commission to initiate the preparation of the draft convention referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. Requests the Commission on Narcotic Drugs likewise to report to the Economic and Social Council, if possible at its first regular session of 1985, on the results achieved in this respect;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

ANNEX

Draft Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities

Preamble

The States Parties to this Convention,

Concerned that the illicit traffic in and the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances transcend the sphere of the physical and moral well-being of mankind and are detrimental to the identity and integration of peoples, since they constitute a factor of dependence and corruption which undermines their spiritual, cultural, social and economic values, and aware that such problems must be dealt with within the framework of international co-operation and global geopolitics, since drugs are goods used to weaken the legitimate economies of the countries and to undermine their sovereignty, and that such practices are impeding development, especially in the countries of the Andean region, agree to declare the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the fundamental means of promoting illicit use of such substances, which use is inflicting serious harm on the youth of the world, to be a grave crime against humanity under international law, having regard to the following considerations:

1. Whereas the illicit traffic in and the use of such substances are detrimental to the integrity and identity of our peoples since they undermine their spiritual, historical and social values, and, as a result of technical advances in the communications media, the unprecedented expansion in untoward cross-cultural influences, the increase in organized crime and other factors, have reached proportions too great to be dealt with through the isolated demands and actions of States,

2. Whereas there is clear evidence that illegal trafficking is closely linked to the designs and actions of some aimed at subverting the legal order and social peace in our countries in pursuit of their despicable commercial aims, and that it constitutes a factor of dependence for the developing peoples and impedes economic integration in keeping with their common interests,

3. Whereas it is clearly established that illicit trafficking operates by corrupting the political and administrative structures of producing and consuming countries and undermines the security and defence of

peoples by sapping their military strength and affecting their sovereignty,

4. Whereas there is a need for international legislation that would provide a basis for effective action to combat the illicit trafficking in, and consumption of, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances beyond national boundaries, and for punishing those responsible wherever they may be,

5. Whereas the volume, magnitude and extent of illicit drug trafficking and use represent a challenge to society as a whole and constitute activities threatening the very existence and future development of human beings and especially affect youth, a key factor for the development of the peoples of the world,

6. Whereas drug addiction is detrimental to health, one of the basic assets and inalienable rights of every human being, and whereas without individual health there is no public health, a fact which in turn bears upon and determines the economic development of peoples,

7. Bearing in mind that the repeated use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances affects the individual and that, through its biological, psychological and social effects, damages the personality and creates problems for the family, society and the State,

8. Whereas the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is taking a very serious and often irreversible toll on youth, which is the noblest part of the human resources of the world's peoples, and weakens their capacity for cultural and material progress,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Definitions

For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) Trafficking shall mean the preparation, production, extraction, cultivation, preservation, acquisition, distribution, financing, organization and management, transport, supply and/or storing of any of the substances, or their raw material, referred to in this Convention, except those enumerated for medical or scientific use in the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 6/ and in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances; 7/

(b) "Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances" shall mean the substances, preparations and proprietary drugs listed in the schedules to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and such others as may, as determined by the World Health Organization, produce a state of dependence, central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking, behaviour, perception or mood, or the use of which may produce effects similar to those produced by any of the substances referred to above.

Article 2

Nature of the crime

Trafficking in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances is a grave international crime against humanity. The parties undertake to prevent and suppress it.

6/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XI.3, p. 13.

7/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XI.3, p. 7.

Article 3

Illicit activities

The following shall be deemed illicit activities: trafficking, distribution, supply, manufacture, elaboration, refining, processing, extraction, preparation, production, cultivation, preservation, transport, storage and the management, organization, financing or facilitating of the traffic in any of the substances or their raw materials referred to in this Convention.

Article 4

Aggravating circumstance

It shall be deemed an aggravating circumstance if an individual responsible for such activities performs a public function of any kind.

Article 5

Character of the crime

The illicit activities enumerated in this Convention shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

Article 6

Imprescriptibility of the crimes

1. The crimes enumerated in this Convention shall be imprescriptible. Irrespective of the date on which they were committed, they shall be investigated, and individuals against whom there exists sufficient evidence of having committed such crimes shall be sought, arrested, charged and, if found guilty, punished.

2. The States undertake to adopt, in accordance with their respective laws, any legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution or punishment, as determined by law or otherwise, of the crimes referred to in article 3 and part A, paragraph 2, of article 10 of this Convention, and that, where they exist, such statutory limitations shall be abolished.

Article 7

Duties of the Contracting Parties

The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt the legislative measures necessary to ensure implementation of the provisions of this Convention and, in particular, to provide for stringent criminal penalties against individuals responsible for the activities referred to in this Convention.

Article 8

Duties of international organizations

Any State Party or competent international organization may seek to have the relevant organs of the United Nations or regional organizations take such action as they deem appropriate, in accordance with the international instruments governing them, to prevent and suppress the illicit activities enumerated in this Convention.

Article 9

International co-operation

1. States shall co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral basis to prevent and suppress the illicit activities enumerated in this Convention and shall take all necessary measures towards that end.

2. Accordingly, they shall:

(a) Ensure that, at the national level, there is co-ordination of preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. They may assign responsibility for such co-ordination to an appropriate agency;

(b) Provide mutual assistance in combating illicit trafficking and co-operate with each other in identifying, arresting and taking legal action against those suspected or engaging in such illicit activities and their accomplices or abettors and also in seizing and destroying such substances;

(c) Co-operate closely with each other and with competent international organizations of which they are members in a co-ordinated effort to combat illicit trafficking, particularly by collecting information and documents relevant to investigation with the aim of facilitating the prosecution of the persons referred to in the preceding paragraph, and exchange such information;

(d) See to it that international co-operation between the relevant agencies is expeditiously carried out;

(e) Ensure that writs for judicial action are transmitted between countries directly and expeditiously to the organs designated by the Parties. This provision shall not prevent any Party from exercising its right to require that such writs be transmitted to it through the diplomatic channel or from Government to Government;

(f) Provide information on illicit activities within their territories that involve narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the cultivation, production, manufacture, trafficking in and consumption of such substances;

(g) States shall not enact legislative provisions or take measures of any other kind which might be prejudicial to the international obligations which they have assumed with respect to the identification, arrest, extradition and punishment of individuals guilty of the crimes enumerated in this Convention.

Article 10

Penal provisions

A

1. Each of the crimes enumerated in this Convention, whether committed by one individual or by several acting in collusion in different countries, shall be considered a distinct offence.

2. Participation or association in the commission of any such crime, conspiracy, instigation or the attempt to commit any such crime, and preparatory actions for such crimes, shall be considered offences.

3. Convictions obtained abroad in respect of such crimes shall be taken into account in determining whether the accused is a habitual offender.

4. Crimes committed by both nationals and aliens shall be tried by the Party in whose territory the crime was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is present if extradition is not authorized under the law of the Party to which a request for extradition is made and if the offender has not yet been tried and sentenced for one of the crimes enumerated in this Convention.

B

1. All the crimes enumerated in article 3 and paragraph 2 of part A of this article shall be deemed to be included among the extraditable offences covered by any extradition treaty which has been or may hereafter be concluded between the Parties.

2. If a Party which makes extradition contingent on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it has no treaty, it may, should it so choose, consider this Convention as the necessary legal basis for extradition in respect of the crimes enumerated in article 3 and in paragraph 2 of part A of this article. Extradition shall be subject to any other conditions laid down by the law of the Party to which the application is made.

3. Parties which do not make extradition contingent on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the crimes enumerated in article 3 and in paragraph 2 of part A of this article as extraditable offences as between them, subject to any conditions laid down by the law of the Party to which the application for extradition is made.

4. The provisions of this article shall not affect the principle that the crimes in question must be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the national law of each Party.

Article 11

Courts having jurisdiction in such cases

Anyone involved in any of the activities enumerated in this Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal in any of the States in whose territory an act or acts to which this Convention applies was or were committed, or by such international criminal tribunal as may have jurisdiction under the applicable legal rules.

Article 12

Assistance fund

A fund shall be established to assist developing countries affected by the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with a view to combating and overcoming the causes of those phenomena and providing them with adequate means of combating such illicit activities. The fund shall be constituted by contributions from countries which are parties to this Convention on the basis of the method of assessment used by the United Nations and by voluntary contributions.

Article 13

Governing Board

The fund shall be administered by a Governing Board composed of an equal number of representatives from each of the Parties.

Article 14

Control

The Parties agree to entrust the task of overseeing the activities and obligations set out herein to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council and the International Narcotics Control Board of the United Nations.

Article 15

Settlement of disputes

Disputes relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of one of the Parties to the dispute.

Article 16

Signature or accession

This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by all countries of the world, whether or not they are members of the United Nations, without limitation as to time; it shall be subject to ratification and the respective instruments shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Article 17

Entry into force

This Convention shall enter into force on the tenth day following the date on which the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession is deposited.

Article 18

Duration

This Convention shall remain in effect for a period of 50 years following its entry into force.

DRAFT RESOLUTION II

Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/168 of 20 December 1978, 35/195 of 15 December 1980, 36/132 of 14 December 1981, 36/168 of 16 December 1981, 37/168 of 17 December 1982, 37/198 of 18 December 1982, 38/93, 38/98 and 38/122 of 16 December 1983 and other relevant provisions,

Recognizing the concern that prevails in the international community about the problem of the illegal production of, illicit trafficking in and abuse of drugs,

Adopts the Declaration set forth in the annex of the present resolution.

ANNEX

Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations reaffirm faith in the dignity and worth of the human person and promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom and international co-operation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,

Whereas Member States have undertaken in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 8/ to promote social progress and better standards of life for the peoples of the world,

Whereas the international community has expressed grave concern at the fact that trafficking in narcotics and drug abuse constitute an obstacle to the physical and moral well-being of peoples and of youth in particular,

Desiring to heighten the awareness of the international community of the urgency of preventing and punishing the illegal production of, demand for, abuse of and illicit traffic in drugs,

Whereas the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs of 11 August 1984 9/ and the New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and

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8/ Resolution 217 A (III).

9/ A/39/407, annex.

the Illicit Use of Drugs of 1 October 1984 10/ recognize the international nature of this problem and emphasize that it should be solved with the firm support of the entire international community,

Whereas the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control have made valuable contributions to the control and elimination of the drug trafficking and drug abuse,

Recognizing that existing international instruments, including the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, 11/ and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, 12/ have created a legal framework for combating trafficking in narcotic drugs and drug abuse in their specialized fields,

Declares that:

1. Trafficking in narcotic drugs and drug abuse are extremely serious problems which, owing to their magnitude, scope and widespread pernicious effects, have become an international criminal activity demanding the most urgent attention and maximum priority;

2. The illegal production of, demand for, abuse of and trafficking in drugs impede economic and social progress, constitute a grave threat to the security and development of many countries and peoples and should be combated by all moral, legal and institutional means, at the national, regional and international levels;

3. The eradication of trafficking in narcotic drugs is the collective responsibility of all States, especially those affected by problems relating to illicit production, trafficking or abuse;

4. States Members of the United Nations shall utilize the legal instruments against the illegal production of, illicit demand for, abuse of and illicit traffic in drugs and adopt additional measures to counter the new manifestations of this shameful and heinous crime;

5. States undertake to intensify efforts and to co-ordinate strategies aimed at the control and eradication of the complex problem of illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse through programmes including economic, social and cultural alternatives.

International campaign against traffic in drugs

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 35/195 of 15 December 1980, 36/168 of 16 December 1981, in which it adopted the International Drug Abuse Control Strategy, 37/168 of 17 December 1982, 37/198 of 18 December 1982, 38/98 and 38/122 of 16 December 1983 and other relevant general provisions,

Further recalling its resolutions 36/132 of 14 December 1981 and 38/93 of 16 December 1983 and paragraph 7 of resolution 35/195 in which it specifically acknowledged the economic and technical constraints impeding many developing countries from combating the illicit production of and traffic in drugs and drug abuse,

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10/ A/C.3/39/8.

11/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XI.3, p. 13.

12/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XI.3, p. 7.

Noting the concern expressed by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization, 13/ in which he recognized the need for greater efforts to reduce the traffic in and illicit use of drugs,

Taking note of the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs of 11 August 1984 14/ and the New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs of 1 October 1984 15/ signed by a number of Latin American countries, in which drug trafficking was considered to be a crime against humanity and integrated, effective and urgent regional and international action was demanded, to be supported by the resources necessary for successfully overcoming the problem,

Considering the activities of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board,

Noting with appreciation the action being taken by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control in providing financial resources and support for integrated development programmes, including the replacement of illicit crops in affected areas,

Reaffirming the need to improve and maintain regional and interregional co-operation and co-ordination, especially in law enforcement, in order to eliminate drug trafficking and drug abuse, and noting the growing interest in regional and interregional co-ordination,

Concerned that, despite the significant national efforts deployed for this purpose, including those of a number of Latin American and Caribbean and Asian countries, the illicit traffic in drugs and psychotropic substances has noticeably increased,

Aware of the serious impact on the life and health of peoples and on the stability of democratic institutions resulting from the illicit production, marketing, distribution and consumption of drugs,

Recognizing that, to root out this evil, integrated action for simultaneously reducing and controlling illicit demand, production, distribution and marketing is required,

Aware that action to eliminate the illicit cultivation of and traffic in drugs must be accompanied by economic and social development programmes for the affected areas,

Bearing in mind the desirability of programming activities for replacing illicit crops in such a manner as to conserve the environment and improve the quality of life of the social sectors concerned,

Recognizing the dilemma of transit States which are seriously affected, both domestically and internationally, by drug trafficking, stimulated by demand for and production and consumption of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances in other countries,

Aware of the need to mobilize a co-ordinated strategy at the national, regional and international levels, which would cover countries with illegal consumers and producers and countries used for transit in the world-wide distribution and marketing circuit, in order to eliminate drug trafficking and drug abuse,

Recognizing the importance of ratifying and acceding to the international drug control treaties,

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13/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/39/1).

14/ A/39/407, annex.

15/ A/C.3/39/8.

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General; 16/

2. Reiterates that urgent attention and highest priority should be given to the struggle against the illicit production of, demand for, consumption of and traffic in drugs;

3. Calls upon Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the international drug control treaties and, in the meanwhile, to make serious efforts to comply with the provisions thereof;

4. Reiterates the importance of integrated action, co-ordinated at the regional and international levels, and for this purpose requests the Secretary-General and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to step up efforts and initiatives designed to establish, on a continuing basis, co-ordinating machinery for law enforcement in regions where this does not yet exist;

5. Recommends that top priority be given to the preparation of specific technical and economic co-operation programmes for the countries most affected by the illicit production of and traffic in drugs and drug abuse;

6. Also recommends that appropriate priority be given to the adoption of measures designed to solve the specific problems of transit States through joint regional and interregional efforts;

7. Urges Member States with available resources and experience to increase their contributions for combating the illicit production of and traffic in drugs and drug abuse, in particular in the countries most affected and where the problem is most serious;

8. Encourages Member States to contribute or to continue contributing to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control so as to enable it to increase its support of drug abuse control programmes;

9. Requests the Economic and Social Council, through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to consider the legal, institutional and social elements relevant to all aspects of combating drug trafficking, including the possibility of convening a specialized conference;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to implement paragraph 5 (c) of resolution 37/198 and that a meeting of heads of national drug law enforcement agencies is convened in 1986;

11. Also requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the convening, within the framework of advisory services, of interregional seminars to study the experience gained by the United Nations system, especially by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and by Member States in integrated rural development programmes for replacing illicit crops;

12. Calls upon the specialized agencies and all other relevant bodies of the United Nations system to participate actively in the implementation of the present resolution;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of fortieth session the item entitled "International campaign against traffic in drugs".

16/ A/39/194.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

U.S. Coast Guard

Commander, Atlantic Area

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. PAUL A. YOST, JR., COMMANDER, ATLANTIC AREA, COAST GUARD

NARCOTICS INTERDICTION

Senator Kasten. Next is Vice Adm. Paul Yost, Commander of the Atlantic Area of the Coast Guard. Admiral Yost.

Vice Admiral Yost. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am pleased to have the opportunity to testify here today.

I have submitted testimony, which I understand will be put in the record, and I will summarize very briefly that testimony.

As the Nation's primary seaborne law enforcement agency, we in the Coast Guard are heavily engaged in the interdiction of narcotics bound for the United States from foreign sources or transit nations. Estimates for 1983 show that about 89 percent of the annual supply of marijuana in the United States was grown on foreign soil. Approximately 65 percent of the imports are smuggled by sea, mostly from Colombia, a smaller amount from Jamaica. The remaining 35 percent comes by air or overland, mostly from Jamaica, Mexico, and Belize. As much as 25 percent of the cocaine comes by sea. In fact, we note a growing trend of cocaine shipments intermingled with bulk shipments of marijuana.

In the past, Coast Guard drug interdiction operations have concentrated on interdicting large mother ships which deliver contraband to smaller, faster contact boats well off shore. Analysis shows that while we must keep pressure on all facets of the maritime drug scene, concentrating on mother ships has the greatest potential for disrupting the maritime flow of drugs.

"WAGON WHEEL" OPERATION

In an ongoing operation code named "Wagon Wheel," we have put sufficient pressure in the southern Caribbean to cause a major disruption of mother ship operations in the last 10 weeks. Marijuana has backed up at departure points, allowing Colombian national forces to destroy over 300 tons of marijuana awaiting shipment in their country since November 1. In addition to our own forces, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft are assisting in "Wagon Wheel."

Between the eradication efforts, the destruction of the crop by

Colombian forces after harvest, and my own interdiction at sea, we feel we fully accounted for 50 percent of the fall crop. The remainder I believe awaits shipment in Colombia.

"HAT TRICK" OPERATIONS

"Wagon Wheel" is part of a larger operation called "Hat Trick," coordinated by Vice President Bush's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. Many agencies are involved, including Customs, DEA, State, FBI, the State of Florida, and the Ambassador's office in Colombia.

The cooperation we receive from foreign governments during seizures is good. We routinely deal with the governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, Honduras, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, as well as the British, French, and Dutch island dependencies in the Caribbean.

The Coast Guard is also operationally involved with foreign governments. We have engaged in joint operations with Jamaica, the Bahamas, Haiti, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica.

COOPERATION WITH PATROL CUTTERS

Local cooperation with our patrolling cutters has also improved dramatically. This is highlighted by three recent incidents where our cutters requested and received the assistance of local Mexican Navy units to investigate and then seize suspected mother ships which had fled into Mexican territorial waters to avoid our enforcement vessels. These three incidents resulted in the seizure of over 32 tons of marijuana.

We plan to continue operations with friendly governments in the future. In the ongoing "Wagon Wheel" operation, several of these governments are working closely with us to destroy stockpiled drugs and seal their own borders to smugglers.

This concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. Admiral, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Yost follows:]

Prepared Statement of Vice Adm. Paul A. Yost

COMMANDER

Coast Guard Atlantic Area

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM VICE ADMIRAL PAUL A. YOST, COMMANDER, COAST GUARD ATLANTIC AREA. I AM THE SENIOR COAST GUARD OPERATIONAL COMMANDER FOR THE ATLANTIC AREA, INCLUDING THE ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS, AND THE CARIBBEAN. IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO REPORT ON COAST GUARD INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL.

FIRST I'D LIKE TO MENTION BRIEFLY HOW DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FIT INTO THE COAST GUARD AND THEN DISCUSS HOW THE COAST GUARD FITS INTO THE NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL.

THE COAST GUARD IS A COMPLEX ORGANIZATION WHICH PERFORMS 14 OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AND 13 SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. IN ORDER TO PURSUE OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION, ALMOST ALL OF OUR VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT, AND MANY OF OUR SHORE FACILITIES HAVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AS ONE OF THEIR ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

IN THE EARLY 80'S THE ADMINISTRATION EMBARKED ON AN AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF ILLICIT DRUGS. A FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY WAS DEVELOPED TO SET NATIONAL PRIORITIES, CLARIFY AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ESTABLISH PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING. THIS STRATEGY ENCOMPASSES FIVE INTERRELATED PROGRAMS:

(1) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO STOP DRUGS AS CLOSE TO THE SOURCE AS POSSIBLE,

(2) DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT, INCLUDING DRUG INTERDICTION, AND HEALTH RELATED ACTIVITIES,

(3) DETOXIFICATION TREATMENT,

(4) EDUCATION AND PREVENTION, AND

(5) RESEARCH

AS THE NATION'S PRIMARY SEABORNE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, WE ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN INTERDICTION OF NARCOTICS BOUND FOR THE U. S. FROM FOREIGN SOURCE

OR TRANSIT NATIONS. ESTIMATES FOR 1983, THE LATEST FIGURES AVAILABLE FROM THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER'S COMMITTEE (NNICC), SHOW THAT ABOUT 89% OF THE ANNUAL SUPPLY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES WAS GROWN IN FOREIGN SOIL. APPROXIMATELY 65% OF THE IMPORTS ARE SMUGGLED BY SEA, MOSTLY FROM COLOMBIA, A SMALLER AMOUNT FROM JAMAICA. THE REMAINING 35% COMES BY AIR OR OVERLAND, MOSTLY FROM JAMAICA, MEXICO AND BELIZE. AS MUCH AS 25% OF COCAINE COMES BY SEA. IN FACT, WE NOTE A GROWING TREND OF COCAINE SHIPMENTS INTERMINGLED WITH BULK SHIPMENTS OF MARIJUANA.

AT THIS POINT LET ME EXPLAIN IN SLIGHTLY MORE DETAIL THE BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF MARITIME DRUG TRAFFICKING AND AT THE SAME TIME POINT OUT SOME TRENDS BEING NOTED.

MOST MARITIME DRUG TRAFFIC DESTINED FOR FLORIDA, AND THE ATLANTIC AND GULF COAST REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DEPARTS FROM SOUTH AMERICAN OR CARIBBEAN STAGING AREAS. MARIJUANA FROM THE GUAJIRA PENINSULA ON THE NORTH COAST OF COLOMBIA IS THE PRIME EXAMPLE. AS SEABORNE SMUGGLERS PROCEED NORTH, THEY NORMALLY PASS THROUGH ONE OF THE FOUR INTER-ISLAND CHANNELS WE CALL "CHOKE POINTS". WE HAVE FOUND THAT CONCENTRATING OUR FORCES IN THESE CHOKE POINTS HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF USING AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO BEST ADVANTAGE. SMUGGLERS SUCCESSFULLY TRANSITING THESE CHOKE POINTS HEAD FOR THE BAHAMAS, FLORIDA OR THE GULF COAST. SOME VESSELS ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT PRESSURE OFF FLORIDA BY TRANSITING THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN AND OFFLOADING FURTHER NORTH ALONG THE MID-ATLANTIC OR THE NEW ENGLAND SEACOASTS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME INCREASE IN DRUG SMUGGLING ON THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH COULD BE A FURTHER REACTION TO INCREASED ENFORCEMENT PRESSURE IN THE CARIBBEAN. WE HAVE NOTED THAT AS LAW ENFORCEMENT PRESSURE IN THE MARITIME REGION HAS INCREASED, THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT TO OTHER MODES AND METHODS OF TRANSPORTATION. THERE HAS BEEN A DECIDED INCREASE IN AIRDROP ACTIVITY, THE USE OF HIDDEN COMPARTMENTS (COMPARTMENTS INCORPORATED INTO THE DESIGN OF A SHIP FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF HIDING CONTRABAND), AND ATTEMPTS BY SMUGGLERS TO CIRCUMVENT OUR INTERDICTION RESOURCES THROUGH COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND THE USE OF THEIR OWN SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE THESE TACTICS CONFIRM THE FACT WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AT DISRUPTING NORMAL MARITIME

SMUGGLING OPERATIONS. SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONAL EFFORTS TO STEM THE OVERALL FLOW OF DRUGS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE COORDINATION OF ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES' INTERDICTION AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES.

IN THE PAST, COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON INTERDICTING LARGE MOTHERSHIPS WHICH DELIVER CONTRABAND TO SMALLER, FASTER CONTACT BOATS WELL OFFSHORE. IN ADDITION TO CARRYING LARGE QUANTITIES OF MARIJUANA, OUR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES INDICATE MANY ALSO CARRY QUANTITIES OF HARD DRUGS (PRIMARILY COCAINE). HOWEVER, WE ARE SELDOM ABLE TO SEIZE THESE HIGHER VALUE, LOW VOLUME, HARD DRUGS BECAUSE THEY ARE USUALLY DISPOSED OF "OVER THE SIDE" PRIOR TO THE AT-SEA BOARDING OF THE VESSEL. DURING ACTUAL BOARDING PROCEDURES, WE HAVE OBSERVED ACTIONS BY SUSPECTED VESSELS TO CONFIRM THIS.

ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT WHILE WE MUST KEEP PRSSURE ON ALL FACETS OF THE MARITIME DRUG SCENARIO, CONCENTRATING ON MOTHERSHIPS HAS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTING THE MARITIME FLOW OF DRUGS.

IN AN ONGOING OPERATION CODE-NAMED "WAGON WHEEL", WE HAVE PUT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE IN THE SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN TO CAUSE A MAJOR DISRUPTION OF MOTHERSHIP OPERATIONS FOR THE LAST 10 WEEKS. MARIJUANA HAS "BACKED UP" AT DEPARTURE POINTS, ALLOWING COLOMBIAN NATIONAL FORCES TO DESTROY OVER 300 TONS OF MARIJUANA AWAITING SHIPMENT IN THEIR COUNTRY SINCE 1 NOVEMBER 84. IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN FORCES, U. S. NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE ASSISTING IN "WAGON WHEEL".

THE COOPERATION WE RECEIVE FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS DURING SEIZURES IS GOOD. WE ROUTINELY DEAL WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COSTA RICA, MEXICO, HONDURAS, THE BAHAMAS, JAMAICA, HAITI, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AS WELL AS THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND DUTCH ISLAND DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN. OUR CONTACT WITH THEM IS COORDINATED THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND USUALLY STARTS WITH A REQUEST FOR A REGISTRY CONFIRMATION OF A VESSEL INTERCEPTED BY ONE OF OUR CUTTERS AT SEA.

PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION AGAINST A FOREIGN VESSEL ON THE HIGH SEAS, WE MUST FIRST HAVE SOME SUSPICION THE VESSEL IS ENGAGED IN ILLICIT ACTIVITY. SECOND, WE MUST VERIFY ITS CLAIMED NATIONAL AFFILIATION TO INSURE IT IS LEGITIMATE. IF THE VESSEL'S CLAIM IS CONFIRMED BY ITS FLAG STATE, THE U. S. EMBASSY THEN NEGOTIATES A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THAT GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TO BOARD AND SEARCH THE VESSEL. IF CONTRABAND IS FOUND, WE THEN SEIZE IT EITHER ON BEHALF OF THE NATION WE ARE DEALING WITH, OR FOR VIOLATION OF U. S. LAW. IF THE PURPORTED FLAG STATE REFUTES THE VESSEL'S CLAIM OF REGISTRY, WE THEN FOLLOW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES TO DECLARE THE VESSEL STATELESS. THE HIGH SEAS CONVENTION PERMITS ANY NATION TO EXERT ITS JURISDICTION OVER A STATELESS VESSEL; THUS WE CAN EXERT U. S. JURISDICTION TO BOARD AND SEARCH. CLOSE COOPERATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL DURING THIS PROCESS. THEIR ABILITY TO RAPIDLY VERIFY CLAIMS OF REGISTRY AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT, AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH US TO FACILITATE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ON THE HIGH SEAS ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF OUR MARITIME INTERDICTION PROGRAM.

INTERNAL PROCEDURES VARY WIDELY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, AS DO REGISTRY SYSTEMS, SO THE TIME REQUIRED FOR RESPONSES ALSO VARIES WIDELY. WE, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THE INVOLVED EMBASSIES STRIVE TO MINIMIZE THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS PROCESS SO THAT VALUABLE CUTTER TIME IS NOT UNNECESSARILY WASTED WHILE THE REGISTRY CHECK OR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT ARE COMPLETED.

THE COAST GUARD IS ALSO OPERATIONALLY INVOLVED WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. WE HAVE ENGAGED IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH JAMAICA, THE BAHAMAS, HAITI, COLOMBIA, PANAMA, VENEZUELA AND COSTA RICA.

LOCAL COOPERATION WITH OUR PATROLLING CUTTERS HAS ALSO IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY. THIS IS HIGHLIGHTED BY THREE RECENT INCIDENTS WHERE OUR CUTTERS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED THE ASSISTANCE OF LOCAL MEXICAN NAVY UNITS TO INVESTIGATE AND SEIZE SUSPECTED MOTHERSHIPS WHICH HAD FLED INTO THE MEXICAN TERRITORIAL SEA TO AVOID OUR ENFORCEMENT VESSELS. THESE THREE INCIDENTS RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF OVER 32 TONS OF MARIJUANA. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITH FRIENDLY

GOVERNMENTS IN THE FUTURE. IN THE ONGOING WAGONWHEEL OPERATION, SEVERAL OF THESE GOVERNMENTS WORKED CLOSELY WITH US TO DESTROY STOCKPILED DRUGS AND SEAL THEIR BORDERS TO THE SMUGGLERS.

IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM THOSE GOVERNMENTS OF CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN NATIONS WE ROUTINELY DEAL WITH AND DEPEND ON FOR THE DAILY CONDUCT OF OUR AT-SEA INTERDICTION OPERATIONS. THE OPEN AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WE HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH THESE COUNTRIES IS EXCELLENT AND WILL CONTINUE. THEY ARE VITAL TO OUR INTERESTS IN THIS IMPORTANT MISSION.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED TESTIMONY, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU OR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF FRANK V. MONASTERO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

THREE POINTS ON ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFIC

Senator KASTEN. The next spokesman on this panel will be Mr. Frank Monastero, Assistant Administrator for Operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration. Mr. Monastero.

Mr. MONASTERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, which I think you have impressed upon us, I will dispense with my brief statement because I think much of it has been covered here, except to make three points, some of which have been made by Senator D'Amato and Congressman Rangel just prior to the hearing.

One of these is the fact that this is a very complex issue and cannot be addressed by simple solutions. It is economic, it is political, it is crime-related, it is social, among other things.

Second, it is a continuous war which has been won in small-scale ways in the past, and which can be won in a large-scale way in the future if we address all fronts, including our own domestic source potential, which I think is very important to keep in mind.

Third, the problem of all countries cannot be addressed uniformly. The resources, the abilities of each country have to be looked at separately and addressed separately.

With that. I will conclude my remarks, sir. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Frank Monastero follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK V. MONASTERO

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee to discuss DEA's international efforts to halt drugs in source and transit countries.

Drug control is an international issue and concern. It is the responsibility and mandate of all sovereign nations to meet the challenge of stopping drug traffickers who operate across international borders without respect for law and order or concern for the havoc they wreak upon the citizens of the world.

The United States' international narcotics and drug control program is an integral part of the total effort by the U.S. Government to stop drug trafficking and drug abuse. International cooperation is one of the five main areas of the administration's national strategy for the prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking.

U.S. diplomatic initiatives, reinforced by enhanced domestic programs, encourage foreign countries to take aggressive action against drug trafficking and drug abuse. The change in attitudes towards illicit drug use and trafficking that has occurred in the United States is also beginning to take place in other countries around the world. Individuals, communities and nations have decided to take a firm stand against drug abuse and drug trafficking.

The United States international drug control program is based on

cooperation with foreign governments. United States efforts focus on country or region-specific crop control programs; law enforcement initiatives and training; interdiction assistance; education, prevention and treatment assistance; and support of regional projects designed to impede illicit drug production, processing, trafficking and consumption.

The United States Government has called for the leaders and governments worldwide to condemn illegal drugs and to take aggressive action to stop production, trafficking and use of such drugs. When it has been necessary and appropriate, US decisions on foreign aid and other matters have been tied to the willingness of the recipient country to execute a vigorous enforcement program against narcotics traffickers, including those individuals associated with producing, trafficking or otherwise profitting from illegal drugs.

The US State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) is the Federal agency responsible for coordinating the United States drug control efforts overseas. In addition to INM and DEA, numerous other US Government agencies contribute in various ways to the international effort. These include Customs, FBI, IRS, Coast Guard, USAID, USIA, NIDA and others.

The United States also supports the United Nations Division of Narcotics Drugs, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and Interpol. These international organizations play an important role in the international drug control effort.

US Government initiatives with key source and transit countries have resulted in positive and aggressive efforts to stop drug production and trafficking. The international response to the tough US policy on drug

abuse and drug trafficking is encouraging. There are numerous recent actions to support this contention.

In mid-March 1984, the Colombian authorities conducted raids and made seizures at a major cocaine processing complex in southeastern Colombia. The result was ten tons of cocaine seized, 41 individuals arrested, 7 aircraft seized, and 4-5 million dollars worth of processing materials, weapons and communication equipment seized.

In mid-1984, the Government of Colombia began testing a cannabis eradication program using herbicides, a significant milestone in international narcotics control.

As part of an all-out offensive against drug trafficking, the Colombian Government has initiated investigations of major drug violators and announced that it will honor its extradition treaty.

Pakistan has taken steps to gain control over and ultimately eliminate opium production and has begun to immobilize heroin laboratories operation in heretofore virtually "off limits" tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province.

Burma and Thailand's military forces have attacked opium traffickers operating in their border areas.

Italy has established laws to seize and forfeit illegal drug profits; and Canada, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand are pursuing similar legislation.

Mutual assistance treaties between the United States and Switzerland, the United States and Turkey, and the United States and the Netherlands (including the Netherlands Antilles) provide for the exchange of drug-related banking information. Similar treaties are in the advanced stages of negotiations or ratification with the countries of Colombia, Italy, and Morocco. Additionally, the United States has an executive agreement with the United Kingdom which provides for the release of drug-related banking information from the Cayman Islands.

In December of 1983, a joint working group on narcotics was established by Pakistan and US authorities to enhance drug eradication and drug law enforcement efforts.

In 1984, a joint working group on narcotics was established by Italian and US authorities to assist in narcotics and organized crime investigations.

In September 1984, Italian authorities culminated one of the most significant organized crime and drug trafficking investigations in recent times with the arrest of Tommaso Buscetta and the subsequent indictment and arrest of more than 300 significant Italian heroin traffickers.

In November of 1984, Mexican authorities seized approximately 10,000 tons of cannabis and released some 8,000 forced laborers.

The response by these and other nations, due in large part to the efforts of the United States, is evidence of the growing understanding that drug trafficking and abuse is truly an international problem with adverse social, political and economic impact on source and transit countries as well as the consumer countries. The leading law enforcement agencies of many key countries formally participate with the United States in international working groups. Due to the initiative of Administrator Francis M. Mullen, Jr., law enforcement officials from 14 American countries have joined in the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) which has established an unprecedented communications link to unify our law enforcement efforts against international narcotic traffickers.

As the lead agency for United States drug enforcement, DEA plays a crucial role in the campaign against international drug trafficking. DEA provides expertise, technical assistance and training to drug law enforcement officials in foreign countries; participates in the collection and sharing of drug related intelligence; and where authorized, participates in or otherwise assists drug investigations. DEA's foreign cooperative investigative program also includes assistance in the coordination of matters regarding extradition and support for the prosecution of major drug traffickers in foreign countries or in the

United States. DEA technical assistance and consultation with foreign governments covers the broad range of narcotics and drug enforcement activities, including development of cases and investigative techniques needed for monitoring financial flow and money laundering.

DEA's foreign cooperative investigations program motivates and assists foreign countries in the development of drug law enforcement and ancillary programs. In FY 84, as a result of these efforts, there were 1,072 cooperative arrests of international drug traffickers and, while FY 84 seizure statistics are not yet completed, it is known that seizures of heroin, cocaine and cannabis as the result of cooperative investigations exceeded those figures of FY 83. FY 84 also saw the funding of 26 Special Field Intelligence Programs (SFIP), the implementation of some 10 Special Enforcement Operations (SEO) and the training of 1,041 foreign government officials in drug enforcement methods. An important aspect of the foreign cooperative investigations program is the development of substantive enforcement and intelligence exchanges.

As previously mentioned, intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination are important functions for DEA Agents overseas. The 200 Agents assigned to 41 foreign countries (a substantial increase over 1982) devote approximately 55 percent of their time to bilateral intelligence activities. One of the primary elements of DEA's mission overseas is to develop and collect intelligence which can assist host countries, DEA, other foreign countries and other US agencies in identifying production capabilities, processing sites, smuggling routes and methods, trafficking trends, organizations, etc.

DEA's enforcement and intelligence efforts assist foreign counterparts in interdicting illicit drugs before they reach the consumer market in

the United States and enable foreign authorities to apprehend and prosecute those individuals responsible for drug trafficking.

The overall emphasis on DEA's international enforcement and intelligence programs is on the flexibility to respond to changing trends and situations and to bring special expertise and resources to bear on a problem. We explore many innovative enforcement and intelligence gathering tactics to bring pressure on the drug traffickers.

Many of these involve the establishment and maintenance of new and enhanced programs such as Special Field Intelligence Programs, Special Enforcement Operation programs and financial investigations. DEA has already experienced success with several of these programs.

One of DEA's newest and most successful Special Enforcement Operation programs is Operation CHEMCON (Chemical Control). This program was developed as an effort to monitor and control the distribution of precursor chemicals needed to manufacture illicit cocaine. The program relies on the cooperation of licit chemical manufacturers and drug law enforcement personnel from many nations. The Governments of Panama, Colombia, Brazil and others have played major roles in the success of the program to date.

CHEMCON began with the control of ether, which is needed to produce cocaine from coca leaves. DEA received the cooperation of all the distributors of ether in the free world. They reported to DEA all transactions involving five or more gallons. This information made it possible during the first four months of the program for the enforcement officials in Panama, Colombia, Brazil and the United States to seize more than 13,000 fifty-five gallon barrels of ether.

We are seeing the impact of the program. Ether has become difficult for the manufacturers of cocaine to obtain and it is, therefore, more difficult to produce cocaine. Thus, cocaine has become more scarce and the price is going up. There are reports of cocaine traffickers in Colombia willing to pay $7,000 for a 55-gallon drum of ether that normally retails for $180 in the U.S.

The chemical program is being broadened and precursor monitoring and control programs have been developed for heroin and dangerous drugs such as LSD, P2P, PCP and Methaqualone. The program is being discussed with many additional source countries and it is anticipated that these programs will be operating in several more source countries prior to the end of FY 85.

Special Field Intelligence Programs were established by DEA to ensure a flow of intelligence from those critical collection areas not covered by routine enforcement or intelligence efforts. Intelligence provided by SFIPs identifies or defines the scope of the problem and can eventually be utilized to support enforcement operations. The following are examples of SFIPs.

DEA conducted a SFIP in Southwest Asia from 1982 to 1984 to locate and identify heroin laboratory operations in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Upon verification, the information was passed to Pakistani enforcement officials. Intelligence from the SFIP led to more than 10 heroin laboratory seizures and closures and provided invaluable assistance to the Government of Pakistan.

A SFIP was recently begun by DEA Headquarters in conjunction with DEA field offices in Pakistan, Turkey and Austria to gather intelligence on the production of opiates in Southwest Asia and their transshipment through Turkey to Europe and the United States.

In Southeast Asia, SFIPs are targetted against heroin producers in the Golden Triangle who operate refineries at the Thailand/Burma border. Intelligence generated from these programs has been passed to both Thai and Burmese officials who have launched successful

operations against refinery sites and storage and crossing points along that remote and ill-defined border.

In addition, information is collected by SFIPs on transportation routes and methods used by trafficking organizations to move opiates from the Golden Triangle to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

DEA also has special programs to control the diversion of licit controlled substances into the international illicit market. These programs operate effectively and have a positive impact on the overall diversion problem. For example, DEA, in close cooperation with the State Department and some members of Congress was instrumental in persuading foreign governments to control the production and distribution of Methaqualone. By the end of FY 83, all known major European source countries, as well as the Peoples Republic of China, had ceased or reduced Methaqualone production, and had placed strict controls on its exportation. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the worldwide abuse of Methaqualone.

The financial aspects of the illicit drug traffic are as damaging as the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. The multi-billion dollar illicit drug traffic breeds corruption; undermines political processes, government stability and economies; and plagues societies with acts of terrorism and other violent crime. DEA has stressed to foreign governments the need to conduct financial investigations designed to target financiers and heads of organizations for prosecution and immobilization. DEA has also worked with several countries to help them develop or strengthen asset seizure and forfeiture laws in order that traffickers proceeds may be seized and turned over to the host country's coffers.

A growing international concern is terrorism. Because of the increasing relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism, DEA has become

involved in developing intelligence concerning drug-related terrorism. With increasing frequency, DEA is receiving intelligence which indicates that terrorist groups worldwide are becoming either directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is being utilized by terrorists to finance their activities. DEA is cognizant of the fact that the criminal alliance of terrorists and drug traffickers is a threat to all sovereign nations and is working together with numerous foreign governments to develop and share drug-terrorist related intelligence.

DEA continues to maintain a broad and comprehensive training program to provide basic, advanced and specialized training to foreign counterparts overseas as well as in the United States. During FY 84, 1041 foreign law enforcement officials received formal training from DEA. This training has proven to be invaluable to the international drug control effort by increasing the level of expertise of thousands of foreign officials during the past few years.

Along the same vein, some 288 mid to senior level drug enforcement and drug policy level foreign officials participated in Executive Observation Programs or Special Observation Programs hosted or programmed by DEA Headquarters during FY 84. These observation programs have been extremely beneficial in developing better bilateral cooperation and drug control programs.

In conclusion, DEA feels that its role in international narcotics control is both to motivate and assist the international community in developing strong programs in drug control and drug law enforcement. We are proud to be recognized internationally as the lead agency in international drug law enforcement and we will continue to enhance our international drug control efforts. While my report today has

enumerated significant accomplishments and emphasized encouraging signs of international cooperation, continued progress toward our goal of reducing the supply and demand for illicit drugs is a formidable challenge. We are confident of the continued support of the Congress and especially of this Committee.

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss international drug control and DEA drug control efforts in source and transit countries. I shall be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. SHEER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEW YORK

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator KASTEN. The next witness on this panel is Mr. Thomas Sheer, who is the Special Agent in Charge of the Criminal Division, New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Sheer?

Mr. SHEER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join with Mr. Monastero in offering to dispense with repeating my previously submitted written testimony.

I would like to add only that the FBI is relatively new to this war, but I would like to make it very clear to everyone here that we are in the war, we have been in the war since 1982, and we are here to stay. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Sheer, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Thomas Sheer follows:]

Prepared Statement of Thomas L. Sheer

Special Agent in Charge
Criminal Division, New York Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before Members of the Subcommittee to give testimony concerning the FBI's efforts to combat drug trafficking in New York City.

Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, drug enforcement in New York bears a heavy responsibility because New York City is a major importation, distribution, and financial center for all types of narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine. Both traditional and nontraditional organized criminal groups have flourished and prospered from their involvement in drug trafficking. Today more than ever before, organized crime is known to be inextricably interwoven to narcotics.

The FBI's participation in narcotics enforcement expanded rapidly from January 1982 when we received concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA to investigate violations of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. At that time, the FBI began to focus nationwide efforts on the following investigative areas: (1) traditional organized crime grcups involved in narcotics; (2) emerging nontraditional organized crime groups involved in drugs; (3) financiers or money launderers; and (4) public corruption in narcotics operations.

The New York Office readily accepted the additional responsibility generated by concurrent jurisdiction with DEA. As head of the Criminal Division of the FBI's New York Office, my first priority was to define our role in drug enforcement so as to enhance the efforts of other Federal, state, and local agencies, and to apply limited resources where they could be most effective. Following research which included discussions with experienced drug enforcement officials and prosecutors, there was no doubt that heroin addiction, because of resultant crimes and its deleterious effect on the populace of the greater New York area, should assume

top priority and FBI resources should be directed against the organizations responsible for the importation and high level distribution of this drug.

Intelligence sources at that time indicated that the "Sicilian Mafia" and their associates were responsible for the importation of the largest amounts of heroin and had developed networks that facilitated their operations. As such, our efforts were concentrated against their criminal organizations.

A strategy was developed to complement the expertise of the DEA and the New York City Police Department by applying the techniques that have proven successful in the FBI's traditional organized crime investigations. I am referring to use of Title III, telephone and microphone surveillances, and sophisticated physical surveillance by specially trained teams. Although our undercover capability in the drug area has rapidly developed, this is not our main thrust, but is reserved for penetration of high level distributors. This precludes duplication of the efforts of the local police and provides an efficient combination of resources.

Based on this strategy, our major cases, by necessity, involve the DEA, the NYPD, and frequently U.S. Customs. Our investigative efforts are directed at developing evidence against the highest level subjects. They are few in number because in order to achieve set objectives, substantial resources must be dedicated to these investigations for extended periods of time. This approach has proven successful in traditional organized crime investigations in the past and has proven to be a successful approach to a drug enforcement program.

As an example of what has been accomplished using this strategy, I would like to cite the Dominic Tufaro case. Tufaro was the leader of a multi-kilo heroin distribution network and, following a 14-month investigation with DEA, 22 individuals were indicted and tried in Federal court. Tufaro was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Another is the Filip Ragusa case which was worked in conjunction with the DEA and the NYPD. The NYPD's undercover expertise served as a basis for court authorized electronic surveillances and as a result, eight individuals were arrested, two of whom were Italian nationals. Thirty-nine pounds of heroin were seized at a stash location. U S. Customs was utilized at the importation stage of this case, which resulted in the conviction of the main defendants who recently received substantial sentences.

The most recent success is the network alleged to have been run by Gaetano Badalamenti, a fugitive from Italy. This network has been labeled by the media as the "Pizza Connection." Forty-three individuals including Badalamenti were arrested in New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, New Jersey, Switzerland, Spain and Italy. This case, which is awaiting trial, utilized the expertise of virtually every Federal and local law enforcement agency and, at times, foreign police agencies.

I cite these as examples of what can be accomplished, and I can assure you that similar cases are currently being worked.

Although the long-term impact of the Sicilian Mafia program may be immeasurable, certain facts are known. The close cooperative effort between American and Italian law enforcement officials enhanced and expedited our program. These relationships will provide the basis for a full and timely exchange of information. Likewise, on the positive side, Sicilian Mafia members are finding it harder to furnish heroin or in some cases, furnishing an inferior, low-grade product. The Sicilian Mafia heroin traffickers were further disrupted by Tomasso Buscetta's testimony which led to the arrest of hundreds of Mafia members and associates in Italy.

On the negative side, the profit margin of heroin trafficking is so great that other individuals or groups quickly fill the void when one dominant group is neutralized. The effects on street crime, emergency room statistics, and methadone center increases are often temporary and at best are stabilized. New York City Police Department statistics show that in 1983, there were

12,046 heroin addicts in city jails. The typical addict commits 209 crimes a year, excluding possession and sale, and the police estimate that 24% of the homicides in New York City are drug related.

Of the 247,000 estimated heavy heroin addicts in New York State, 77% are estimated to be in New York City. This combined with New York being a major port of entry accounts for it being a lucrative trafficking area. With the apparent temporary neutralization of several major Sicilian heroin trafficker networks, intelligence sources have indicated that no other group with the extensive organization demonstrated by the Sicilian Mafia has emerged as a dominant factor in the heroin trade.

The void is currently being filled by a variety of organized crime groups. These groups are ofttimes comprised of persons from the source country. For example, Pakistanis are reportedly involved in narcotics distribution networks. These emerging groups have not yet developed the sophistication of their predecessors. Given time, if not checked by a combination of domestic and international enforcement, one or all of these groups will develop networks comparable to the Sicilians.

I believe that the formation of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force in late 1982 and the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 have greatly enhanced the drug enforcement effort in New York as relates to narcotics investigations and heroin investigations in particular. The time is now opportune to continue our efforts to impact on the problem by continuing to work together. Thirty DEA Agents currently occupy space with fifty-two FBI Agents in New York City in an effort to consolidate and coordinate Justice Department resources and, to date, this pilot project has been successful.

Cocaine use is recognized as a growing problem that is affecting all segments of society as well as siphoning large sums of money out of the United States into foreign bank accounts. Consistent with the FBI national priorities, the New York Office is working a number of cocaine cases involving the laundering of

large sums of money. DEA already has a strong commitment to cocaine enforcement, and the FBI is ready to assist to the extent that our unique abilities will enhance these investigations.

Domestic enforcement, Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, is not the total answer to the drug problem. It is, however, an integral part that must be aggressively addressed. Judge William Webster, Director of the FBI, in remarks made in July 1983 before the Ninth Circuit Conference, referring to the drug problem, said "...it has become the number one crime problem in the United States... The FBI simply has to be a part of the effort to deal with it." The New York Office has been and intends to continue to be a major part of this national effort through quality investigations and close cooperation with other agencies and prosecutors charged with enforcement of drug violations.

I am now prepared to answer any questions which you may have.

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESS

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES

STATEMENT OF DR. DOUGLAS LIPTON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, AND CONSULTANT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS OF UNITED NATIONS

Senator KASTEN. The final speaker on this panel is Mr. Douglas Lipton, who is the Deputy Director for Research and Evaluation, New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services, and a consultant to the United Nations on International Drug Control Efforts. Dr. Lipton?

Dr. LIPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is unfortunate that I only learned about this yesterday afternoon. I do not have prepared remarks, but I will be pleased to submit something at a later date.

The United Nations, as described by Ambassador Buffum, has been involved in this effort as an outgrowth of the effort of the League of Nations. The concern of recommitment has been exemplary. However, the impact of the world situation, as we have all been able to see, has not been very great.

I was asked not very long ago, back in the late part of the summer, to be a consultant to the United Nations and to respond to requests by the General Assembly to determine whether the drug control efforts of the United Nations were indeed having an impact, whether they were useful, whether the end users really saw what was being done by the United Nations as having an impact on the drug situation either in their countries or in the world.

PROVINCIAL ANTINARCOTICS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Four projects were selected to be examined in some detail. Two of the projects were in Turkey and two of the projects were in Thailand. Very briefly, let me just say that the provincial antinarcotics telecommunications system which has been established in Turkey by the United Nations through UNFDAC funding, as well as through the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, has been established in as exemplary a way as a communications system for law enforcement could be established. It has undergone continuous scrutiny by experts from a variety of countries. And it is in place.

DRUG TRAFFIC IN TURKEY

As to its impact on the international drug situation as it applies to Turkey, that is less obvious. The fact is that there is still some traffic moving through Turkey, both in the form of the TIR trucks moving across from east to west as well as clandestine smugglers carrying backpacks of opium up from Lebanon and from Iraq and through Syria and into Turkey and then on through to Bulgaria and across.

The efforts by the Turks have been extraordinary in the sense of the degree of investing on the part of the national government to support the Shawndarma, the rural police that provide the major bulwark of law enforcement against drug traffic.

But all in all, there is still a considerable effort that needs to be exercised by the Turks, particularly beyond the United Nations efforts, beyond the capability of the United Nations to support.

In fact, as we look across all of the efforts of the United Nations, they are totally dependent upon the will and the commitment of the individual countries that receive the funds to make the objectives happen. There is no way that the United Nations can make it happen. The United Nations can provide, I think the words that you used were catalytic funds.

CROP SUBSTITUTION EFFORT

Wherever I went, I saw fairly effective catalytic action, that is, in Thailand, for example, as we looked at the highland agricultural and marketing production project, a crop substitution effort. There was indeed a very catalytic program that has taught all of the other 11 nation programs what is going on in Thailand is a better way of doing things as far as crop substitution goes.

But the program itself had very limited objectives. It was not designed to eliminate opium in the nation. What it did demonstrate is you can grow other crops in opium fields, and you can convince the farmers to do so.

The hill farmers in the highland are ultimately capitalists. If you can demonstrate they can make more money with another crop, they will do so. They will continue to grow a little opium to supply their own opium smokers in their village. They will still grow a little opium to keep the cash reserve under their bed in case there is crop failure. But by and large, they will not grow a sufficient amount to make it a problem for this country.

HEROIN IMPORTS INTO THAILAND

In fact, as we look at Thailand right now, Thailand is a net importer of heroin. They have a tremendous problem of their own, a very rapidly growing addiction of heroin. They are not a severe problem. If one might use an analogy, it is like the guy who lost his key out in the street and went to look for it under the streetlight, not where he lost it. Much of the effort in Thailand is because Thailand has invited those efforts in.

The big problem is not in Thailand but in Burma. I think we all are aware of that. We must realize 35 times more is grown in Burma than in Thailand. If we were to stamp it out in Thailand tomorrow, we would not make a dent in the problem here in this country.

That is not to say the efforts that have gone on are useless or futile or have not had a payoff. They have. There has generally been a reduction. But the reductions have been offset in fact by other areas not under U.N. programs and not under U.S. programs, not under FRG programs, where the growth has increased.

So in Thailand itself there has been really no net impact of any kind. But there has been a great deal of very positive learning in terms of what can be done, and there are very good prospects for the future. Unfortunately, not the near future. I would say probably we have to wait 20 to 30 years, at least as I see it, from having talked to the people there. As I see it, they will not move themselves to actively eradicate the crops. They will move to suppress as pressure continues to be applied, but in a very humanitarian rather than an aggressive way.

The reason for that is there is a very powerful need for internal national security. The likely insurgent areas are the same areas where opium is grown. If pressure is applied severely by our country, they will back out, I firmly believe, from that support because they are at risk of a severe civil war and will not move aggressively against that if they feel that the suppression of opium will bring on that kind of insurgence.

Senator KASTEN. I am going to ask you to summarize a bit here, Dr. Lipton, because we have to proceed.

Dr. LIPTON. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

DRUG TREATMENT EFFORTS IN THAILAND

The efforts of treatment in Thailand have not been very successful at all. All they do is detoxification. They have a program which consists of more than detoxification, but nobody stays beyond detoxification, no one. It is the most frustrating thing to all of the physicians and dedicated workers who are there waiting for patients to treat but do not have that.

The control of the world situation that the United Nations has been actively involved in is probably a portrait in frustration more than anything else. The efforts have not had a major impact. In fact, the problem has continued to grow worse and will probably continue to grow worse for at least another decade. And all of our suppression efforts notwithstanding, if we suppress all of the opium that now grows, we would still be faced with manmade chemicals which are more powerful, more potent, and are relatively easy to make. Phetinol and its 1,400 analogues exist right on the horizon. That is sometimes called China 1. So that if we were to eliminate all the natural opium and opiates, we would still be faced with the problem of the development of new chemicals which can be fabricated illicitly which have anywhere from 2,000 to 8,000 times the potency.

That is a real problem we have to deal with proactively not reactively, as we have in the past. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Doctor, thank you very much.

GENERAL QUESTIONING OF DEPARTMENTAL PANEL

U.N. EFFORTS TOWARD DRUG CONTROL

Senator KASTEN. Ambassador Buffum, you suggested that there was a growing feeling of the importance of this issue in the United Nations. I have to say, frankly, that I wish that they were spending as much time on this as they are on beating up the State of Israel or some of the other efforts they make day after day in the United Nations. I am hopeful they will start to concern themselves about these more serious issues about which, through cooperative work, they might be able to make a contribution.

As you are aware, and you talked about the growth in this account—the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control—for many years the United States was, for all practical purposes, the sole donor. You described the growth of the fund. I think it went up to roughly $9 million this year.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N. FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE

Could you tell us what the U.S. percentage of the contributions to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse is, who are the other top five donors, and what is the percentage contribution?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I certainly would be very happy to do that.

You are absolutely right, that in its formative period, the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control existed largely through the generosity of the U.S. Government. I have just had occasion to look back at the record of the contributions and expenditures for the first 12 years of its existence. The United States contributed about 50 percent of its total resources during that period, $35 million out of something like $77 million.

LARGEST CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

But there has been a dramatic change in that picture just in the last 3 years. In the fall of 1983, the largest single commitment ever made to the fund came from the Government of Italy, which volunteered to pay up to and in excess of $40 million over a 5-year period for programs confined to the Andean subregion, an area where the United Nations had previously not been particularly active. In the earlier years, the U.N. actions were concentrated on opium, heroin, and more traditional drugs. Now that the problems involve the coca leaf and usage of cocaine, it is quite clear that a reallocation of resources to deal with this newer phenomenon is required, and it is taking place.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will then look at the list of contributors. Perhaps the most useful figures to give you would be

those contributions pledged during 1984, up to the month of October. The largest amount during that period came from Italy, $4.8 million. The second largest was from the United States, $2.5 million. Next was the United Kingdom with $260,000, and then Canada at $240,000. Then you had a series of smaller contributions. Those are the major components of funding.

Senator KASTEN. So is it fair to say that the U.S. contribution, taking out that extraordinary contribution from Italy, because evidently that is just a 1-year contribution—is that right?

Ambassador BUFFUM. No, sir. Italy has committed themselves to a 5-year program totaling $40 million. This program is, as I have said, one initiated only in the fall of 1983. Therefore, 5 years into 40 would be $8 million a year we could expect. In the first year of that fund they were only able to use $4 million of that.

Senator KASTEN. It would be helpful for us to have a summary of contributions by all nations to UNFDAC.

Ambassador BUFFUM. I would be happy to supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL

Status of Cash Contributions Pledged or Received during the Years 1971-1983 as of October 1984[1/]

	1971-1983 Contributions in US$
Algeria	7,995
Argentina	86,000
Australia	2,127,877
Austria	516,937
Bahamas	5,000
Barbados	1,750
Belgium	167,503
Benin	1,667
Bolivia	6,000
Brazil	48,000
Canada	2,104,541
Chile	27,500
Cyprus	6,582
Denmark	433,026
Egypt	4,000
Finland	156,053
France	1,388,646
German, Federal Republic of	9,361,257
Greece	23,799
Guyana	487
Holy Sea	1,000
Hong Kong	172,907
Iceland	23,900
India	42,000
Indonesia	8,000
Iran	43,715
Iraq	20,032
Ireland	20,000
Israel	4,500
Italy	953,161
Ivory Coast	1,211
Jamaica	7,505
Japan	2,705,682
Jordan	2,000
Kenya	24,386
Kuwait	26,000
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	16,460
Liechtenstein	6,000
Luxembourg	1,000
Madagascar	6,400
Malawi	1,014

1/ This cumulative list shows all contributions pledged or received during the period 1971-1983 irrespective of they year of application.

	1971-1983 Contributions in US$
Malaysia	21,500
Malta	2,580
Mauritius	3,338
Mexico	10,000
Morocco	29,275
New Zealand	311,223
Nigeria	14,778
Norway	8,014,740
Oman	997
Pakistan	5,546
Panama	2,470
Philippines	17,979
Portugal	19,000
Qatar	62,000
Republic of Korea	13,500
Rwanda	1,066
San Marino	1,500
Saudi Arabia	657,000
Senegal	6,204
Singapore	3,000
South Africa	52,474
Spain	20,000
Sri Lanka	500
Sudan	1,000
Suriname	2,000
Sweden	3,776,873
Switzerland	340,379
Thailand	9,000
Togo	652
Trinidad and Tobago	1,000
Tunisia	17,342
Turkey	39,773
United Arab Emirates	12,000
United Kingdom	936,347
United Republic of Cameroon	4,504
United States of America	35,270,000
Uruguay	1,000
Venezuela	16,000
Viet Nam	1,000
Yugoslavia	69,288
Zaire	500
Totals:	70,330,821
Public Donations:	2,543,449
Interest Income (31.12.83):	4,156,683
GRAND TOTAL:	77,030,953

CUTOFF OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NONCOOPERATING NATIONS

Senator KASTEN. I just have one further question for Mr. Thomas. Do you think that we should have an automatic cutoff of U.S. assistance to any country which does not cooperate with the United States in the efforts toward dealing with this drug problem?

We read almost every week of a country, most recently countries in South America, in which there clearly has been a lack of cooperation. Do you think, and not just in reference to the $56 million we are spending in this particular drug eradication effort, but do you think there should be a system where we simply automatically cut off aid if we find a country, wherever they are in the world, is not cooperating completely with the efforts of this Government?

Mr. THOMAS. We certainly are aware of the congressional interest in this issue over the years. The Hawkins-Gilman amendment, which has strengthened the previous provisions to suspend assistance to any country that is not taking effective measures, is solid, is sound, and has the support of my Bureau and the Department of State.

I would certainly be willing to recommend to the Secretary of State and, through him, to the President that assistance should be suspended to any country that is unwilling, for whatever reason, beyond its control and capabilities, to take the necessary steps to control narcotics production and trafficking.

I would add, however, that to date, most countries are willing to cooperate to various degrees without that threat hanging over them. Perhaps it is in the background. Perhaps they know that it exists and that supports some of our efforts. Colombia, for example, did not have to be forced into the very laudable cooperation they have taken over the past 2 years.

But I want to repeat that I certainly am prepared to recommend suspension of assistance for any country that we judge as being completely unwilling to take the necessary steps.

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato.

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have so many questions that I would like to ask our various panelists. I understand that time simply does not permit that. I am wondering if I might be able to submit these questions to our panelists and ask that they respond in writing so they might also be part of this record.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection, the questions will be inserted at the conclusion of the hearing.

I might say parenthetically, that it is standard procedure to hold the record of each hearing open for 2 weeks, during which time there may be questions which come to you from Senator D'Amato or other members of the subcommittee who are unable to be with us. There may be specific questions that Congressman Rangel is interested in pursuing. What we will do is submit these questions to you and ask you get back to us in writing.

SITUATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, if I might just touch on two points. I have been following with great interest the situation in Paraguay and some of the other problems we have been experiencing in Latin America. There is a fierce battle being fought between narcotics traffickers and the Government of Colombia, with the car bombs. In Peru, the antidrug contract agents who were put in the field were ruthlessly gunned down. It shows you the force, virulence, and determination of these narcotics groups. I wonder in certain cases if they might even be more powerful than the government. In particular regions they would appear to be so.

CHEMICAL SEIZURE IN PARAGUAY

I would like to know if our Government has been in contact with Paraguay with respect to the large amount of chemicals which were seized last week? Have we undertaken diplomatic efforts to ensure that those chemicals are destroyed? These are chemicals used in making cocaine, correct?

Mr. THOMAS. That is correct; a seizure of primarily ether, although there were some other chemicals as well.

The answer to your question is yes. I know there has been some press coverage on this matter. Although we do not like to discuss openly the government-to-government dealings we have on matters like this, I can say that we have been in touch with the Government of Paraguay on this matter, and we have made it very clear to that government the importance that we attach to this issue.

We know full well that this ether shipment would be primarily dedicated to cocaine refining if it would fall into the wrong hands.

We have asked the Government of Paraguay that these chemicals be destroyed. It is my belief that the Government of Paraguay, under its own volition, will do so.

Senator D'AMATO. That would be a very useful sign, I think, very symbolic. We don't think it is going to end the problem, but we certainly would hope they would comply.

DESTINATION OF ILLEGAL CHEMICAL

On the drug enforcement side of this question, do we know for whom that ether was bound?

Mr. MONASTERO. No, Senator, we don't know precisely to whom that was going because the shipment was seized. If it had proceeded further, perhaps we would have known.

CHEMCON PROGRAM

Senator D'AMATO. What about prior shipments? Obviously this wasn't the first time. They must have been carrying this on for some time.

Mr. MONASTERO. Yes; we do have a program called CHEMCON, chemical control, in which we do monitor the disbursement of ether and other chemicals from cooperating manufacturers around the world—and many, many manufacturers have cooperated with us—as a

result of which we have been able to trace ether shipments many times right to a laboratory.

In this case, that was not true. However, we did trace it to that point. That is why we were able to bring it to the attention of the Paraguayan Government.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN CARIBBEAN DRUG TRAFFIC AREAS

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you. I am wondering if I might just touch on one other thing. Possibly DEA and the FBI will be able to respond to this. In some of the Caribbean areas there is an awful lot of drug activity. I know that Congressman Rangel understands the nature of this particular problem. How extensive are our intelligence sources in this area? It would seem to me that we should really have some tremendous capabilities in the Caribbean. I am wondering, do we have such capabilities?

In St. Thomas, for example, there is so much drug trafficking. That should be an area where we can do something.

If necessary, I would like to see a detailed report, Mr. Chairman, that indicates exactly the kind of intelligence operations going on there. If we can't clean out some of those areas, we are not going to be successful elsewhere. If we can't control that situation in our own territories, what are we going to do up in the Andes?

Mr. MONASTERO. As I mentioned, our intelligence capabilities vary considerably in each country, but in most countries in Latin America we have what we call special field intelligence programs. These are in cooperation with the host government, and they are generally effective over the long term.

It is difficult to have, without being able to penetrate the particular organization, precise intelligence.

PROBLEMS IN ANDES AND ST. THOMAS

Senator D'AMATO. I understand that we have an antidrug operation in the Andes, and the resistance to this operation is fierce. But what is going on in the islands in the Caribbean close to the United States? It should not require much intelligence to understand where the drugs are being grown, who is growing them, et cetera. Do we have that?

Mr. MONASTERO. Well, we certainly have a good idea of where the growing areas are and where the transit areas are. In order to have an impact on those on a daily basis, we have to have the resources in place to do that. In many places the host governments don't have those resources in place.

Senator D'AMATO. Would the host government in St. Thomas, for example, object to our utilization of such resources?

Mr. MONASTERO. There is no objection there. It is a question simply of resources. Whether it is in Nebraska or St. Thomas or anyplace else, it is a question of how much of a contribution can you make there as opposed to some other place.

Senator D'AMATO. I would like to pursue, Mr. Chairman, possibly in a closed session, what kinds of efforts we are really making. I am not trying to tell anybody how to run their jobs because this is new to me, but it just seems to me that there are certain areas where we should be able to close down drug trafficking.

You will then say that they will just relocate to another area. Well, that is fine. It must make some impact.

Mr. MONASTERO. Yes.

CONTINUING DANGER FROM DRUG TRAFFICKING

Senator D'AMATO. I would like at some other time to study this particular problem further. I don't think our antidrug efforts should be public. You don't advertise to the enemy. As far as I am concerned, they are the enemy. Those people who are producing, distributing, in this business are killing our youth.

I live in fear. Why do I live in fear? I have two teenage boys, 14 and 16. They go to parties. They are exposed to drugs. It is there. Who is kidding? In the local high school where my boys go, there are potheads or druggies. It is a common, accepted thing in most of our communities. The problem isn't just in Harlem. You know, this is America's problem. We better wake up. We are hiding our head in the sand, making believe it is not going on. Cocaine is the fashionable thing. It could tear our society apart.

So I would really like to, Mr. Chairman, get the necessary information to our domestic law enforcement officers to identify who it is, where it is, and try to cut out that source. I truly believe that because of our open society, it is a lot easier keeping narcotics from our shores than controlling this problem once it has permeated our society.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Congressman Rangel.

CONTINUED LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR PROGRAMS

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for giving me the opportunity to join in with Senator D'Amato to present questions to this very outstanding panel of dedicated public servants so that we might be better able to know what our problems are legislatively and to be more supportive in this effort.

I would like to congratulate Secretary Thomas for assuming his new responsibilities, and knowing that he follows a great New Yorker that has made a great contribution toward trying to resolve some of these problems, and letting you know, as you already know, of course, that the Select House Committee stands ready to support your efforts as we start this new administration.

PRIORITIES

Your testimony emphasized priorities. This is where I have historically, no matter what administration was in office, had a problem as to how we use this word priority. Do you look forward, Mr. Secretary, to sitting in with Cabinet Members from the Justice Department as well as

from State, with the Vice President, and/or Carlton Turner, on a periodic basis to determine the direction that we should be going as relates to international drug trafficking?

Mr. THOMAS. I have in my previous position as Deputy Assistant Secretary, sat in on many sessions either at the Cabinet level, sub-Cabinet level, meetings with the Vice President, and others.

As you are aware, Congressman Rangel, Congress has now established a new Drug Enforcement Policy Board which will begin to meet after January 20 which will provide, I think, some very good and solid policy guidance in the area of both domestic and international narcotics enforcement.

DRUG POLICY BOARD

Mr. RANGEL. If we in the Congress wanted to identify one person from the executive branch who would be coordinating this effort, what name would you recommend to us?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, you already did identify an individual as the chairman of this particular Drug Enforcement Policy Board who will be the Attorney General. It is a collegial board. It will make recommendations to the President who, of course, is in a position to make final decisions on what course of action we should be taking under a broad Federal strategy.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. RANGEL. But that would include international responsibilities as well?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly my international responsibilities fall under the Secretary of State's mandate as passed to him by the President.

PRIORITIES WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. RANGEL. In dealing with the priority as relates to the Secretary of State, in the last 4 years, with the exception of Secretary Shultz's speech to some business people in Miami, do you know of any speech that the Secretary of State has given to indicate the priority of the United States concern with international drug trafficking?

Mr. THOMAS. Secretary Shultz, on a number of occasions prior to that speech, issued statements such as to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other bodies. Also, subsequent to the speech in Miami—which, I might add, was very well received around the world; it was seen as a significant speech by the Secretary——

Mr. RANGEL. I assume I didn't word my question correctly. I am talking about in front of any international body or any national group.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH BEFORE OAS

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. Secretary of State Shultz in his address to the OAS, Organization of American States, in Brazilia, in November of last year, addressing a broad range of issues, had a very significant segment on narcotics and the problems it poses to us. The audience, of course, was composed of leaders from Latin America.

And Secretary Shultz's key foreign policy address which he gave in Los Angeles in October, which was a review of the foreign policy priorities over the next decade or so, stressed the importance of narcotics control, and was a very prominent part of that particular speech.

Mr. RANGEL. Unfortunately, this gets very little reporting in our papers because, with the exception of the Miami report, our staff was unable to pick up anything.

Do you know of any addresses that have been made at the United Nations to support our representatives there, either by Ambassador Kirkpatrick or the Secretary of State, as relates to our plea for international cooperation?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly in the Secretary's statements at various times there has been mention of the importance of narcotics. I might add that a very important statement was made this year by the Secretary General of the United Nations strongly supporting the steps that need to be taken by many nations. This was done in November and is something which, I think, speaks very strongly for what the Secretary General's commitment will be.

Mr. RANGEL. And Ambassador Kirkpatrick?

Mr. THOMAS. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, to my knowledge, has not made a formal speech to United Nations on this subject.

CROP SUBSTITUTION

Mr. RANGEL. Let me ask, with all of the efforts we are making relating to crop substitutions, and I respect the testimony we received today, our committee has had the opportunity to visit almost every major opium or cocaine producing country, and our report indicates we should expect from each one of these countries a bumper crop as relates to opium and cocaine. Does the State Department have any information to contradict that? The countries, of course, would be Mexico, Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Thailand, and Pakistan.

Mr. THOMAS. We know production of illicit narcotics may be up this year in certain countries. However, in other countries we expect production may very well be down. The program in Turkey continues successfully. In Pakistan, we are estimating 45 to 50 tons of opium production, the same as last year. In the Northern Frontier Province, we expect a decline. No major changes are expected in Burma. Thailand may show a modest increase. The Government of Colombia engaged in an aerial spray program against marijuana this year, taking out more than 3,000 hectares of marijuana cultivation, the first year with limited equipment. With the help of the United States and with the ongoing commitment of Colombia, I will make an estimate that this coming year the Government of Colombia will destroy the majority of the marijuana cultivated in Colombia.

COCA LEAF PRODUCTION

So there are some very positive signs out there. A very troubling area, of course, is in the area of coca leaf production. We have seen some increases in coca production in the Andean region this past year.

We will be submitting to Congress the Hawkins-Gilman report of February 1 and all of that data will be contained in that report.

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. AMBASSADORS

Mr. RANGEL. We get the impression in Colombia, and perhaps even in Bolivia, that our Ambassadors are being chased out by the narcotics terrorists, certainly American personnel have been. If that is so, what are we doing about it?

Mr. THOMAS. Our Ambassadors have not been chased out of those countries. In the case of our Ambassador to Colombia, Ambassador Tambs, who has done an outstanding job in that country, he certainly has had numerous death threats directed against him. I can assure you, Ambassador Tambs is a friend of mine, and no one would be able to run him out of Colombia.

Our Ambassador in Bolivia is equally strong on that issue. I assure you no narcotics terrorist organizations will in any way run off the Ambassador.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me point out these are two outstanding Americans, courageous Ambassadors. I have not in my 14 years in the Congress met anyone that would exceed their commitment and ability. But it is true that both of their families have been threatened on more than one occasion and attempts have been made on both of their lives, is that not so?

Mr. THOMAS. It is absolutely true those Ambassadors have had death threats directed against them.

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Mr. RANGEL. In addition, it is true some of our personnel have been removed from those countries.

Mr. THOMAS. There has been a reduction in personnel and families in Colombia at this stage. But there is in no way any abandonment or even reduction in the narcotics efforts in that country.

Mr. RANGEL. Or in Peru.

Mr. THOMAS. And equally in Peru. In spite of the 19 deaths Senator D'Amato referred to earlier, our program has not altered in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It certainly had a pause; unfortunately, the level of violence was so extreme. Our program is ongoing. We intend to stay with it. We and the Government of Peru will not be deterred.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, we intend to revisit again. I am saying that notwithstanding what has been described as limited successes, we have not seen any impact in the amount of cocaine or heroin coming into this country from the countries that have been visited. We do hope that maybe next year we will have different type of data to come together with.

SUPPORT FROM U.S. COAST GUARD

I would like to congratulate the Coast Guard for the outstanding job they are doing, even where there have been suggested cuts from the administration. I think the Congress has been able to see what you have

been able to do with so little, especially in reaching out and working with the Navy. We do hope and will be exploring how we can get more military, within our Constitution and legal restrictions, involved in what is perceived by many of us to be an attack against this country.

TREATIES WITH SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS

I will conclude by asking the representative from the United Nations, notwithstanding the fact we are doubling our effort in making financial contributions, and recognizing that there is no power of the Secretary General to direct that a country do what we would want as relates to eradication plans, what pressures do we have?

We heard recently, and it has been testified, that Colombia has sent over four people who have been indicted in this country. I assume this was a part of the 1982 extradition treaty. I would like to laud the government for agreeing to a 1982 agreement. I will do that for the record.

But we have this single convention treaty. We have a variety of agreements that nations have entered into that are moral and legal, and we don't expect that we will be evading these countries because of their failure to abide by their commitment. But what good are the agreements if we have a dozen countries that sign them but completely ignore them?

U.N. AUTHORITY IN DRUG CONTROL

Ambassador BUFFUM. Congressman Rangel, you really have put your finger on the very heart of the problem. That is the willingness of governments to live up to their commitments. I personally believe we already have adequate international law established which covers all of the problems you mentioned. This would include extradition, which is explicitly provided for in the single convention and protocol.

The United States has found difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the country concerned to implement the law. More fundamental than that, if I might say so, is the fact that we are dealing here with an array of lawbreakers, both national law and international law.

So as far as the United Nations is concerned, I have to admit, and do so readily, we do not have any enforcement power in this field. There is very, very limited ability to cut off the supply of drugs to countries which are found in woeful violation of the limits established on illicit drugs. That is an extremely narrow sanction. The only sanction on the enforcement power available to the United Nations really comes under the charter, and it is only available to the U.N. Security Council in cases of breaches of peace. That too has been applied very rarely.

As I said earlier in my testimony, the governments of the world today are not yet ready to yield that kind of authority to any international body. Therefore, I think it would be unrealistic for us to expect at this stage of international development to have the United Nations or any other existing institution enforce the kinds of agreements that exist when the governments themselves directly concerned, for whatever reason, simply are not willing or able to implement their commitments.

CLOSING REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE RANGEL

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, again thank you for this opportunity. The House Select Committee on Narcotics will be having a series of executive sessions with the departments and agencies that some of our witnesses represent here today.

I want to thank you individually and collectively for the contribution you have made. We look forward to working with you. I certainly will be extending an invitation to you, Mr. Chairman, and my friend, Senator D'Amato, to see whether or not we can work together without duplicating the efforts that the House and Senate are making in this area, and at the same time make a plea to the witnesses that perhaps you might be able to give us assistance that is really not drawn out by these questions as to how we can be more helpful and at the same time not violate any of the national security regulations or, indeed, international standards which all of you are respected for upholding. Thank you very much.

COORDINATION OF EFFORTS

Senator KASTEN. I would like to say also thank you to members of this panel. It strikes me that we have before us four different U.S. Government agencies and one international, which all have a role in working with this problem. I am not sure how often you talk to each other. I am not sure how often you coordinate. I do know that is one of the reasons why this Drug Enforcement Policy Board was established. But the first question from Senator D'Amato was what does the Attorney General have to do with what is going on in foreign countries? Immediately, State gets involved with something run by the Department of Justice.

So it seems obvious that somehow we have to do as well as possible coordinating these efforts. I think the answer is that at present we are not coordinating as well as we might want to. The Vice President has his goals, and every once in awhile there is a successful effort, such as "Wagon Wheel" and several more by the Coast Guard. But it is like pieces of a puzzle. At some point it would be nice to think that we are all going in the same direction.

So one of the things I personally hope you would address, Congressman Rangel, with your Select Committee, and I think Senator D'Amato and I and others on this subcommittee would pursue this effort, is to begin with just a little hook of $56 million on drug eradication programs coming through the Appropriations Subcommittee. Obviously the problem is bigger than that, and it involves more than just our committee. However, it seems to me that we ought to work toward greater cooperation and coordination. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. THOMAS. It is a complicated field, and there are various agencies and departments involved. On the other hand, I believe, and having been closely involved over the past 3 years with interagency coordination in narcotics matters, particularly as it relates to the international field, that I and other people in my Bureau meet frequently with people at this table and their superiors. Meetings take place frequently and in an open and frank way.

I would qualify and characterize the current cooperation among agencies in the narcotics area in Washington as perhaps the best it has ever been. Although I think we endorse expanded cooperation and coordination efforts, such as the Drug Enforcement Policy Board, the fact in my opinion is that the current coordination is very strong.

Senator KASTEN. I hope you are right. If we had a longer table, we could add other agencies with jurisdiction such as Customs, the IRS, maybe the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and perhaps the Park Service. Also, maybe even the Department of Agriculture. Actually, this table could be a whole lot longer. Then you could start to put some international experts on it, too.

I hope you are right. I hope we can work in that direction.

On behalf of the subcommittee I would like to thank all of you for your testimony here this morning, and once more remind you that the record will be held open for 2 weeks, during which time questions will be submitted for the record. Hopefully, you can get back to us with answers in a reasonable period of time. Thank you all very much.

NONDEPARTMENTAL PANEL

FORTUNE SOCIETY

STATEMENT OF DAVID ROTHENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FORTUNE SOCIETY

ACCOMPANIED BY:

ALDEN LEWIS, PRESIDENT, FORTUNE SOCIETY
VINCENT DI FRANCESCO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORTUNE SOCIETY
ROMEO SANCHEZ, COUNSELOR, FORTUNE SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION OF PANEL

Senator KASTEN. Our next panel consists of Mr. Lewis, Mr. Rothenberg, Mr. Di Francesco, and Mr. Sanchez.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator KASTEN. The committee will come to order. On behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to apologize to you. This has been a long morning. We are here to listen, and we are interested. I know you have been waiting to testify, and I apologize for making you wait so long. I am sure you have perceived that the testimony is of great interest to a number of people.

Mr. ROTHENBERG. I am David Rothenberg. I will make the opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. You are executive director then of the Fortune Society.

STATEMENT OF DAVID ROTHENBERG

Mr. ROTHENBERG. Senator Kasten, Senator D'Amato, and Congressman Rangel, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.

I am David Rothenberg. I am executive director of the Fortune Society. It is a position I have held since the organization's inception 17 years ago.

ACTIVITIES OF FORTUNE SOCIETY

In that time, the Fortune Society has worked with thousands of men women, and teenagers who have been in trouble with the law. Most of our staff members are ex-offenders, men and women who came to us for assistance or guidance and who have stayed to be part of the solution.

The three men who I will introduce to you today fall into that category. They are all ex-offenders, all former drug users, all who at one time in their lives were adorned with labels which flow very liberally or flip in typewriters, such as career criminals or incorrigibles.

Fortune Society's efforts in their own lives should provide some clues to the possible solutions in the area you are now searching, making a correlation between drugs and crime.

At Fortune Society we have witnessed the various phases and approaches to crime, most of it having to do with public posturing and political expediency. The Fortune Society approach to crime is the single notion of relentless pursuit. The most likely way to reduce crime is have less criminals. Also, we have worked with people who find themselves outside of the social system and helped to create a support system for them, widening their opportunities and options through education and career planning. And, most importantly, we try to create an atmosphere which creates their own sense of self-worth. It is not an easy task. I might add, with embarrassingly little interest from government.

Probably half of the 2,000 people who come to us each year have had a history of drug usage. Much of it is mixed with alcohol abuse. Many have supported their own drug habits by selling drugs as two-bit drug sellers.

TOUGH ATTITUDE TOWARD CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES

We have watched laws created geared to curb drug sales and use, and we have watched the periodic police roundups and cleanups. None of that has made a dent in crime. The roundups are an inconvenience, not a deterrent. The laws have merely been a game of chance, where a handful are punished for the offenses of many. We don't have the prison space available if we were to seriously incarcerate all drug users and sellers. Indeed, we might find ourselves incarcerating too many people who are related to people who influence and enact laws.

Drugs have become so pervasive that I blanch when I hear friends of mine referring to the recreational use of drugs. We are in another period when we are getting tough on crime. Toughness itself has become our position. Yet there is no indication that toughness per se has any effect on drug use. Vengeance diagnosed as toughness has replaced being smart about complex social issues.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND REGULATION OF DRUGS

There are no easy answers. Drugs continue to be sold because the profits without taxation are enormous. Would this forum permit even the hint of discussion about the real way to eliminate drugs, the removal of profits.

We have talked of economic boycotts. We have talked about patrolling borders, and some political officials have even talked about the bombing of borders. But they have carefully avoided a confrontation of the real issue of the profits because that would mean a possible discussion of government control, regulation, or distribution of drugs. So let us just discuss the possibility of discussing it.

I hope these hearings will raise some important questions because we won't find answers of substance without raising questions of urgency. I think that the accumulated experience of the men from whom you will

be hearing might provide you with some insights into the reality of drug use and sales. These men—Alden Lewis, Vincent Di Francesco, and Romeo Sanchez—are more than cases. They are people. They have a past, they have a present, and although it wasn't always thought possible, they have a real future.

It is my pleasure to introduce to you Alden Lewis, Vincent Di Francesco, and Romeo Sanchez, who will give you some indication of their background, experiences as drug users, sellers, and people who have changed their lifestyle.

STATEMENT OF ALDEN LEWIS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Good day, Mr. Chairman, Senator D'Amato, and Congressman Rangel. My name is Alden Lewis. I am currently president of the Fortune Society.

I first started using drugs when I was 15 years old. I was primarily involved with heroin at that time. I continued to use drugs for a period of 7 to 8 years, at the same time being involved in a variety of illicit activities to support my habit, including being a two-bit drug seller, as David alluded to earlier.

A small portion of the time that I used drugs I was in jail. After my last arrest, I went to a therapeutic rehabilitation program where I stayed for a period that exceeded 2 years. After leaving that program, I became associated with the Fortune Society. After working with the Fortune Society, gaining strength and determination to continue my education, I attended college and went on to law school. I am now a practicing attorney here in New York with my own private practice.

My experience has shown that there are at least two sides to this drug problem. In addition to the supply side, there is also a question of demand. Without squashing or somehow dealing with the reality that there are people who want all of the drugs that are coming in, and in fact there may be a market for more than the amount that does come in.

That is all. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF VINCENT DI FRANCESCO

Mr. DI FRANCESCO. Gentlemen, my name is Vincent Di Francesco. I am deputy director of the Fortune Society, where I have worked for the last 12½ years.

As a youth growing up in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn, at the age of 15 I was introduced to heroin and for the next 16 years I used heroin, became addicted, and spent 9 years going in and out of New York State's jails and prisons.

My occupation and my work as a counselor at the Fortune Society, assisting men and women who use drugs and seeing them, gives me some credibility of experiences I am happy to share with you of the reality of drugs and addiction. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ROMEO SANCHEZ

Mr. SANCHEZ. Good afternoon. My name is Romeo Sanchez. I was born and raised in New York City. I am 34 years of age and am a counselor to the Fortune Society.

I became a heroin addict at the age of 16, leading to approximately 12 years of drug abuse, including methadone and cocaine. I have served 6½ years in various New York State prisons and have been drug free now for 7 years.

It is my opinion and experience that drugs are a direct cause of criminal activity. There is an urgent need to focus more on prevention of substance abuse. Today, teenagers are using drugs at younger ages, and the availability of drugs is prevalent in our schools.

There have been government cutbacks in community-based programs which offer the opportunity for drug treatment and rehabilitation. Our prison system does not deal with the root of a person's problem. On the contrary, it reinforces alienation and compounds the negativeness within an individual.

I hope that we as a society can begin to reexamine our priorities and establish a course of action that will be more effective and more humane than at present. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to thank all of you.

SUCCESS OF REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

I would like to ask just one question. Earlier today you heard several people say that these treatment programs don't really do much good, and that it depends upon what the individual person has decided. We went back and forth on what was wrong or inadequate about the methadone programs and other kinds of rehabilitation programs.

I wonder if each of the three of you would explain very briefly, why you think that whatever happened to you worked, and why are you now drug free.

Mr. SANCHEZ. First of all, I would like to respond in terms of the treatment programs. I happen to be in favor of them. I think that some individuals, and there are people who come down to Fortune, whatever program or whatever services there may be available, a person has to be ready, and they have to be ready to accept change, and they really have to want to get their lives together and be serious and sincere and have all the different ingredients a person needs.

Not all programs work for all people. Therapeutic programs, I think, are very valuable in that they deal with a person's lack of confidence, raising a person's self-esteem, their self-worth, and begin to really deal with the emotional and the mental problems that a person may have.

I experienced methadone, and I am anti-methadone because I view it as a substitute drug. What it does to your body physically, it just destroys you. It gets into your bones, the aches and everything else. I found it to be a very negative experience for me.

I think the way to go is through counseling and through drug-free treatment.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Lewis?

INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAM

Mr. LEWIS. I don't think that there is any one particular reason or cause that I can point to that changed my life. I think it was perhaps a combination of circumstances, the fact there were people interested in my future, and they lent of their time and efforts to support my efforts to change myself.

I think that, as Mr. Sanchez said, participation in the program is an individual effort, and it depends on a person's being ready to change himself. I think that is the key here. What is important is that while a person is in a program, even though the success rate may be high or low, the point is while a person is in a program, he is not out there on the street committing crime.

In addition, a person may go through several different programs before he finally decides that he actually does want to change.

I think that the important thing is that there is an alternative. We should realize there are a number of people who are sort of inexorably caught up in the life of crime and don't really want to change or find it very difficult to change. But there are also a number of people who are somewhat marginal, who are on a borderline, who if given the opportunity, would quit that life and would turn to other alternatives.

I think rather than looking at it as a total picture of can everyone be helped by this, we should look at how many people can be helped and to what degree.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Di Francesco?

Mr. DI FRANCESCO. I agree with both what Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Lewis have said. I just want to say I am 43 years old and out of everybody that I grew up with in my neighborhood, I would say approximately 90 percent of us got involved in heroin. Most of us didn't know what we were getting into back then. Like I said, I was 15 years old.

Senator D'AMATO. Where did you grow up?

Mr. DI FRANCESCO. In the Bushwick section of Brooklyn.

PERSONAL DESIRE TO QUIT DRUG ADDICTION

I don't know what ingredients turned me around, why I stopped. It is a combination of things. It is a combination of going in and out of prison, of viewing people inside of prison, the guys I grew up with were growing up inside of institutions, and seeing a lot of friends die, overdoses, falling off roofs, being shot, killing each other. One day in my last sentence I just said I can't take it any more, I need to get out of here.

There was no help. Whatever strength I got, I got from myself. I am here today. But from my work now, from my experience, seeing people that were in my position, I know people can be helped. I know there is more need for more money for programs. That is what we have to be talking about.

I don't think stiffer penalties, larger sentences, are going to work. They are not going to deter anybody. Certainly when I was out there doing what I was doing, I was not concerned about any time I was going to get. You don't think about that in the life of drugs and crime. If you get arrested, it is considered an occupational hazard. You go away and do your time. I think the emphasis has to be put on treatment. That is where it is at.

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato.

PRISON PROGRAMS

Senator D'AMATO. Two things I would like to touch upon, Mr. Chairman. When you are in prison for more than just 60 days, are there any treatment modalities that you think are effective? Can they do better or do they do anything now?

Mr. DI FRANCESCO. As far as I am concerned, they don't do anything now. I think if you segregate the population, you cannot have all types of people in one institution under one roof and expect one certain segment of the population to get treatment and it will work. You have to live in that environment. You have to survive in that environment. That environment is violence. You live with violence from day to day. There are no positive things going on inside of prison. I think if you had different types of institutions, mainly for people that use drugs, then you might get somewhere. You might be able to break it down a little better.

Senator D'AMATO. So the problem comes in attempting to identify those who, No. 1, are drug dependent; No. 2, where there might be an opportunity for them to come off it; and, No. 3, to basically segregate them, as you say, out of the institutional life where the institution itself demands a certain amount of conformity. So it is quite difficult then to be successful in that environment. It is impossible.

Mr. DI FRANCESCO. People in prison are afraid. They are afraid of society. Most of us used drugs for whatever reasons. We couldn't function out here. We had problems, family problems or whatever. Most of us were too young to understand what those problems were. That is how we got involved in the life of crime.

When you go into these places, you don't learn about these things. They compound it. You like it in there. It is very comfortable, very easy to survive. Crazy as it is, it is comfortable. When you have to come back out here, you are afraid to come out here. The only way you are going to feel good, if you have a drug background, is to stick a needle in your arm. Once you do that, then you are going to survive out here. So I think yes.

Senator D'AMATO. Is that your view?

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Sanchez, it looks like you are trying to get a word in here.

Mr. SANCHEZ. I have different things running through my head. I sort of agree with what Vinnie is saying. When I first went upstate, and I was a certified addict at the age of 17, at that time I received a 5-year

sentence under the Narcotics Control Commission. I went to the Great Meadow facility, a rehabilitation center. Yet there was no rehabilitation. It was a farce. I was mixed in with the regular population, people doing 10, 20 years for whatever crimes they committed. I just had to try and learn at that stage to survive and to deal with prison life.

The various institutions that I have been in, which I have been in maximum security prisons upstate, there are no programs. One of our major criticisms about prisons is that there is no counseling. There is no one that ever asks you hey, what is happening? Why are you here? What is going on? You get caught up and become another number or statistic. You either lift weights in the yard or play football or read in your cell. No one deals with why you are there. Each person has to find, I guess, their own way.

LACK OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN PRISONS

But there is a lack of support systems. One program that I can think of right now that we all are centering on at Fortune, and what we try to say, is take in the program offered at the Arthur Kearn Correctional Facility. It is therapeutic. Try to deal with the person. A lot of times then a person is paroled into the TC program for ongoing followup treatment. At least that is a start. It is an attempt.

Mr. LEWIS. I don't have that much experience in prison. I have been in several New York City and other local State jails. In counterpoint here, I would like to say in addition, since the time that I used drugs, which was like in the middle 1970's, it seems that there is a very different population that is using drugs. The drug user today is not as likely to be somebody who is criminal or out there doing crime, particularly since the major drug use has changed from heroin to now cocaine. A large number of people are out there working, doing regular jobs. They are otherwise upstanding citizens.

So I would say the problem has expanded to other levels of society. It is not just the focus on people who are committing crimes that end up in prison.

PREVENTIVE STEPS

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank the three witnesses and Mr. Rothenberg for coming here.

I am going to ask you something now that you might even want to respond to in writing because otherwise this is just going to continue to go on, but I think it is very important because you did touch on the fact of prevention. You said we must eliminate the need by trying to bring about prevention. I think that is awareness and education, et cetera.

I just simply do not know how we go about achieving this. I started this effort 15, 16 years ago down in Hempstead where we promoted educational programs and tried to get local government to work with the school districts. Most of the teachers didn't know what they were talking about. They talked to young people and just absolutely turned them off because they were so absolutely out of step with what was

taking place. I think educational efforts have to take place before they reach seventh, eighth grade, or high school because some of them could be too far into it.

I am wondering if you would submit ideas to this committee in terms of the kinds of things that you think we can do to help and that you think would be effective in the area of awareness, education, et cetera. I will not ask you to attempt to respond verbally. You might want to put something together in the group at the Fortune Society. We need to know what you think society should do, what government should be pushing for, what we should undertake. I would be very much interested in that. We talked about the problems of rehabilitation, but obviously it is a heck of a lot easier—maybe not easier—but more productive to keep people from getting involved in it in the first place. What could have stopped you? What do you think about it looking back in your own lives? Then if you have the experiences of others that you might want to draw upon so we could have some kind of comprehensive document from you, I would be deeply appreciative.

Senator KASTEN. Congressman Rangel.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think I heard anyone suggest from this panel we should consider legalizing illicit drugs. Counselor?

Mr. ROTHENBERG. I am not a counselor. This is the counselor.

I said I think there has to be a discussion at some point, while we are discussing patrolling or bombing borders or economic boycotts, discussing the fact there is a buyers' market and the enormous profits that exist. There wouldn't be introducers of drugs if people weren't making money. The product wouldn't be on the streets if there wasn't big money. And the roundups don't work because there is such money to be made because a would-be roundup on 14th Street, there are other——

Mr. RANGEL. You are not leading up to the possibility of legalizing?

Mr. ROTHENBERG. No; I think we have to talk about ways of getting into the profits, government regulation or distribution, a discussion of it. I don't know enough about it. I have been reading about the English plan. I would hope, though, we could at least discuss it. Every time I bring it up, the walls get up so I get suspicious why we can't even have a discussion of it.

I am not advocating. I think we have to talk about it. Because without profits, there would be no reason to continue sales.

METHADONE PROGRAM

Mr. RANGEL. There is no profit in methadone. Would you support methadone as a maintenance program?

Mr. ROTHENBERG. We find those programs don't let people off methadone.

Mr. RANGEL. I am sorry?

Mr. ROTHENBERG. I don't know, to say there are no profits. We find those programs which are methadone treatment programs are loathe to

let people ease off of methadone, because their funding is dependent on how many people are on that.

Mr. RANGEL. I am not arguing with you about that. I agree with you. If you say that we should have discussion on the possibilities of legalizing heroin or cocaine, I left that since you just said you wanted to discuss that, and I was asking you would you support methadone programs not for rehabilitation, not for detoxification, but just for the purpose of keeping people off the street?

Mr. ROTHENBERG. But we do have methadone, and I don't find it working that successfully. It just makes people dependent on another drug.

Mr. RANGEL. I agree with what you are saying there, too. That is why I am one of those who doesn't want to discuss another addictive drug.

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS

But I want to thank the chairman and the staff for bringing such an array of witnesses before us in a short period of time. We certainly had an opportunity to get a variety of different views. I will be looking forward to receiving the written testimony that you will be submitting. Again I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing the subcommittee to our great city. I thank my colleague for encouraging you.

[CLERK'S NOTE: Additional statements have been received from individuals unable to attend the hearing. They will be inserted in the record at this point.]

THE CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007

January 11, 1984

Hon. Robert Kasten
Chairman
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations
F 125 U.S. Capital
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Bob:

You can rely on my strongest support in your subcommittee's quest for a workable solution to this nation's drug problem. I regret that I didn't know of yesterday's hearings, for I would have appreciated the opportunity to testify. Should other hearings be scheduled and you believe that my participation would contribute to your subcommittee's deliberations, please let me know.

I am enclosing for your information or if possible, for inclusion in the subcommittee's record, some prior statements I have made on possible new measures for the interdiction of drugs at our borders.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Edward I. Koch
MAYOR

WORKING DRAFT ON PROPOSALS FOR UTILIZATION OF U.S. MILITARY RESOURCES TO PREVENT NARCOTIC SMUGGLING AND TRAFFIC

New York City Proposals

1. Congress should pass a bill declaring that there shall be an auxiliary mission of the Armed Forces of the United States to interdict, for a specified period, under the direction of the Secretary of the Department of Defense, the importation of illegal narcotics into the country.

2. Congress should pass a bill authorizing and requiring the United States Navy, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to participate in drug enforcement operations outside the land areas of the United States, its territories and possessions. Specifically, the Navy should be charged with limited jurisdiction to intercept narcotic trafficking at sea, particularly, but not limited to, the areas of the Caribbean and southeastern shoreline of the United States. It should be empowered to stop vessels of any nationality about which there is reasonable cause to believe that illegal narcotics are on board and intended for delivery within the United States, to search such vessels and to seize any illegal drugs or narcotics and any narcotics contraband found thereon. Additionally, Navy personnel should be permitted to make arrests and to deliver any person so arrested and any seized contraband to the appropriate civil authorities of the Federal Government of the United States.

3. Congress should pass a bill authorizing and requiring the use of

the United States Army personnel, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to assist the United States Customs Service drug enforcement efforts at all ports of entry, including, but not limited to, all major seaports and all airports receiving international flights. Army personnel working in conjunction with the U.S. Customs Service will be authorized to perform searches for illegal narcotics only in conformity with the authority granted by Congress to Customs officials, to seize any narcotics found, and to make arrests for referral to the appropriate civil authorities of the Federal Government.

4. Congress should pass a bill authorizing and requiring the United States Air Force, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to utilize its equipment, including planes and radar equipment, and personnel to assist drug enforcement officials of the Federal Government in locating and intercepting air flights of drug smugglers across the borders of the United States. The Air Force would be required to provide sufficient radar equipment, intercept planes and personnel to ensure coverage of the borders most used for illegal importation of drugs. Air Force personnel would be authorized to assist civilian federal drug enforcement officials in performing searches for and seizures of illegal narcotics and in making arrests.

WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT DRUGS

An Address

by

The Honorable Edward I. Koch

Mayor

of the

City of New York

Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a privilege to salute the Chicago Crime Commission in its historic role as the nation's most famous symbol of the business community's commitment to do something about crime. Its record of over sixty years of outstanding service to the people of Chicago has made it a source of civic pride appropriate to the great and unique city in which we meet today. One cannot think of the relentless struggles against organized vice and corruption in the 1920's, and against racketeering and mob violence in the 1930's without acknowledging the moral authority and vigor of this Commission. In the early 1950's, when Senator Estes Kefauver was undertaking his famous investigation of the organized underworld, it was this Commission's distinguished former Executive Director, Virgil Peterson, who played a crucial role in shaping the agenda and providing the framework for that historic Senate inquiry. In recent years, the Commission has devoted itself energetically to the reduction of a different but equally destructive lawlessness. Rampant, predatory street crime, wanton violence and burglary on a truly monumental scale disfigured life in our cities throughout the 1970's. But the efforts of unsentimental

and aggressive municipal leadership and the unremitting support of this Commission and others like it, most notably your outstanding counterpart in New York City, have reversed the upward trend of crime and its attendant injury and suffering in America.

In New York, if trends for the first six months of this year continue through the end of 1984, we will have reduced major felony crime at the astounding rate of 19.9% over the three year period 1981-1984. Similar positive progress has been achieved here in Chicago and in cities and towns across the nation. It has been accomplished because of a resolute and uncompromising commitment to expanding the police, building more jails and demanding mandatory sentencing laws for repeater felons, violent criminals and narcotics offenders. We, and you, have talked sense to the American people on crime. But more important, we have heard them, and applied their wisdom. The man in the street will tell you, if you ask him, how to deal effectively and justly with crime: hold people to account, and if they are guilty, punish them. That is at the heart of our success. But there is still far too much crime in America.

The utterly desperate problem of the narcotics traffic in American cities is an especially frightening aspect of our national life. Today I want to enlist your understanding, your moral indignation, and your support for a strategic program to deal with it honestly and effectively. If something is not done shortly, and decisively done, to confront this plague with weapons and imagination adequate to the crisis, we shall see the human, the social and the economic costs mount beyond calculation.

For five months I have been relentlessly urging an unprecedented initiative. We must take the truly radical step of

committing our Armed Forces directly against the tide of illicit narcotics overwhelming our borders.

Let me begin by sharing with you a particularly acute revelation I had on this subject just last week. It is my custom to have the following day's newspapers delivered to me late in the evening at Gracie Mansion. On glancing over the front page of the New York Times on Wednesday night, October 17th, I was shocked beyond belief to see a report on an official government survey which concluded that almost a third of seventh grade students in New York State had used illicit drugs before entering the seventh grade. It also found that drug use among students in grades seven through twelve was notable for a sharp increase in the substitution of cocaine as the drug of choice over marijuana. Furthermore, the study observed that not inner city kids, but students from Long Island, Westchester, Rockland and the Hudson Valley reported the highest levels of serious abuse in the State. On the basis of weighted projections, researchers concluded that over 900,000 secondary school students in the State had had some illicit involvement with drugs.

That same edition of the Times contained another article announcing that undercover police officers were being sent into City high schools in search of drug dealers. In our school days, years of the teacher's confident possession of both the moral and physical dimensions of the classroom and the schoolyard, we were oblivious to the daily tribulations of police work. Sadly, such is not the case for today's student, teacher and principal. What ordeals of mind and body our children are being subject to, because of the unchecked greed of drug profiteers. What an outrage, what a truly awful commentary on our nation and ourselves, I thought, as I read those articles.

There are 500,000 heroin addicts in this country. Twenty-five million Americans have used cocaine at least once, and 25% of these are regular abusers. During the last five years in New York, the number of cocaine users has tripled. Every day, 5,000 more Americans become cocaine users. Approximately 40 million Americans routinely smoke marijuana.

The presence of this lengthening shadow across the health, productivity, and future of our country ought to be cause for the gravest concern at every level of our national life. There was a time when the poison of drug addiction was thought to be a peculiar feature only of the ghetto life in our cities. This is no longer true. The scourge has cut across every social class and economic sub-group. From the prep schools of Connecticut, to the board rooms of some of our largest corporations, from the glittering world of professional athletes to the dead end precincts of the poor and dispossessed, narcotics indiscriminately destroys lives and families.

The Government has now found it necessary to issue rules advising engineers that they must not operate railroad trains while they're high on drugs. One of our local television stations recently ran a series on widespread drug abuse by doctors and nurses. We are left to speculate on the impact of such habits on diagnosis and dexterity. I served in the infantry as a combat rifleman in the European theatre of World War II. I do not recall that there was a drug problem with our troops at that time, but there is no question that during the Vietnam War there was widespread drug abuse, which continues to worry our commanders today. Can our colleges reach our young people if the blue haze of marijuana clings to the lecture halls, the corridors and the lavatories of academe, to say nothing of the harder drugs in discotheques

from big cities, to farming communities, to prairie towns all across America?

Research discloses the role drug abuse plays in road safety and automobile accidents. In a 1981 survey of New York State households, based upon a carefully selected random sample of 3,500 residents, it was determined that approximately 729,000 New Yorkers had driven an automobile during the previous six months while under the influence of a drug used non-medicinally. It was further estimated that 58,000 had had an automobile accident while under the influence of drugs. The personal injury and property damage thus caused by the widespread availability of illegal drugs in our cities and towns is one more exaction upon all of us of this persistent and deadly contagion.

The appalling avalanche of four metric tons of heroin, 48 metric tons of cocaine and 12,000 metric tons of marijuana are smuggled, largely with impunity, into this country each year. These figures translate into 987 million doses of heroin, 745 million tins of cocaine, and 37 billion marijuana cigarettes. The aggregate estimated street value of all three categories of this contraband is $80 billion. Furthermore, current import trends are dramatically rising. About 70% more cocaine, for example, entered the United States in 1983 than in 1981.

Let me give you some general indicators of how this massive drug influx is affecting New York City. During the two-year period 1981-1983, the number of babies born addicted to drugs rose by 20%, deaths attributed to drug overdose increased by 20%, and hepatitis cases associated with drug addiction jumped a startling 52%. We now have 31,000 people in methadone maintenance programs at any given time, a number

approximately equivalent to the population of Highland Park, Illinois. Twenty-four percent (approximately 400) of the homicides committed in New York City are drug related.

The supply of hard drugs had swelled so dramatically in New York City by the end of 1983 that the street price for both heroin and cocaine fell by 25% while purity levels rose. From 1980 to 1983 the number of State prison inmates in New York State who are heroin addicts almost doubled, from 7,600 to 13,000 and the percentage of the entire State prison population addicted to some type of hard drug now stands at the astonishing rate of 62%.

If current trends continue, State officials estimate that the number of heroin addicts in the city will rise to 208,300 by 1988, and the number of cocaine and other hard drug abusers will increase to 507,900 by that year.

The city's police and prosecutors have made an outstanding effort to arrest and indict those committing drug felonies. In the years 1979 through 1983, the police increased felony arrests from 8,630 to 16,520, a rise of 100%. Indictments leaped by 150% from 2,134 in 1979 to 4,936 in 1983.

The volume of crime associated with narcotics addiction is massive. The correlation of high crime rates and broad scale drug addiction is undeniable.

A 1981 study concluded that 243 addicts in Baltimore were responsible for 473,738 crimes in an 11-year period. This crime count did not include drug offenders. The Rand Corporation in its 1982 review of the careers of 2,200 prison inmates in California, Michigan and Texas, found that drug abusers committed robberies on an average of 33.6 days, burglaries on 67.6 days and other thefts on 65.8 days during

each year they were addicted and not incarcerated. This comes to an average of 167 crime days a year, or a major crime every other day for as long as the addict was at liberty. In a 1979 report on heroin use and street crime, 356 active heroin users on the streets of Miami, Florida were found to have committed 118,134 offenses, or 332 crimes of all types by each addict per year. Another 1979 study by the Institute for Law and Social Research of 4,703 arrestees over a 56-month period in Washington, D.C. found drug use to be the decisive predictor of criminal recidivism in the city. Another study in Washington completed in 1981 for the Justice Department established that in a sample of 7,087 felony offenders arrested over a five year period, drug users had on average almost twice as many previous arrests as non-drug users. Finally, in New York in a study released last year, 61 male heroin addicts admitted that they had committed a total of 106 crimes during the immediate 36 hours prior to their interview.

Stopping the hard drug traffic is quite plainly the single most compelling imperative if serious crime is to be systematically and permanently reduced in this country. Beyond the human costs, the economic burden is staggering. New York State has recently announced a prison construction program costing $700 million, and the City is committed to its own jail expansion effort that will cost $300 million. Just think of it, a billion dollars in just one State alone for capital investment in places to lock away addicts. Remember, almost two-thirds of all New York prison inmates are drug addicts. But consider the collateral costs of society over one year's time of the typical drug addict: $26,800 in thefts, $21,000 in correctional expenses, $7,000 in welfare costs, $3,300 per law enforcement arrest expenditures, and $2,340 for treatment

programs. This amounts to over $61,000 per addict each year in New York. This translates into billions more in losses for the public in New York.

The illicit drug traffic and the widespread drug abuse it facilitates was described by The New York Times last month as having a "devastating effect on American society." Indeed, it is, according to the Times , the nation's number one concern. It is not New York's problem alone, but Chicago's, Miami's, Los Angeles', Philadelphia's, and all the towns and villages within our borders. Chicago, for example, is described by federal intelligence sources as not a major entry point for narcotics, but as a "domestic distribution hub" for narcotics that enter at other places. For example, the Herrera organization, located in Durango, Mexico, exports heroin over the Texas border, ships it to Chicago and then distributes it to the Los Angeles area. The so-called "Pizza Connection" handles heroin that enters the country through New York and ships it through a chain of pizza parlors in New York and Chicago for further nationwide distribution. It may surprise you to learn that the wholesale kilo price and relative available volume of heroin and cocaine in Chicago is at substantial parity with New York rates, which suggests generally equivalent market demand.

I was most appreciative to receive a letter recently from Mayor Washington who expressed full agreement with my efforts to rally the nation to focus on the drug problem, and do something about it. Your Mayor asserted that "narcotic drugs represent the number one killer of the promise of American youth."

All this misery, injury and cost to our families, our neighborhoods and our nation, ought to lead you, as it has

me, to ask what in God's name is being done to stop it. The answer, sad to say, is very little.

Our police and prosecutors have labored heroically to raise dramatically the level of felony arrests, indictments and convictions for violation of our narcotics law. With respect to the open and notorious street traffic in hard drugs, the police in New York have won national acclaim for their imaginative and unprecedented attack on the pushers on the lower east side of Manhattan. But the narcotics problem in this or any other American city cannot be eradicated by pursuing only a strategy of investigating and prosecuting the so-called kingpins of the trade, or disrupting the visible street traffic by uniformed police patrols. The market, in the physical sense, as well as the transactional and financial, must be destroyed. That can be done only by systematic and relentless interdiction of the contraband before it crosses the nation's borders. It is therefore critical that the Federal Government commit the resources to stop the flow of drugs on the high seas and at our land and air ports of entry.

Now, some will insist that crime control and police expenses are a local and not a national obligation. But it must be frankly acknowledged that the narcotics plague in America is a failure exclusively of the Customs, diplomatic and international policing functions of the national government.

It is appropriate to invoke the metaphor of war. The people of many New York and Chicago neighborhoods, and those of many cities across America, are in a state of open and protracted hostilities with the poison of heroin and cocaine. These substances do not originate here, but have penetrated our borders with the impact and misery of a foreign invasion. Repelling foreign invasion is the primary responsibility of

the federal government. It cannot morally restrict its efforts to the prosecution of major racketeers whose removal from drug traffic networks leads only to the filling of leadership voids by others willing to risk prison for access to the huge profits of the trade. Nor can it discharge its moral obligation only through diplomatic efforts to induce foreign governments to eradicate illicit drugs at the source of the trade.

The most essential point to be made about the federal role in stopping the drug traffic is that it has broadly failed to interdict the flow of heroin and cocaine as it crosses the borders of this nation. According to a recent Government Accounting Office report all federal agencies combined seize only 16% of the marijuana, and less than 10% of the heroin and cocaine that comes into the country each year. The record of the United States Customs Service is particularly dismal, reaching, in fiscal year 1982 for example, only 3.2% of the heroin traffic. The Port of New York entry points have experienced a 17% increase in the volume of international shipments and a 7% increase in the number of travellers passing through our ports and yet the Administration's budget proposals for the next fiscal year called for a reduction of 600 in the total number of Customs Inspectors in the Service. There is a total of only 4,500 inspectors at all land ports of entry. The head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the primary anti-drug agency in the nation, stated recently that in order to effectively curtail the flow of illicit narcotics into America, he would need 40,000 agents. He has in fact only 1,900 worldwide. The Coast Guard has only seven to ten boats patrolling the entire southeastern coast and Gulf of Mexico, although Caribbean waters are the principal

channel through which the bulk of illegal cocaine and marijuana shipments enter our territory. Customs admits that it intercepts only one out of every 100 planes smuggling cocaine into the country. There were an estimated 18,000 flights in 1983.

While Defense and Treasury bicker over which Department has primary responsibility for detection of air and sea smugglers (neither wants it), our borders remain wide open to the drug merchants. There are no radar installations designed to detect drug flights over our southern coast. The Drug Enforcement Administration has only eight planes with sufficient overtake speed to police the border from Key West to San Diego. Incredibly, we are the most technologically sophisticated military power in the world, and yet our meager border police have no look-down, low altitude radar, only a few interceptor jets with tracking radar, and only a small and thoroughly inadequate number of large and fast helicopters to transport teams of enforcement agents to landing sites once suspicious aircraft, mostly small, private executive jets, are forced to land.

Because the illegal narcotics trade is an $80 billion business, it may surprise you to learn, as it did me, that the entire federal drug abuse budget totals only $1.5 billion. Only about two-thirds of this figure, or $1 billion, is committed to law enforcement programs, including prosecution, prisons and Internal Revenue Service auditors. The principal agencies charged with interdiction of dangerous drugs as they flow into the country are the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Coast Guard. These budgets in fiscal year 1983 were $252 million, $236 million and $191 million, respectively, for a total of $679 million committed to combatting smuggling and seizing drug contraband. This represents less than one-

tenth of one percent of the federal budget. The recent recommissioning by the Navy of just two battleships, the New Jersey and the Iowa, cost the government $700 million.

This is why I have called for the commitment of our armed forces to help in the fight to secure our borders from what has become a literal invasion of drug smugglers. Searches of individuals and cargo, not violative of constitutionally protected rights, should be required, whether it be by the use of drug-sniffing dogs, by body search or by strip search. We must make it clear to both our own citizens as well as to foreigners coming in from countries prominently known as drug sources, that we mean business. Criminals carrying drugs must understand that they will be arrested, tried and sent to jail.

The direct involvement of naval, air force and army units and personnel on the high seas, patrolling the skies over our borders, and conducting searches at our land and sea ports of entry has not been effectively pursued. The obvious and crucial military solution has been limited to a never fully or regularly realized fifty hours monthly flying time by Navy surveillance planes on the East Coast, and another twenty on the West Coast; a supposed 24 hours per month of AWAC surveillance time in the Gulf, also never realized; sporadic assistance to the Bahamas, where Special Forces lends helicopter support to local arrests at clandestine trans-shipment points; a total of eight Army helicopters loaned to Customs; and occasional Navy participation, when ships on patrol stumble upon obvious drug activities.

I should point out that federal law presently places significant constraints on military involvement in drug interdiction efforts by domestic, civilian law enforcement agencies like the Customs Service and the Coast Guard. Clearly pro-

hibited are "interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other similar activity, a search or seizure, an arrest, stop and frisk, or similar activity, and the use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals." This law, called the Posse Comitatus Act, imposes absurd obstacles in the path of the Navy, Army and Air Force in the war on drugs. This is demonstrated by a recent example of military involvement on July 17, 1983. The USS Kidd, a naval vessel on patrol in our southern territorial waters, encountered a suspect ship flying a foreign flag. It was stopped, but refused to allow boarding. It was determined that the ship was not registered in the country it claimed and therefore was a stateless ship which could be legally boarded, but only by the Coast Guard. The captain continued to refuse permission to board and the Navy, fearing its intervention would violate the Posse Comitatus Act, requested direction from the Department of Defense while continuing to follow the vessel. Eventually, a Coast Guard ensign, or flag, was transported to the USS Kidd and on direction of President Reagan the USS Kidd raised the ensign and, in effect, became a Coast Guard vessel, thus allowing disabling fire to be directed toward the pirate ship. A cache of drugs was seized.

This circumvention of the law, though necessary, illustrates the immediate requirement for revision of the Posse Comitatus Act. I have therefore made the following proposals to the Congress:

I. Congress should pass a special resolution declaring that it shall be an auxiliary mission of the Armed Forces of the United States to interdict, under the direction of the Secretary of the Department of Defense, the importation of illegal narcotics into the country.

II. Congress should pass a bill requiring the United States Navy, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to participate in drug enforcement operations outside the land areas of the United States, its territories and possessions. Specifically, the Navy should be charged with limited jurisdiction to intercept narcotic trafficking at sea particularly in the areas of the Caribbean and South Eastern shoreline of the United States. It should be empowered to stop vessels of any nationality about which there is reasonable cause to believe that illegal narcotics are on board and intended for delivery within the United States, to search such vessels and to seize any illegal drugs or narcotics and any narcotics contraband found. Additionally, Naval personnel should be permitted to make arrests and to deliver arrestees and any seized contraband to the appropriate civil authorities of the Federal Government of the United States.

III. Congress should pass a bill authorizing the use of United States Army personnel, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to assist the United States Customs Service drug enforcement efforts at all ports of entry, including but not limited to all major seaports and all airports receiving international flights. Army personnel working in conjunction with the U.S. Customs Service will be authorized to perform searches for illegal narcotics only in conformity with the authority granted by Congress to Customs officials, to seize any narcotics found,

and to make arrests for referral to the appropriate civil authorities of the Federal Government.

IV. Congress should pass a bill requiring the United States Air Force, pursuant to specific authority of the Secretary of Defense, to utilize its equipment, including planes and radar equipment, and personnel to assist drug enforcement officials of the Federal Government in locating and intercepting air flights of drug smugglers across the borders of the United States. The Air Force would be required to provide sufficient radar equipment, intercept planes and personnel to ensure coverage of the borders most used for illegal importation of drugs. Air Force personnel would be authorized to assist civilian federal drug enforcement officials in performing searches for and seizures of illegal narcotics and in making arrests.

If we but focus upon the awful dimension of the drug problem, the perils of shrinking from bold action are clear. Federal leadership in this crisis is preeminently the foremost imperative in our national life.

THANK YOU.

STATEMENT BY EDWARD I. KOCH, MAYOR OF NEW YORK CITY

Mayor Koch today renewed his proposal that the armed forces of the United States be used to interdict the illegal smuggling of narcotics across our nation's borders. In a letter to Congressman Melvin Price, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, the Mayor urged passage of legislation which would permit direct military intervention in drug enforcement efforts along the borders and in the territorial waters of the United States. Mayor Koch stated in his letter to Chairman Price that "with your assistance we will be successful in persuading the Congress that the influx of narcotics into this country constitutes a real and present threat to the very fabric of our society, and that military intervention to stop this drug traffic is a necessary deterrent which can be utilized without endangering our civil liberties."

During October Mayor Koch submitted four specific proposals to Congress in response to what he has labelled "a literal invasion of drug smugglers":

1. Passage of a bill declaring the interdiction of illegal narcotic importation to be a mission of the Armed Services of the United States.

2. Passage of a bill requiring the U.S. Navy to participate in drug enforcement operations outside the land areas of the United States.

3. Passage of a bill allowing the United States Army to assist the United States Customs Service in drug enforcement, particularly searches of passengers and cargo at air and sea ports of entry.

4. Passage of a bill authorizing the United States Air Force to assist Federal drug enforcement officials in intercepting air flights by drug smugglers.

Mayor Koch stated that "It has been estimated that the trade in illegal narcotics in our nation last year exceeded $80 billion but the entire federal drug abuse budget only totals $1.5 billion. The combined budgets of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, the principal agencies responsible for interdicting the illegal flow of drugs into our country, is only $679 million in 1984. We must have a commitment of our armed forces to be able to succeed in our fight to repel this invasion. The present constraints on military involvement in this war against drug importation must be lifted as soon as possible by Congress."

The Mayor also praised Congress for enacting legislation during its past session, creating a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, which will serve as a high level interagency council to coordinate all federal drug enforcement activities.

"While I have pressed in the past for the creation of a national drug czar to lead all federal agencies in the battle against drugs, and I still believe it would be a constructive step," the Mayor stated that "Congress deserves credit for its tenacity in overcoming the resistance of the Reagan Administration to even the creation of the Board and its mandate for strategic policy coordination."

Mayor Koch also emphasized today that "a successful strategy for stopping this deluge of narcotics from crossing our borders must include not only the direct dedication of the military to intercepting drug smugglers, but also

diplomatic initiatives aimed at those countries where the narcotics are produced. He noted that 75% of the cocaine brought into this country originates in Colombia, with Bolivia and Peru accounting for another 20%. The "Golden Crescent" countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran grow and produce almost 50% of all the heroin introduced into this country, and Mexico supplies approximately 33%.

Because of successful diplomatic efforts made during the early 1970's, the volume of heroin traffic from the "Golden Triangle" countries of Thailand, Burma and Laos in Southeast Asia has been reduced to approximately 19%.

The legal authority authorizing the State Department and the President to pressure foreign drug producing countries to take internal steps to destroy the cash crops supporting the heroin and cocaine traffic is clear. The 1972 Protocol amended the Single Convention on narcotic drugs and mandates the suspension of economic assistance to countries not cooperating in international efforts to control and eliminate the production and distribution of illicit narcotics. The 1983 Rangel-Gilman-Hawkins amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to suspend military assistance to any country failing to comply with the Single Convention.

The Federal Government must take more aggressive steps through the Agency for International Development to develop substitute cash crops in countries where the cocoa plant, the opium poppy, and the marijuana plant play a major role in economic stability.

Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran and Afghanistan, we must use our economic and military assistance to Mexico to suppress opium produc-

tion in Mexico. With respect to the cocaine traffic, we must punish Colombia, Bolivia and Peru if these countries fail to develop aggressive programs to eliminate the cocoa plant within their borders. If necessary, we must seek their agreement to introduce United States drug enforcement agents to assist domestic efforts at drug suppression. Although programs along these lines are being pursued in Colombia and Bolivia, they do not appear to be sufficiently broad or aggressive.

The Mayor noted that aid suspension might be more effective in Mexico than in Bolivia where in 1980, United States assistance of $100 million was terminated, but with little effect because the national income from the narcotics traffic amounted to approximately $1.5 billion. The problem in Bolivia is also complicated by the fact that even though in 1983 the Army occupied and eradicated a number of cocoa plantations, insurgent forces continued to control other cocoa regions. Furthermore, these efforts by the Bolivian Army in 1983 resulted in a 30% fall in the value of the Bolivian peso.

The 1984 assassination of the Colombian Justice Minister has led to a broad crackdown by the government on domestic drug operations, but large amounts of cocaine continue to find their way out of Colombia and into the United States.

In Thailand in 1984 there was a 30% increase in poppy acreage plantings, largely controlled by insurgents beyond the effective power of the government. A similar situation prevails in Burma where well armed north country insurgents cannot be overcome by government forces. Furthermore, as

a non-aligned country, Burma isn't interested in United States aid.

Pakistan has effectively reduced the poppy acreage, leading to a reduction from 800 tons to 45 tons. This, however, may be the result more of bad weather conditions than effective programs.

It is therefore clear that the Federal Government must apply maximum pressure upon Colombia, Pakistan and Mexico for more aggressive domestic control and eradication programs. In addition to suspension of military and economic aid, and the introduction into these countries of agricultural alternatives to lucrative illicit cash crops, the State Department must consider the application of commercial embargoes and restriction of American tourism in those countries which do not do everything in their power to destroy the drug poisons crossing their borders and violating ours.

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS

Senator KASTEN. On behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for your very, very informative testimony and once more thank you for being patient and working with us through the morning and now well into the noon hour.

I would also like to remind you that the hearing record will be open for 2 weeks, during which time we will submit questions. We would hope you could be back to us within a week or two with responses to those questions.

I know that we have learned a great deal this morning. So I would like to thank all of you and also, most importantly, to thank Senator D'Amato and Congressman Rangel for an informative and helpful hearing.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the witnesses for response subsequent to the hearing:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

Questions Submitted by Senator D'Amato

PROGRESS IN PRODUCING COUNTRIES

Senator D'Amato: Can you tell us what progress was made last year in implementing the Hawkins-Rangel-Gilman amendment, and, in seizing drugs, attacking drug smuggling, eradicating drug crops, taking acreage out of production, and destroying drug laboratories by the world's leading opium or heroin or coca or cocaine producing countries? Which of these countries were most successful, and which were least successful in meeting last year's goals?

Mr. Thomas: While strongly reemphasizing the 1971 provision that the President shall suspend assistance to any country which fails to cooperate on narcotics control, the 1963 amendment's other major thrust is to require the Administration to submit a detailed report on the narcotics problem and control performance by major source countries, especially estimates of the degree to which those countries plan to reduce production.

Our second international narcotics control strategy report will be submitted to Congress on or about February 15. In this report, the Congress will find reports on eradication, seizures, labs destroyed, and hectarage taken out of production. The Congress will find that the ban on opium production remains highly effective in Turkey and continues to be expanded in Pakistan; that Colombia has embarked on a progressive herbicidal eradication program that could eliminate marijuana production in that country during the next year or two; that Brazil and Ecuador have conducted eradication campaigns against the new coca crops which traffickers are trying to establish; that Thailand has exhibited a greater willingness to eradicate opium; that Peru has continued coca eradication despite the terrorist style activities of the narcotics traffickers; that Colombia is experimenting with herbicidal applications that may permit comprehensive elimination of coca crops; that Mexico's resort to sweeps has increased its eradication of opium poppy; and, certainly not least, that in 1984 there was a definite expansion of support not only from the international community but from the leadership of source countries, especially in South America. That report, like my testimony, will also document our problems, and set forth our agenda, while noting our disappointments in Bolivia, Belize, Jamaica and other countries.

NARCOTICS SURVEYS

Senator D'Amato: Can you tell us what success your bureau had last year in supporting narcotics surveys for major source countries supplying narcotics to the United States?

Mr. Thomas: A survey of marijuana cultivation was completed in

1984 in Jamaica, and provided new estimates of crop size and location to that government. A survey of coca in Bolivia, and a partial coca survey of the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru were also completed. These three surveys, conducted by indigenous agencies with our assistance, produced improved estimates of crop production, as did the continuing opium survey in Thailand, which we have supported for several years. We are planning to assist Pakistan and Burma in new opium surveys, and have had preliminary discussions with Colombian officials on surveys of both coca and marijuana crops. We expect to support comprehensive aerial surveys in all of these countries in 1985, and, additionally, to use the imagery to provide tactical maps to guide crop eradication campaigns.

COCAINE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS SEIZED IN PARAGUAY

Senator D'Amato: What pressure does the State Department plan to put on Paraguay to persuade that country to destroy the cocaine processing chemicals seized last week?

Mr. Thomas: I believe that you are referring to a seizure of precursor chemicals first reported in the press last week, but seized in September 1984. Although the issue is now in the Paraguayan courts, we have formally sought the destruction of the chemicals and will continue our efforts until these chemicals which were destined for the narcotics trade are destroyed.

CONTROL OF PROCESSING CHEMICALS

Senator D'Amato: What success has Colombia had in its efforts to disrupt cocaine production by reducing the flow of processing chemicals such as ether?

Mr. Thomas: Colombia's actions aimed at disrupting cocaine production have included other measures in addition to restrictions on the importation of ether, acetone and other precursor chemicals, so it is difficult to attribute how much disruption was due to chemical control measures. These measures include more aggressive law enforcement, stepped-up attacks on large processing labs, the grounding of aircraft involved in trafficking and raids against traffickers' headquarters and properties. Overall, the increase in price of cocaine to $11,000 per kilogram at the end of 1984 from $7000 a year earlier is an indication of some disruption. Prices for the chemicals have also increased within Colombia and the traffickers have had recourse to fraudulent and clandestine shipments. There are also indications of attempts to shift production into Central America and Panama. American producers of precursor chemicals are cooperating with DEA in reporting on any suspicious orders.

BOLIVIAN EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE CHAPARE

Senator D'Amato: What is the status of the Bolivian Government's effort to take control of the coca producing Chapare region? Did Bolivia establish the 150-man narcotics strike force in the Chapare? Did they add the 200 men they had planned to add to their special police force?

Mr. Thomas: Bolivia deployed the special 150 man narcotics strike force in the Chapare in August, but it withdrew in September on the basis of an unauthorized order from the chief of the national committee to combat narcotics. He was subsequently dismissed from his post, and his activities have been the subject of a continuing Congressional investigation. The 200 additional men have been recruited and trained. Moreover, some of this strike force has been used in anti-narcotics operations in the Beni. Both forces are ready for deployment. The GOB has committed to redeploy these forces and we expect this to happen in the near future (although experience in Bolivia suggests that deployments are always subject to delay).

Factors which have complicated Bolivian efforts to reestablish control over the Chapare include continuing political and economic crisis, as well as significant and well-organized resistance from coca cultivators and traffickers to any control over coca -- this resistance has been manifest in mass demonstrations, political pressure, and a newspaper propaganda campaign.

CORRUPTION IN BOLIVIA

Senator D'Amato: Does corruption continue to be endemic in Bolivia? In general, how does corruption limit your efforts?

Mr. Thomas: Bribery and corruption are a threat to all narcotics control programs, and we encounter the problem in varying degrees in all of the countries where we have assistance programs. Bolivia tends to be on the higher end of the scale of corruption that accompanies narcotics trafficking. A limiting factor in Bolivia which is largely attributable to corruption is the lack of capacity to convict traffickers who have the means to bribe their way out of apprehension. We are keenly aware that officials at all levels can be tempted by bribes which far exceed their wildest dreams of earning capacity in legitimate activity. In Bolivia, as elsewhere, we direct our efforts toward identifying and working with officials of integrity within the government.

COLOMBIAN MANUAL ERADICATION

Senator D'Amato: In 1983, the Colombians manually eradicated 1,981 hectares of coca leaf cultivation. What percent of total acres in cultivation does that represent?

Mr. Thomas: The 1,981 hectares eradicated in 1983 would represent 12.4 percent of the estimated 16,000 hectares then under coca cultivation. For 1984, our Embassy in Bogota estimates that the area under coca cultivation increased to 20,000 hectares and the area eradicated to 2,400, or 12 percent of the total. Considering how tentative estimates of total production must be, we do not regard the slightly lower percentage figure for 1984 as significant.

ERADICATING COCA PLANTS

Senator D'Amato: Last year, the Government of Colombia

announced it would undertake a pilot program to test different methods of eradicating coca crops. Was that program ever begun?

Mr. Thomas: The object of the Colombian government is to identify an efficient and ecologically safe herbicide which can be used for aerial spraying of coca fields. Since coca fields in Colombia are generally located in remote, unpopulated areas often requiring heavy security to protect manual eradication, aerial spraying is infinitely preferable to manual eradication as well as more cost effective. Aerial spraying is probably the only way one could hope to significantly effect total production.

The problem is to identify a herbicide which meets these criteria. While we have such herbicides against marijuana and opium, we have so far not identified any against the coca plant, which is a deep rooted perennial. Last spring the Colombians tested various herbicides against coca, principally combinations of 2,4-D with other chemicals. None proved satisfactory. The principal problem was premature defoliation -- the leaves dropping from the plant before the herbicide had any systematic effect on the plant itself.

In September, Colombia sent two officials to the U.S. to consult with government, academic and business experts on eradication with a view to identifying further herbicides for testing against coca. Since, their return field tests have been conducted at sites in Colombia's tropical plains. Tests included herbicides formulated by Dow and Monsanto. For test purposes the herbicides are applied by back-pack spraying. Samples of leaves and plants have been sent to the U.S. for analysis. Results so far are inconclusive. Reports from Colombia received after this hearing are optimistic about results from one of the tested herbicides which completely killed coca bushes within four to six weeks. We still are hopeful about something faster acting. Testing is continuing. Colombia is committed to an all-out attack on coca when an effective herbicide is found.

RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES IN AID PROJECT AGREEMENTS

Senator D'Amato: Pakistan has accepted restrictive clauses in its agreements with the United States that commit the Government of Pakistan to keep U.S.A.I.D. project areas free of opium poppy cultivation. Are they keeping to those agreements?

Mr. Thomas: Commitments by the Government of Pakistan to keep U.S.A.I.D. project areas poppy free have been kept. A distinction is drawn between areas with existing poppy cultivation, where the government has agreed to progressively eliminate the poppy, and areas already poppy free, where the government has agreed to keep them that way. In the Gadoon/Amazai area, site of a USAID project with specific narcotics elimination objectives, 25 plots totalling eight acres of poppies planted by farmers on government-owned lands of the Water and Power Development Authority were destroyed on April 15, 1984. In a separate project area, known as the Bara Irrigation Scheme Area of the Tribal Areas Development Project, authorities required the destruction of 10 acres of poppies after the cultivation had been called to their attention by the USAID project manager. Owners of the plots at first resisted the order to destroy the

poppies, but the Khyber Agency Commissioner firmly insisted, and the destruction of the poppies nearly ready for harvest, was completed in April 1984.

Senator D'Amato: How many other countries have agreed to similar restrictions?

Mr. Thomas: Similar restrictions are in effect in Thailand, Bolivia and Peru. In Thailand, INM provides assistance through the Civilian/Police/Military commands in northern Thailand to villages where opium has been grown. To receive assistance, the villagers must agree to cease cultivation of opium poppy in commercial quantities, and the CPM command must agree to have destroyed any crops cultivated in violation of such agreements. Also in Thailand, a large AID project called the Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project includes a poppy clause which requires the Thai Government to take all necessary steps to ensure that opium poppy is not grown or processed within any village or area benefitting from the project. The clause further calls for the government to monitor and enforce these prohibitions and terminate project benefits to individuals using these benefits for the cultivation of poppy.

Senator D'Amato: Do our agreements with South American countries contain such restrictions concerning coca cultivation?

Mr. Thomas: In Bolivia, U.S. AID is linked to progress on coca control, and therefore the Chapare Regional Development project was delayed several years pending the GOB's commitment to narcotics control projects. As a matter of implementation policy, disbursements since the signing of the agreements have also been linked to specific progress in control efforts; i.e. development efforts in the Chapare were held up until it became evident that the GOB would make an attempt to restore government control and attempt to control narcotics in the region.

The pertinent text of the AID project agreement requires that the GOB covenant to "carry out the coca control and reduction program agreed to by the GOB and the USG."

In Peru, the AID Upper Huallaga Project Agreement requires the GOP to commit itself "to a coca-eradication program in the Upper Huallaga Valley satisfactory in form and substance to the USG."

PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF COCA ERADICATION OPERATIONS IN THE TINGO MARIA AREA OF PERU

Senator D'Amato: What are the possibilities of reviving the drug eradication program in the region around Tingo Maria in Peru?

Mr. Thomas: Coca eradication operations resumed in the Tingo Maria region on January 21, 1985. The GOP has committed to a goal of eradicating 6000 hectares of coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1985, and has assured us that the program will continue.

Senator D'Amato: Why is the Peruvian Army not supporting this program?

Mr. Thomas: We are hopeful that the Army, which previously had

targeted all of its efforts against political terrorists in the emergency zone, will become involved in the narcotics control effort in 1985.

PROBLEMS IN CROP SUBSTITUTION EFFORTS

Senator D'Amato: How do you address the problem that certain fields are unsuitable for any crop other than coca?

Mr. Thomas: Cultivation of coca on steep hillsides that are unsuitable for any other crop is a consequence of the coca boom. AID-sponsored infrastructure development projects in the Upper Huallaga Valley are designed to offer the prospects of alternate economic activity, but there is no certainty that those who came to reap quick profits from the coca boom would be attracted by legitimate employment. These cultivators are not ordinary farmers who have turned to coca; they are opportunists who illegally cultivate coca and only coca on these extremely marginal lands. As such, they are primarily an enforcement problem if they choose not to enter the legitimate economy.

Senator D'Amato: Is it true that we sometimes assist farmers with growing rice crops even as those same farmers continue to grow coca in adjacent fields?

Mr. Thomas: Assistance in rice cultivation is an AID project. As a matter of policy, we oppose assistance to any farmer who has not eradicated his coca cultivations. We have pressed for closer coordination between the Peruvian eradication and agricultural assistance organizations in order to direct assistance to those farmers who eradicate their coca, and to deny assistance to those farmers who continue illegal cultivation.

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

Senator D'Amato: What is the extent of United States sponsorship of eradication in Colombia, the world's largest producer of cocaine?

Mr. Thomas: The U.S. has been a strong proponent of a vigorous eradication effort against both coca and marijuana in Colombia, believing as we do that the most effective anti-narcotics strategy must include as its basis the destruction of the plants at the source. Our program with the Colombian National Police has as its object eradication, interdiction, and improved law enforcement against narcotics trafficking. This is our largest single program worldwide, amounting to $9.2 million this fiscal year (out of a total of $10.3 million for Colombia). Much of the commodity support which we provide -- helicopters, vehicles, communications equipment -- is used both for eradication and for other law enforcement activities. The Turbo-Thrush fixed wing aircraft which we sent to Colombia last fall for testing, is meant strictly for eradication. Use of the plane against marijuana fields proved successful and we may provide additional such aircraft to Colombia.

For its aerial spray program against marijuana, Colombia chose to use the herbicide glyphosate, rather than paraquat which has been

used by Mexico. Glyphosate proved effective in the fall test spraying and will be used in an extensive campaign against marijuana this year. Glyphosate is commercially available in Colombia and was procured locally for use in the marijuana spraying. The U.S. has not yet completed environmental requirements that would allow us to provide glyphosate for an intensive aerial spray campaign. If toxicological interpretations of pyrolysis testing of marijuana sprayed with glyphosate give us a green light, we would proceed with the Environmental Assessment and would hope to give full support to an all-out eradication effort against marijuana.

Until an effective herbicide is identified, Colombia will depend on manual eradication of coca. This is far from satisfactory, since it is labor intensive and insecure. Such eradication is carried on by the National Police under the existing program.

PROSPECTS FOR WORLDWIDE CONTROL

Senator D'Amato: Last November, you were quoted as saying that "worldwide narcotics trafficking cannot be significantly curtailed unless all of the production areas are brought under control simultaneously." Is there any reason to believe that will happen in the foreseeable future?

Mr. Thomas: Yes. We have negotiated coca control agreements in all three of the current major producer countries, and are providing support to Ecuador and Brazil, which are the next targets of traffickers. Marijuana is being eradicated aggressively in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, and we are providing support for cannabis eradication in Costa Rica, Belize, Thailand and other secondary sources, and are prepared to increase assistance to Jamaica for an expansion of its current, modest efforts. We are working closely with Mexico, Pakistan, Burma and Thailand on opium control projects and have reason to believe that programs in all four countries will be significantly enhanced in 1985. Thus, with the exception of Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos, whose products we are attempting to contain through interdiction programs in the transit countries, and Jamaica, we have agreements now with the major and even some secondary producers. We are therefore nearing our first goal, which is to reach agreements with all of these governments, and, are well along in second quest, which is to enhance and broaden these control programs.

But, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on U.S. efforts to achieve progress toward this long-term objective. Integral to our national strategy is the internationalization of the supply control effort, as well as the demand reduction effort. In this area, we are similarly encouraged. In each of recent years, we have witnessed incremental strengthening of attitudes and policy and resources involvement in illicit narcotics control by other governments. European governments now support opium poppy control programs in Pakistan, as well as in Southeast Asia and coca control projects in this Hemisphere.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator D'Amato: To what extent do we provide military assis-

tance to countries to help them fight the insurgent groups dealing in drugs? If a country is nonaligned, can it seek U.N. military assistance?

Mr. Thomas: There are two narcotics source countries where we have clear evidence that terrorists are dealing in drugs, Colombia and Burma and one, Peru, where evidence of a connection between terrorist groups and drug trafficking is incomplete and contradictory. No military assistance which we have given to Colombia or Peru has had as its rationale the combatting of narco-terrorism, nor indeed has that been a rationale for any military assistance anywhere. With regard to Burma, that Government has consistently maintained that it does not desire external involvement, i.e., assistance, in its insurgency/terrorist problem, which it considers a solely internal matter of concern.

REASONS FOR REDUCTION ON OPIUM IN PAKISTAN

Senator D'Amato: How much of the reduction in opium production in Pakistan is the result of government action, and how much is due to the fact that there was a severe drought in 1980?

Mr. Thomas: Weather patterns in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province have certainly had an effect on opium production. After the drought in the 1980/81 growing season, the 1981/82 season saw severe rains and hail damage that again reduced opium production. Another drought occurred in the 1983/84 growing season just past, which cut production in some areas as much as 50%, although not all areas were equally affected. However, following the 1979 poppy cultivation ban in settled areas, the dramatic drop in opium prices caused by past over-production was an even more significant factor in discouraging opium production than the weather. The government took advantage of both low prices and the weather to extend the opium ban throughout the NWFP's settled areas. Since 1980, prices for opium have gradually recovered, although they are still less than half the record $200/kilo paid in 1978. But with the precedent for enforcement of the opium ban established, the government has successfully maintained the ban, and extended it to other areas now receiving development assistance. Weather risks are a constant in the NWFP, and, with opium prices having now recovered to an attractive level, government enforcement must be given the greatest share of credit for reduction of opium production to its current level of 45-60 metric tons. While it is impossible to estimate how much opium would be produced in the absence of government enforcement, it is safe to assume that it would be significantly higher than present levels.

AFGHANISTAN

Senator D'Amato: What is the connection between the increase in opium production in Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation of that nation?

Mr. Thomas: The Soviet occupation has not materially affected opium production in Afghanistan, and exports to heroin refineries in Pakistan and elsewhere continue. Recent estimates place production in the 140-180 metric ton range. The difference with earlier estimates that ranged up to 400 tons is a result of changed methodology

for making estimates and should not be read as a U.S. determination that Afghan opium production has declined.

USE OF DRUG CONTROL MONEY AGAINST GUERRILLAS

Senator D'Amato: Why do Federal regulations prohibit spending drug control money to fight guerrillas who deal in drugs and attack our drug control programs?

Mr. Thomas: There is no prohibition against INM committing funds or commodities to assist foreign government campaigns against drug traffickers, including military-style campaigns against guerrillas and insurgent groups who are involved in drug trafficking. There is a general prohibition against using assistance funds to provide arms or ammunition.

EFFORTS OF DRUG-PRODUCING COUNTRIES

Senator D'Amato: To what extent are drug producing countries replacing their aging equipment used in their eradication programs?

Mr. Thomas: Our assistance programs all include end use monitoring, and we use this tool to effect timely replacements of equipment which we provide under narcotics control agreements. We have also witnessed a trend towards increased materiel contributions by host governments, although most of the increased contributions to control programs have been in the form of increased personnel devoted to drug control.

Senator D'Amato: Do any of these countries plan major increases in their drug eradication budgets?

Mr. Thomas: We do not have forward budget planning yet, but the trend has been toward a gradual increase in resources devoted to narcotics control, as various national economic circumstances have permitted.

Senator D'Amato: How extensively do they use their armed forces to eradicate drug crops?

Mr. Thomas: Generally the role of the armed forces has been limited to support. In Burma, the armed forces have carried out annual manual eradication of opium crops, and armed forces involvement in Thailand is increasing. Mexico and Belize both use the armed forces for manual eradication. Eradication elsewhere is carried out variously by para-military, police, or civilian units.

Questions Submitted by Mr. Rangel

PAKISTAN

Mr. Rangel: When the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control visited Pakistan in January 1984, we were told by the Acting President and the Minister of Interior that President Zia had announced in December 1983 the decision of the Government to apply the national narcotic law in the "Federally Administered Tribal

Areas." This was directed specifically at the enormous illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin originating in the area from opium originating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So far as we can determine 13 months after this commitment, the Government of Pakistan has not moved to implement narcotic enforcement controls in the tribal areas and that illicit heroin manufacture continues unabated. Further in this area, particularly around Landi Kotal in the Khyber Agency, most of the heroin from that part of the world affecting the United States is produced.

What steps is the Department of State taking to have the Government of Pakistan assume its obligation to implement its national narcotic laws in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and end the enormous uncontrolled production of opium and heroin in that sector of the country?

Mr. Thomas: The Department of State continues to be concerned about the high levels of heroin production in the Khyber Agency of Pakistan, and continues to express this concern to the Government of Pakistan at every opportunity. What has been made clear to us by senior Pakistani officials is that the importance of the "extension" or "application" of certain enforcement laws to the Federally Administrated Tribal Territories is the realization by FATA leaders and residents that they can be invoked there. When and with what frequency will be a function, according to these officials, of the Government's capability to do so, in terms of the political environment as well as resources. This having been said, the Government of Pakistan, acting through its energetic Political Agent in the Khyber, and his assistants, has established a creditable record of seizures and arrests during 1984 that merits our recognition. I would like to note a number of these:

On May 5, agents seized a shipment of heroin precursor chemicals consisting of 180 gallons of acetic anhydride and soda ash and arrested two suspects.

On August 8, combined forces of the Khyber Political Agent and the Frontier Corps raided a fully operational heroin laboratory within the tribal area of the Khyber Agency. One hundred sixty kilograms of opium, 20 kilograms of heroin, an opium press, and assorted chemicals were seized and a chemist arrested.

On August 13, a party of the Khyber Rifles seized 770 kilograms of opium from a truck headed toward Landi Kotal.

On September 4, the Khyber Political Agent's forces raided a heroin laboratory near Bara in the Khyber Agency where 4.5 kilograms of heroin, as well as chemicals and equipment were seized.

On October 11, officers under command of the Khyber Political Agent arrested a notorious laboratory operator and heroin distributor during a raid on his ship in the town of Bara. A raid on another ship in Bara the same day netted 2.5 kilograms of heroin and the operator.

On December 20, forces of the Khyber Political Agent and the Khyber Rifles raided a laboratory just north of Landi Kotal, which turned out to be the largest heroin processing operation seized in recent memory. DEA agents who observed the seized materials esti-

mate the total of heroin base seized at 500 kilograms. Opium presses and a large quantity of precursor chemicals were also seized and 14 persons were detained.

Numerous other smaller seizures and many arrests have occurred in the Khyber during this period, and I would be pleased to share the reports we have received with you or members of your staff. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters will continue to support and encourage the Government of Pakistan and its officials who demonstrate the courage and moral commitment necessary for effective action against heroin laboratory operators and traffickers.

Mr. Rangel: Pakistan in 1979 promulgated the highly publicized Hadd Ordinance which prohibited the production of opium in its territory. While it has reduced opium production since then, it has done so selectively and has only done so after considerable foreign assistance has been received in each opium growing sector to facilitate the transition to new crops. What concerns the Select Committee is why, after six years, plans have still not been provided for phasing out illicit opium production throughout the entire country.

Why cannot Pakistan submit a final plan and obtain the available international assistance to phase out all the opium production in the country within the next two years?

Mr. Thomas: Following promulgation of the Hadd Ordinance, the Government of Pakistan moved quickly to eliminate opium production in "settled" areas under firm control of the central government. In the "merged" areas, where traditional tribal controls were stronger, the Government asked for, and received, development assistance to ease the transition to elimination of opium poppy cultivation. While both the Government and international donors, including the United States, have moved with all possible speed, it is not possible to bring the benefits of integrated rural development to these relatively isolated areas in one or two years. Thus far, Government commitments to eliminate opium cultivation in areas receiving assistance have been met. In late 1983, the Government developed a broad plan to eliminate opium cultivation in all the remaining major producing areas of Pakistan. The plan, called the "Special Development and Enforcement Plan" (SDEP), was presented and accepted for execution by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and work on the plan began in Dir Subdivision (just North of INM's Malakand Project) in the fall of 1984. To assist with the first phases of SDEP activity, the Pakistan Government has already received pledges of assistance from several governments, including the U.S., totalling $11.5 million. In addition to efforts of the SDEP, the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters continues to sponsor similar work through its "outreach" assistance program. "Outreach" provides small scale agricultural assistance (seeds, implements, fertilizers etc.) and infrastructure projects to complement or "fill in the cracks" in major development efforts. The "outreach" program is now active in souther Dir Subdivision, where it is achieving immediate results in reductions of poppy plantings, and helping to smooth the way for the longer range efforts of the SDEP.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Rangel: The Administration reports that 400 to 575 tons

of opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1983 and that in 1984 those same levels of production continued. What can you tell us of the situation in Afghanistan? Where is this opium being produced and by whom? Is heroin production increasing in Afghanistan? Where is it being produced?

Mr. Thomas: While our estimates of Afghan opium production for 1983 were in the range of 400 to 575 metric tons, the 1984 harvest appears to be significantly smaller than anticipated. However, our estimate of 140-180 metric tons of opium produced in 1984 reflects not only what may prove to be a temporary decline in production but also an improvement and change in estimation methodology. In the absence of any controls, opium production in Afghanistan could increase in 1985 since we have no evidence that poppy control is an active objective of the Karmal regime. The most concentrated areas of opium cultivation are in the provinces along the border with Pakistan. According to our best information, heroin production in laboratories close to the Pakistan border is increasing, and as pressure continues on laboratories on the Pakistani side of the border, this trend may continue.

Mr. Rangel: What effort is the Department of State making to determine the drug production and trafficking situation in Afghanistan and what steps can be taken to counter this situation?

Mr. Thomas: Continuous efforts are made to better understand the drug production and trafficking situation in Afghanistan through contacts and interviews with Afghan refugees who have recently arrived in Pakistan as well as all other available sources of information. The information thus obtained is fragmentary and sometimes anecdotal in nature, but it assists us in following trends in production and trafficking. We can and do attempt to sensitize Afghanistan's neighbors to the dangers posed by Afghanistan's uncontrolled opium production, but the leverage of neighboring nations is limited. As long as the Soviet occupation continues, we foresee great difficulty in affecting the course of events in Afghanistan.

IRAN

Mr. Rangel: From 1980 through 1983 the Administration reports 400 to 600 tons of opium produced annually in Iran. The Iranian authorities report the destruction of opium production in the eastern and western sections of the country where it had been illicitly produced since 1979. They also report aggressive enforcement against illicit heroin manufacture and the traffic of opium, morphine base and heroin. The Iranians report opium, morphine base and heroin is entering their country from Pakistan and Afghanistan for internal consumption and movement westward via Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Italy for trafficking in Europe and North America.

What can you tell us about Iran? What steps is the State Department taking with reference to this situation, on its own or with other governments and the U.N. narcotics control organs to encourage effective controls in Iran and for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey to cooperate with Iran in mutual narcotics control efforts?

Mr. Thomas: At the most recent meeting of the Subcommission

on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters, held at Vienna on February 2, 1984, the Iranian representative stated that his government would support a United Nations survey of illicit poppy cultivation throughout the region, which would presumably include Iran. This statement appears to indicate a willingness on the part of Iran to cooperate with UN efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation in the region, and we will be watching to see if Iran in fact opens its territory to UN observers. From press reports and other sources we know that drug usage and trafficking continue to plague Iran, and, other reports to the contrary, we believe opium production remains high. In the spring of 1984, the Iranian government announced a crackdown on drug smuggling, and reportedly has executed 100 alleged drug smugglers, arrested 1,400 others, and seized more than seven metric tons of drugs by October, 1984. We consistently encourage Iran's neighbors with whom we have good relations to seek increased cooperation with Iran targeted on the several known drug smuggling routes across Iran. Nevertheless, even neighboring countries have a difficult time gaining the full attention of the Iranian government to this issue when Iran is actively engaged in a war with Iraq.

Mr. Rangel: What is being done to enhance the work of the U.N. Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East which could add so much to bring a solution (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sweden are members.)?

Mr. Thomas: The February 2, 1984 session of the Subcommission produced what we believe to be the sensible recommendation that future meetings be held at locations within the narcotics producing nations of the region, rather than at Vienna. Iran has offered to host the next meeting of the Subcommission. Member nations also agreed that, at future meetings, police and customs officers actually working in narcotics control should be added to national delegations. We believe that both of these recommendations, if implemented, will add a more realistic dimension to future Sub-Commission sessions, and may lead to improved operational cooperation among narcotics enforcement officials of the member nations.

TURKEY

Mr. Rangel: From the late 1970's Turkey has been called "the land bridge" for the flow of heroin and opiate raw materials originating in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran across its territory to the west, often via Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus and Sicily. Heroin is being manufactured in Turkey illicitly from those raw materials and from some opium allegedly grown in remote sections of Eastern Turkey.

Since about 1980, it is my understanding your office has provided the Government of Turkey about $1 million per year for narcotics enforcement assistance to the Turkish National Police and Jandarma. In our visits to Turkey in January, 1984 we learned that while these services expanded their narcotics enforcement units and increased manpower and equipment resources, their performance in the way of drug arrests and seizures and the confiscation of laboratories has been disappointing. Very little in drugs has been intercepted entering the country, yet Western European authorities continue to intercept great numbers of Turkish nationals smuggling heroin from Turkey to Europe.

What can be done to increase the effectiveness of the Turkish drug enforcement agencies to prevent the movement of drugs through Turkey to Europe and North America?

Mr. Thomas: While Turkey can do more to intercept the movement of drugs across its territory, we believe that Turkish efforts in this respect have been reasonably effective and certainly sincere. I would not concur that Turkish performance in drug arrests and seizures and confiscation of laboratories has been disappointing. Heroin seizure figures for the first nine months of 1984 (245 kilograms), if projected through the entire year, would not compare unfavorably with the 296 kilograms seized in 1983. Similarly, while arrests have not risen over the course of the past year, they have at least remained steady. When drug seizures and arrests rise sharply in any given country, we tend to conclude that the level of trafficking is on the increase. We cannot reasonably reach the same conclusion when these figures start to level off. Turkish authorities believe that their enforcement activity, together with the serious and certain penalties imposed on convicted narcotics traffickers in Turkey, are operating to induce traffickers to try other routes. Certainly, there are neighboring nations where risks to traffickers are not as great. The large numbers of Turkish nationals that live and work in Western European countries, and the potential that these persons represent for narcotics smuggling, is a serious concern to the Turkish government as it is to us. Their sheer numbers make it difficult to exercise effective control over them at Turkey's land borders as they move back and forth. In a number of the major narcotics seizures that occurred in Western Europe during 1984, Turkish authorities played a role in alerting their European counterparts to the shipments. These instances demonstrate an improving Turkish intelligence capability, and a willingness to cooperate with other governments in interdiction activities. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters intends to continue its commodity and training support for Turkish drug enforcement agencies for as long as there are useful contributions to be made.

Mr. Rangel: The Select Committee periodically receives reports of sporadic illicit opium production in remote sections of Eastern Turkey. The Government of Turkey vigorously eradicates any opium poppy illicitly being grown in its territory that it detects. Is the Department of State ensuring that the Turkish authorities are provided the opium poppy detection capability necessary to prevent any significant illicit cultivation in Turkey?

Mr. Thomas: We have also seen some reports, usually by informants from other countries, of illicit opium production in Turkey. However, when checked out, all of these reports have, to our knowledge, turned out to be false. It is always possible that some small patches of cultivation exist in the remote and mountainous regions of Eastern Turkey. But we doubt that cultivation at a level which would be required to produce significant amounts of opium would remain undetected. The Jandarma Air Wing has a special aerial photography program (MOPS) to overfly suspected areas and identify illegal cultivation. This is an experienced unit that knows exactly what it is doing. Pilots are familiar with the terrain and know where to look, and the unit's photo interpreters are well trained and competent. It was the MOPS program that was the first recipient of INM international narcotics control assistance in Turkey in the late 1970's.

PERU

Mr. Rangel: In general terms Peru illicitly produces the coca raw material used to make about 40 percent of the cocaine affecting the United States. For almost six years Peru has been proposing to initiate crop substitution programs and enforce its prohibition against the illicit cultivation of coca carried out in six different sectors of the country.

Because of the enormous explosion of coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley that area was singled out to commence crop substitution and begin the eradication of illicit cultivation. However, to date, notwithstanding the fact the State Department has made available $15 million in law enforcement assistance, Peru has failed to make an effective start in the eradication program it proposed to implement in 1981. In 1983, while 1,600 hectares of aged coca bushes were eradicated, 6,000 hectares of new coca bushes were planted. Overall production is now estimated at 25,000 hectares. No crop substitution or eradication has been begun in the five other sections of the country which amounts to an additional 48,000 hectares of coca.

Following narco-terrorist attacks against U.S. sponsored crop substitute programs in the Upper Huallaga Valley, it is my understanding that U.S. supported crop substitution and coca eradication programs have been suspended and the martial law under the Army has been put in place in the Upper Huallaga. Narcotics enforcement, we are told, has been suspended pending the Army restoring order.

What is the current status of joint U.S. and Peruvian narcotics control cooperative efforts in Peru and what do you believe needs to be done by the U.S. to assist Peru bring this terrible problem with coca and cocaine production and traffic under control? From what we can learn it is steadily growing worse.

Mr. Thomas: As previously assured by the Government of Peru, eradication in the Upper Huallaga Valley resumed January 21, under the protection of UMOPAR, and interdiction activities were scheduled to resume on or about February 1. Normally, eradication operations are not undertaken in January because heavy rains hamper the work. However, the GOP and we wish to sustain these operations to demonstrate to Peruvians that the eradication program will continue despite the narcotics terrorism which has cost so many lives in the region. We anticipate that a normal level of eradication operations will resume as soon as the weather permits. In 1984 more than three thousand hectares of illicit coca were eradicated. That is more than 11 square miles of coca plantations. The Peruvian eradication goal for 1985 is 6000 hectares, nearly double the 1984 figure. This eradication effort has had an impact on the valley, and the rise in violence reflects the fact that traffickers are being hurt by narcotics control efforts. We anticipate that the threat of violence will continue as eradication progresses throughout the Upper Huallaga Valley and narcotics control efforts are stepped up nationwide.

BOLIVIA

Mr. Rangel: Coca produced in Bolivia is the raw material from

which about 40 percent of the cocaine entering the United States is produced. The four project agreements signed in August 1983 to provide for crop substitution and coca eradication in the Chapare region, one of the seven major producing areas in the country, have not yet been implemented. In August 1984, 1,200 men of the Army, Navy and Marines and 300 Policemen occupied the Chapare to implement a full range of suppression activity against illicit coca and cocaine production and traffic. It is my understanding that to date no coca eradication has taken place and coca production continues to increase there and in the six other coca growing regions of Bolivia.

Two large cocaine laboratories, 860 kilos of coca paste and 40 kilos of cocaine were seized, and several important arrests were made in the Beni region to the north of the Chapare.

Could you give us a brief report on the current situation in Bolivia relative to bringing the production and traffic of coca and cocaine under control?

Mr. Thomas: We likewise are frustrated by the delays in achieving implementation of these 1983 agreements. We are hopeful that a coca eradication program can commence in 1985. The prospects for success must take into account the fragile state of the Bolivian government and society. The task is also complicated by continued strong resistance to coca control in the Chapare itself, despite the entry of the military and police in the summer of 1984. Control efforts have continued, and a number of ranches, laboratories, planes and other assets belonging to major traffickers have been seized in addition to those you mention in your question. There has also been some slippage in establishing the security that is a prerequisite for an eradication program. The Government of Bolivia deployed a 248 man U.S.-supported specialized rural police unit into the Chapare during the weekend of February 1. Another unit is deployed in the Cochabamba area. Other specialized narcotics police units will be earmarked for other Bolivian growing areas as circumstances permit.

Mr. Rangel: Are you prepared to recommend courses of action you believe the State Department should adopt as to action that the United States Government might take to assist Bolivia bring this terrible problem of the illicit production and traffic in coca and cocaine under control?

Mr. Thomas: I think that we are essentially on the right track in addressing an unusually intractable set of problems. We are making a hands-on effort to build narcotics control institutions from scratch under difficult circumstances. As we get these institutions in place we hope to be able to expand the scope of our efforts to assist Bolivia. Our aims are to help the Government of Bolivia put the traffickers on the run through effective enforcement measures, to separate the traffickers from their sources of supply and the cultivators from their markets, and to help those farmers whose crops are eradicated find licit ways of earning a living in the coca regions. There is good coordination among involved U.S. Government agencies, particularly among AID, DEA and my Bureau, here in Washington and in La Paz, under the capable leadership of Ambassador Corr.

COLOMBIA

Mr. Rangel: About 75 percent of the cocaine entering the United States continues to be clandestinely manufactured in Colombia from coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia where it is converted from coca leaves produced in those countries. Since 1981 Colombia has brought on line its own coca leaf and coca paste industry to augment the raw material supply from Peru and Bolivia.

The clandestine production of marijuana in Colombia is also responsible for about 70 percent of the marijuana entering the United States.

Following the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Colombia beginning in March 1984 mounted an aggressive campaign that seized 47 cocaine laboratories, 14 tons of cocaine and coca paste and resulting in 1,425 arrests through August 1984.

However, with few exceptions all these arrestees have been released due to insufficient evidence, a chronic problem in Colombia drug enforcement for 15 years.

Why does this inability or unwillingness of the Colombian Government to effectively prosecute the vast majority of illicit cocaine and marijuana traffickers they arrest in flagrant violation of their law continue?

Mr. Thomas: I share your concern that so many accused traffickers seem to go free with such apparent ease in Colombia. I do not have the data that would tell me how many were released for lack of sufficient evidence and how many were released because of collusion, bribery or intimidation of officials. The latter reasons are, unfortunately, all too common in Latin America and the admonitions from the Presidential and ministerial level in several countries do not seem to have effected much change in how things are done. At the same time, the determination and dedication of leaders like President Betancur has been exemplary, as witness the recent extraditions and the continuing emphasis on crop eradication programs. The difficulty of rooting out entrenched patterns of corruption and intimidation in any reasonable period of time is a prime factor that has led us to believe that crop eradication is the most promising approach to narcotics control in the source countries.

Mr. Rangel: Why, after ten years of urging the Colombian Government to utilize some form of herbicide for the aerial spraying of its enormous marijuana crop, are the results disappointing?

Mr. Thomas: Results were certainly disappointing up until last year, but, as is known, President Betancur last May decided in favor of the use of approved herbicides against cannabis and coca. Subsequently, in July, the Colombian Government expanded its manual eradication program and initiated aerial eradication of marijuana with glyphosate, eradicating 4,000 hectares by the end of 1984 (3000 by aerial spraying and 1000 by manual means). The Colombians have now initiated testing in efforts to identify a herbicide that can be applied aerially to destroy coca.

Mr. Rangel: For 1984 the authorities report that of the estimated 44,000 hectares of marijuana cultivated, about 1,500 hectares

were destroyed manually and then in late August about 3,000 hectares were finally destroyed by the aerial spraying of the herbicide glyphosate. For the year 1984 the quantities of marijuana smuggled from Colombia to the U.S. did not diminish. When can we expect effective marijuana eradication via the spraying of glyphosate in Colombia?

Mr. Thomas: We do not yet have sufficient data to know whether quantities of marijuana smuggled from Colombia to the U.S. in 1984 diminished, but the data available at this time indicate that the amount available for export is down sharply, thanks to the eradication and seizure programs. The spraying of glyphosate was conducted from July to early December. For most of that time, spraying was conducted by two helicopters but for about a month an Ayres Thrush, a fixed wing turbo-thrush spray aircraft, was also tested for use in the campaign. Both we and the Colombians are very pleased with the performance of the Thrush and we expect to supply additional such planes to complement the helicopters we have supplied previously. Given additional aircraft, I am hopeful that the Colombian Government can eradicate 50 percent or more of the marijuana cultivated in Colombia later this year.

Mr. Rangel: Since 1981 Colombia has gone from a near zero level of coca production to 20,000 hectares by 1984. For four years discussions and studies have been under way for a herbicide that will destroy coca. The impression is created that Colombians are stringing us along just as they did with marijuana and if they had the will they would find the way. Coca leaf production is increasing dramatically and a way must be found to eradicate it. What is the status of efforts to develop a system to eradicate the newly established growth of coca in Colombia?

Mr. Thomas: I do not believe that the Colombians are stringing us along. They are according a high priority to controlling the coca problem just as they are to controlling marijuana. The major problem is developing or finding a herbicide or combination of herbicides that is effective for aerial spraying against coca and environmentally safe. Colombia is cooperating fully with us in this quest, and is currently testing several herbicides in order to identify one which could be used safely and efficiently to eradicate coca by aerial spraying. We are mutually optimistic that this search will lead to an acceptable herbicide. As you know, U.S. courts have to date prohibited U.S. agencies from implementing the aerial spraying program advocated by DEA. Thus, we are encouraged that Colombia, Mexico and other countries continue to use herbicides in crop eradication programs involving aerial applications.

Mr. Rangel: Last week four notorious cocaine traffickers wanted in the United States were extradited to the United States for prosecution. This was the first time Colombia has honored a U.S. request for extradition under the 1982 treaty. This is a good step in the right direction and it is hoped the 35 or more other individuals similarly wanted will be extradited. What is the status on these individuals?

Mr. Thomas: These cases are being processed in accordance with the extradition treaty between our governments. The Colombian government shares our desire to bring these traffickers to justice,

and we believe that these cases will be prosecuted as rapidly as due legal process permits.

Mr. Rangel: Perhaps more important than honoring extradition requests of the United States for narcotic traffickers would be the Colombian Government finding the ability to prosecute the several thousand important and even major narcotic traffickers arrested each year which up until now with few exceptions are never prosecuted. What is the U.S. Government doing to correct this situation?

Mr. Thomas: I addressed this issue in part in my response to your first question, and reiterate that this is an issue of very serious concern as regards successful prosecution in the United States and in source countries. As you are no doubt aware, successful prosecution of narcotics traffickers, even when they are caught red-handed with the goods, is not always easy in any country. Colombia's willingness to extradite its own nationals to the U.S. for prosecution signals a new era of cooperation in which we anticipate stepped-up efforts to prosecute these traffickers.

MEXICO

Mr. Rangel: As you know in August 1983, I led a delegation of the Select Committee to Mexico. We found that after almost eight years the Mexican aerial herbicide spraying of opium poppy and marijuana was continuing vigorously. However, we learned that opium growers had begun to counter those efforts by using smaller growing plots and dispersing them more widely. This resulted in an increased supply of heroin of a better purity and texture. We also learned that marijuana growers were disposing their plots beyond the range of the Mexican Government's anti-narcotic aerial patrols. We recommended the Mexican Attorney General be provided the equipment necessary to overcome the growers' evasive tactics and to increase the eradication capability.

What has your office done in this regard relative to Mexico? We note that 10,000 tons of marijuana were seized in the state of Chihuahua in November 1984. This was about seven times greater than the 1,300 tons of marijuana thought to have entered the U.S. from Mexico in 1983.

Mr. Thomas: The Mexican Attorney General's office maintains an extensive fleet of aircraft to conduct aerial eradication of cannabis and opium poppy. Although the program has had considerable success over the years in reducing Mexican marijuana and heroin production, traffickers continually alter their methods and procedures to attempt to reduce the effectiveness of enforcement and eradication efforts. While close and productive dialogue with the Mexican government regarding narcotics control has characterized our relationship of almost a decade, 1984 witnessed an increase in the level of cooperation between the two governments and several new steps taken to improve the effectiveness of eradication and enforcement programs. Ambassador Gavin and the Deputy Chief of Mission meet frequently with the Attorney General to discuss narcotics matters, and other members of the Embassy staff have frequent contact with their counterparts in the Mexican government to assure a high degree of coordination in narcotics control activities.

To cite one example of recent initiatives to improve narcotics control programs, the Mexican Attorney General's Office implemented in late 1984 an independent verification program, directed by the Attorney General's Office Inspector General, an individual who has no previous involvement with the eradication program. The program is designed to provide independent confirmation of opium and cannabis cultivation and verification of the results of eradication operations. The program is now fully operational, and INM has provided financial assistance to the program for additional aircraft procurement and maintenance. We believe that the program will significantly increase the reliability of information available about narcotics crop cultivation and specifically the eradication program, and thereby will substantially increase effectiveness of eradication operations.

Also in 1984, agreement was reached with the Mexican government whereby INM will provide funding for the purchase of a Turbo-Thrush fixed wing spray aircraft that will greatly increase capabilities of the Mexican spray fleet. The "Thrush" has a much greater range and carrying capacity for herbicides than helicopter. Used in combination with the existing helicopter spray fleet, this aircraft will help the Mexican Government to extend eradication operations into difficult operating areas.

In regard to the Chihuahua marijuana seizure, I would like to note that we were gratified that swift action prevented most of this new production from entering the United States, action arising from effective investigation by U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. I visited the site in December, 1984, to obtain a clearer idea of the operation. Although you correctly note that an estimated 10,000 tons of cannabis were seized and destroyed, this figure refers to the bulk weight of entire plants that were seized. The total weight of actual dry, useable marijuana that could have been produced from these plants is much less, estimated by DEA at approximately 1,900 to 2,400 tons. This amount of marijuana, the size of the camps, and the number of laborers found all indicate that a major operation had been attempted in Chihuahua state, although indications are that the camps had been established fairly recently, within the last nine months. The episode (particularly the miserable working conditions of the laborers found at the site) received wide-spread publicity in Mexico, which may help to hamper future recruitment of laborers for narcotics cultivation and production operations by the traffickers.

Mr. Rangel: When we were in Mexico in August 1983 we learned that from about June 1981 through December 1982, during the last 18 months of the Lopez Portillo administration, there was a total collapse of cooperation by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police with DEA. This was reestablished in early 1983 by the de la Madrid administration.

Can you tell us if this had progressed enough to begin to reestablish the Janus program for the prosecutions in Mexico of major narcotic traffickers on the basis of evidence developed both in the United States and Mexico?

Mr. Thomas: As I have previously noted, I believe that the current overall level of cooperation between the United States and Mexican governments in the area of narcotics control is very good. President de la Madrid has expressed a personal commitment to this

effort, as has Attorney General Garcia. We are very pleased with the current level of communication and coordination with all U.S. agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

Progress has been made toward reestablishment of the Janus program, and the Mexican Attorney General's Office appointed an individual in late 1984 to specifically direct Janus program prosecutions. Although no prosecutions have yet been brought to court since the Janus program was restarted, there have been active discussions between Mexican and U.S. officials to lay the necessary groundwork, and significant progress has been made. On the basis of the discussions and progress to date, we are very optimistic about the future of the program.

JAMAICA

Mr. Rangel: I think you know in my judgement the continuing failure of the Government of Jamaica to prepare and begin implementation of a plan that would gradually eliminate the production of marijuana within a reasonable period of time places it in violation of its obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

What can you tell us about this and the efforts of the State Department to correct this situation?

Mr. Thomas: We fully share your concern about the level of marijuana imported into the United States from Jamaica. We have been active in expressing our concern to the Jamaican government. I travelled to Jamaica in October, 1984, and thoroughly discussed this issue with Prime Minister Seaga and members of his government. Ambassador Hewitt and other Embassy officers have also continued to stress the importance we attach to narcotics in their contacts with Jamaican government officials.

Despite our continued belief that more needs to be done, I should note that progress has been made in several areas. The Government of Jamaica implemented several measures in 1984 to strengthen narcotics enforcement. Most drug shipments from Jamaica involve aircraft, and new legislation was passed in October, 1984, giving the Jamaican government much broader authority to regulate aircraft movements and close down illegal airstrips. The legislation expands government authority to control overflights and landings and takeoffs, and provides for greatly increased penalties for violations, as well as broadened authority to confiscate aircraft and other personal property. The government also has implemented fiscal measures designed to penalize narcotics traffickers through large tax assessments. We have expanded our assistance to the manual eradication program conducted by the Jamaican Constabulary Force, and have just agreed to provide additional assistance to the Jamaican Government for increased interdiction and enforcement activities.

Prime Minister Seaga has publicly expressed a commitment to control narcotics trafficking. As you know, we believe that the most effective means of controlling narcotics is through eradication of crops, and that interdiction alone is extremely difficult if not

impossible, without enormous resources available for the effort. We will continue to encourage the Jamaican government to increase the effectiveness of its own control efforts to decrease marijuana exports through both eradication and interdiction.

THAILAND

Mr. Rangel: What is your office and our Embassy in Bangkok doing to assist the Government of Thailand complete its "master plan" for the phase out of opium production, hopefully within three to five years?

Mr. Thomas: The "Master Plan for Development of Opium Poppy Cultivating Regions of Thailand" is a Royal Thai Government (RTG) document, prepared by the Office of the Narcotics Control Board with the assistance of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). Our embassy in Bangkok has been following the progress of the masterplan, and has reported that the plan is being circulated throughout the RTG for review and comment. Both Embassy officials and senior State Department officers, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Taylor and I, have frequently and forcefully urged the RTG to adopt a policy of enforcement of the RTG's opium poppy ban in situations where hilltribe farmers have received development assistance and are able to produce and market alternative crops, but continue to grow commercial quantities of opium poppy. We have urged UNFDAC and bilateral donors to make such enforcement a condition of all future development assistance projects.

The executive summary of the draft Masterplan contains the following statement: "The Royal Thai Government policy based upon its international obligations and its project experience insists that socio-economic development of the hilltribe people will lead to the eradication of opium poppy cultivation. It is also aware that illicit cultivation may persist in certain areas even when development assistance has helped opium cultivators to attain a satisfactory living standard. In those areas the Government will enforce the laws prohibiting opium cultivation and if necessary eradicate illicit plantations."

The Embassy recently reported that as the 1984/85 opium growing season commenced, the Thai Government demonstrated its continued commitment to halting the cultivation of illicit opium for commercial purposes in the shortest time frame possible. While Thai agencies and officials entrusted with the responsibility for the implementation of government policies in hilltribe areas would prefer to achieve that goal through non-confrontational methods, including on-going crop substitution projects, all elements of the Thai Government recognize the need for eradication in instances in which farmers have benefitted from development assistance, have alternative means of income, and continue to grow opium for sale.

The report went on to note that responsible agencies of the Thai Government developed plans for eradication during the current growing season and began implementing those plans in mid-December 1984. Some agencies, such as the Public Welfare Department, are using voluntary methods of eradication in which hilltribe farmers are enlisted to assist in the destruction of their illicit crops in return for promises of future government assistance in finding

alternative sources of income. In other cases, the Border Patrol Police and other law enforcement agencies are carrying out forced eradication in areas where farmers have an alternative source of income but refuse to cooperate with the Government in terminating opium cultivation.

We expect that the 1984-85 season's eradication efforts will considerably surpass the initial eradication efforts which began late in the 1983/84 season.

BURMA

Mr. Rangel: How is it possible to press Burma to take measures to eradicate opium production in its territory dominated by insurgents when Thailand fails to phase out opium production in the hill tribe areas which are under the control of the government?

Mr. Thomas: The situations in Burma and Thailand are completely different. Thailand produces only about one fifteenth of the amount of opium produced in Burma. Moreover, as I noted in the previous answer, Thailand is taking firm action in this growing season to enforce its ban on opium production in some of the areas where farmers who have alternative means of support are continuing to produce opium for sale. We believe that opium production in Thailand will continue to decline in future years.

Burma, on the other hand, is the world's largest illicit producer of opium. However, it is not necessary to press Burma to take measures to eradicate opium production in its territory. The government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (SRUB) makes every effort to reduce such production, and is firmly committed to a policy of eliminating illicit opium production within its borders. Because a large proportion of the opium growing areas in Burma are in control of insurgents, and because most of the insurgents are deeply involved in opium production and refining, the SRUB views the two problems as intertwined and inseparable. Every year the SRUB undertakes combined police/military action to manually eradicate opium being cultivated in areas to which it has access, and undertakes military actions against the major opium producing and refining insurgent groups. These actions are accompanied by heavy casualties. While the SRUB and the United States have cooperated for the past ten years on narcotics control efforts and plan to continue such cooperation, the SRUB has made it clear that it would continue to seek the elimination of illicit narcotics production within its borders even if no assistance from external sources was available.

UNITED NATIONS

POLITICAL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR D'AMATO

DRUG ABUSE AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM

Senator D'Amato: Do you have any information about the growth in heroin and other drug addiction in drug-producing nations? Do you see evidence that drug abuse is no longer viewed as merely an American problem?

Mr. Buffum: There is ample evidence of growth in addiction to heroin and in addiction to or abuse of other drugs among populations (generally young persons) of those States where heroin and other drugs of abuse are produced and through which these drugs transit in the illicit traffic. Of a total of 111 States and territories which submitted annual reports in 1984 to the Division of Narcotic Drugs, only nine reported no, or no significant drug abuse for calendar year 1983.

One hundred and one Governments reported illicit traffic had been detected in 1983, and of these 60 Governments reported traffic in heroin and seizures thereof during the same calendar year; 31 of the 101 reported increases ranging from 20 per cent to more than 100 per cent in total quantities of heroin seized from traffic in 1983 compared with 1982.

Concurrently 62 Governments reported addiction to or abuse of opiates (opium, morphine or heroin): heroin was certainly the most widespread opiate abuse. Of these 62 Governments, only 39 were able to support the information provided with figures of known addicts or abusers or with estimates of total numbers of such addicts or abusers.

There is no doubt from those reports which provided detailed information that so-called heroin "producing" and "transit" States are increasingly adversely affected by escalating heroin addiction. In Pakistan, for instance, heroin abuse was virtually unknown in 1980. There are now 1,900 heroin addicts under treatment and the estimated number of abusers is 100,000. In Sri Lanka, heroin abuse following transit has emerged only during the last three years and is sharply increasing. There were 640 heroin addicts who presented themselves for the first time for treatment in 1983, and an estimated total of 2,000 heroin abusers.

A similar adverse impact was reported by many Governments in respect of cocaine. Fifty-eight Governments reported illicit traffic in cocaine during 1983, and many in Western Europe as well as in the region of the Americas expressed concern over the spread of cocaine abuse, especially among young people.

Drug abuse is increasingly viewed as a global problem, rather than as "merely an American problem". Regional initiatives to develop intergovernmental mechanisms in the Near and Middle-East,

Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America provide concrete evidence of widespread concern at governmental levels. The United States usually participates in these group meetings.

Recognition of the genuinely international nature of drug abuse and trafficking problems, is well illustrated by several recent events. These include: a much higher priority given to the subject during the debate in the United Nations General Assembly; a personal intervention by the Secretary-General in the Assembly's Third Committee: Assembly adoption of a Declaration (resolution 39/142) and a new draft Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances and Related Activities (resolution 39/141); and the expansion of the number of States members on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs from 30 to 40 in 1983.

There is also recognition, however, that greater efforts by governmental and non-governmental organizations are required to mobilize communities and societies to prevent and reduce demand for illicit drugs as part of the international drug control strategy approved by the General Assembly in December 1981. This is also reflected in action taken by international non-governmental organizations to support the United Nations initiatives. The role of the United States in mobilizing various interest groups in the effort to prevent and reduce drug abuse, remains of great importance.

It should be recognized that well organized drug trafficking groups, with a primary interest in financial profit will continue to direct their efforts towards the most profitable markets of which the United States, because of the strength and ready convertibility of the dollar, remains the most attractive.

The United States will therefore probably remain a major target for traffickers for the foreseeable future and until either demand prevention and reduction and/or strengthened international sanctions against traffickers take effect.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON DRUG MONEY

Senator D'Amato: To what extent is the United Nations involved in getting countries to free themselves from economic dependence on drug money?

Mr. Buffum: The resources of the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) and the Executive Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) under international drug control treaties, as well as the financial support which is provided by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) are used to assist Governments to promote economic and social development through crop substitution, marketing and infrastructure assistance, thus serving to replace financial income derived by farmers from illicit activity associated with the drugs. This includes assistance to Governments to develop remote areas where narcotics raw material is usually produced illegally so as to enable farmers to grow and market licit crops. These activities are thus primarily driected to reduction of production of organic substances.

In relation to drug trafficking, the United Nations involvement includes more broad-based activity encouraging greater knowledge among Member States of legal measures which can be used effectively at the national and international levels to trace, freeze and ensure forfeiture of the proceeds of drug crimes. This is particularly important to national economies since illegally acquired assets are frequently invested abroad and escape taxing mechanisms as well as constituting a drain on the economy.

MEASURING LEVELS OF DRUG ABUSE

Senator D'Amato: Does the United Nations attempt to measure levels of drug abuse worldwide?

Mr. Buffum: The Division of Narcotic Drugs receives and analyzes annual reports from Governments which include inter alia the nature and extent of both recorded and estimated drug abuse within the territory of each reporting State. The quality and quantity of data provided varies widely however, and a methodology for estimating the extent of the problem has not yet been standardized.

The Division has taken steps to develop the means of measuring drug abuse and addiction. In this regard, it has published a manual, and provided guidelines.

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) publishes three technical reports on narcotic drugs annually which set forth information provided by Governments in accordance with international treaties. These reports provide estimated opium production and licit requirements of narcotic drugs, statistics on narcotic drugs accompanied by an analysis of major trends in the licit movement of such drugs.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE

Senator D'Amato: What are the countries of the world contributing to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control? What countries contribute more than $1 million per year? What country contributes most? What country is second? What do they contribute? What is being done to bring in other donor nations?

Mr. Buffum: By the end of 1983 a total of 83 countries had contributed or pledged US $ 77 million to UNFDAC since it was established.

Contributions and pledges during 1984, including those special purpose contributions financing activities over a five-year period, total US$ 54.5 million. Thus far in 1985 additional long-term pledges of US$ 10 million have been announced. Those countries contributing or pledging approximately US$ 1 million or more applicable to 1984 are: Italy US$ 5.1 million, United States US$ 2.5 million, the FRG US$ 1.4 million, and Norway US$ 0.9 million. Thus far, in 1985, Sweden has contributed US$ 1 million.

Major efforts have been devoted in the past two years to strengthen fund raising activities and to develop new concepts and methods of enlisting other donor countries. As a result, considerable growth in the resources of the United Nations Fund for

Drug Abuse Control has been achieved in 1984. Moreover, 1984 marked the setting up of large scale integrated programmes which have replaced pilot projects undertaken during the first decade of UNFDAC's existence. It is expected that on the basis of a so-called master plan approach, additional countries may substantially increase their contributions to UNFDAC. Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, have already expressed strong interest in UNFDAC's programmes and are considering the possibility of making substantial contributions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN RANGEL

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING

Mr. Rangel: Can you tell us if there has been any recognition by Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar and his principal deputies that the technical mechanism for international narcotics control has broken down due to the political failure of a few countries to implement the convention requirements in their territory?

Mr. Buffum: The Secretary-General is well aware of reports which indicate that there has been a failure in some countries to mount effective narcotics control measures and fully implement various international narcotics conventions. Generally speaking, weaknesses in such control have been noted particularly in remote and sparsely populated regions of the world where governments have found it difficult to exert their authority, such as in South-East Asia, Middle-East, and in South America. In this regard, the Secretary-General has publicly stated his concern and has taken steps to enlist the political will and help of the Member States concerned as well as that of the various entities within the United Nations system.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General has called for increased support of programmes mounted by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). UNFDAC has focussed its effort in assisting drug control measures in regions such as those mentioned above where serious problems exist. For example, it has developed programmes of "Master Plans" which focus on urgent needs such as crop substitution in certain areas of Colombia, Pakistan and Bolivia.

INVOLVEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Mr. Rangel: Has any action been taken or has any consideration been given to having the UN Secretary-General use the enormous prestige and good will of his office to convince the leadership of countries deliquent in narcotics control of their moral and legal obligations to meet the treaty requirements to limit the availability of narcotics and psychotropic drugs in their territory to medical purposes and to seek whatever technical and financial help they may need from the United Nations and all friendly governments to bring the illicit production and traffic of narcotics under control?

Mr. Buffum: The Secretary-General has attached priority concern to the need for enhanced drug control measures in his discussions with the leaders of various Member States. He will continue to point out their moral and legal obligations to meet treaty requirements. At the same time, it should be noted that the primary responsibility for engendering respect for treaty requirements limiting the availability of narcotics and psychotropic substances for medical purposes, remains with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The Board, which was established by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, administers a drug quota system for narcotics drugs, a mandatory controls system, and a monitoring system for the production, manufacture, export and import of these substances with a view to preventing leakages into illicit channels. While the Board is independent and quasi judicial, it does seek to collaborate with other international bodies concerned with drug control. The Board's annual report analyses the drug control situations worldwide so that the governments are made aware of existing and potential situations which may endanger the objectives of the relevant conventions. The Board also has the function of drawing governments' attention to the weaknesses in national control and in treaty compliance. The Secretary-General closely follows the work of the Board. He also endeavours to encourage governments to avail of the Board's technical assistance as well as that of the Division, and of the limited financial assistance through UNFDAC.

INVOLVEMENT OF UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Rangel: Do you have any policy whereby the UN Resident Representative in countries where serious illicit production and traffic exists, is instructed to urge corrective action on the host government and remind it of its obligation to the narcotic and psychotropic control conventions?

Mr. Buffum: The United Nations Development Programme Resident Representative, as Resident Co-ordinator of the United Nations System's Operational Activities for Development, has a general jurisdiction which gives him responsibility for the guidance and supervision of the United Nations operational programmes executed in the country of his assignment. In countries where "serious illicit production and traffic in drugs exist", projects are financed by UNFDAC addressed at controlling the illicit supply, traffic and demand. The related agreements between the United Nations and the host government contain provisions ensuring that the host government commits itself to the achievement of drug control objectives. The Resident Representative, as Co-ordinator of United Nations activities in consultation with other competent United Nations agencies and organizations, is involved in achieving the goals stated in the agreements and, in case of lack of fulfilment of the obligations contained therein, assists UNFDAC and its executing agencies to adopt measures which could be referred to as "corrective action".

PROGRESS BY UN BODIES IN DRUG TRAFFIC CONTROL

Mr. Rangel: Can you tell us if the work of the UN Sub-Commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near

and Middle East shows any promise of improved narcotic controls in that region particularly in Iran and Afghanistan?

Mr. Buffum: Improved narcotic control in the region of the Sub-Commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East may be inferred from the quantities of drugs seized by drug law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. According to seizure reports submitted by the Governments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the provisions of the Conventions, a total of 7.5 tons of heroin (approximately 63% of worldwide seizures) and 71 tons of opium (approximately 85% of worldwide seizures) were seized by agencies of the four governments of the region in 1983. Of that total, 3,464 kg. of heroin were seized in Iran and 446 kg. in Afghanistan; 35,328 kg. of opium were seized in Iran and 16,416 kg. in Afghanistan.

By comparison, 3,796 kg. of heroin were seized in the region in 1981 and 3,211 kg. in 1982; 43,754 kg. of opium were seized in 1981 and 32,837 kg. in 1982. The vast increase in the total quantity of drugs, particularly of heroin, seized over the past few years can be attributed to improved co-ordinated countermeasures and to some extent increased seizures may be assumed to result from such improved co-ordinated action. This was the conclusion reached by representatives and observers who attended last October's eighteenth session of the Sub-Commission. Despite the very considerable seizures of opium and heroin, organized trafficking groups continue to move considerable quantities of South-West Asian heroin to other regions, especially to parts of Europe.

At the February session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the representative of Iran stated that all opium production in the country had been banned in 1979; there was no evidence of attempts to undertake illicit opium poppy cultivation. He stated that, in his opinion, the report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1984 gave the impression that there may be opium production in Iran; this was not the case and the implication in that report was not justified. He also invited the Sub-Commission to hold its next session in Tehran in early autumn. At the same session, the observer from Afghanistan reaffirmed that residual illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was confined in scattered remote areas and was very limited. Afghanistan has taken action this year to adhere to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

In response to a suggestion made to the Sub-Commission by the representative of Iran, the Sub-Commission recommended and the Commission subsequently adopted Decision 4 (XXXI) requesting the Secretary-General "to make arrangements to assist the governments concerned, in consultation with them, to identify with accuracy sources of illicit supply" of narcotic raw material as great difficulty had been encountered in undertaking such a task. This would assist the governments concerned, with the support of the international community if necessary, to eradicate such illicit supply. It is intended to initiate this activity in the context of the autumn meeting of the Sub-Commission.

HOLD A CONFERENCE INCLUDING PRODUCING COUNTRIES ON TRAFFICKING

Mr. Rangel: Has any consideration ever been given by the Secretary-General and his staff to bring together in conference the major victim countries which are the industrial democracies and the major producer or source of supply countries to develop plans for mutual action to bring the problem under control? It seems to me, given the UN responsibiiity for administering the international narcotics control conventions it has an obligation to promote and energize the political action necessary to make the international narcotics control system work effectively.

Mr. Buffum: The composition of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, established by Economic and Social Council resolution 9(1) of 16 February 1946, was designed to meet the objectives now formulated in question 5 since, as the resolution specifies, its Member States are drawn from "important producing and manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem". The principle of balanced membership was reiterated in Council resolution 845 (XXXII) of 3 August 1961 which specified that the members shall be elected "with due regard to the adequate representation of countries which are important in the field of manufacture of narcotic drugs, and of countries in which drug addiction or the illicit traffic in drugs constitutes an important problem". The attached list of the current membership of the 40 member-Commission reflects this principle and it may be noted that in addition to the regular membership, sessions of the Commission are also attended by observers designated by more than 25 other Member States interested in the activities and agenda items of the Commission.

The Commission is the basic policy-making and legislative organ concerned with international drug control in the United Nations system. Its functions and responsibilities with respect to the implementation of the two major narcotics control conventions are set forth in article 8 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and article 17 of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Since 1946 the Commission has met in 31 regular and eight special sessions and has initiated a range of actions specifically designed to improve and strengthen international co-operation in matters within the scope of the existing Conventions as well as to enlarge international co-operation in related areas. The most recent example of this has been the action taken by the Commission at its recently concluded thirty-first session (11-20 February 1985) to initiate the preparation of a draft convention on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

ANNEX I

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
AS FROM 1 JANUARY 1984 */

Members of the Commission are elected from among Member States of the United Nations and non-Member States Parties to the Single Convention

Members	Term of Office expires on 31 December
Algeria	1987
Argentina	1985
Australia	1985
Austria	1985
Bahamas	1985
Belgium	1985
Brazil	1987
Bulgaria	1985
Canada	1987
Colombia	1987
Finland	1987
France	1987
German Democratic Republic	1987
Germany, Federal Republic of	1987
Greece	1987
Hungary	1985
India	1985
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1987
Italy	1987
Ivory Coast	1985
Japan	1985
Madagascar	1987
Malaysia	1985
Mexico	1985
Morocco	1987
Netherlands	1987
Nigeria	1985
Pakistan	1987
Panama	1985
Peru	1987
Republic of Korea	1985
Senegal	1985
Sri Lanka	1987
Thailand	1987
Turkey	1985
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	1985
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1985
United States of America	1987
Yugoslavia	1987
Zaire	1985

*/ The names of members newly elected or re-elected by the Economic and Social Council at its first and second regular sessions in 1983 are underlined.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

COAST GUARD

Questions Submitted by Senator D'Amato

SOUTH AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

Sen. D'Amato: What resources have the countries of South America contributed to your interdiction patrols off the coast of Colombia?

Adm. Yost: While we didn't operate jointly with the Colombian Navy, during Operation Wagon Wheel, we did exchange information and coordinate our respective operations as much as possible. The Colombian Navy had two Corvettes and three 105' patrol vessels operating in their waters, while our forces were further offshore. They also operated several light aircraft. The Colombian government also provided a Navy liaison officer and two government officials who rode the flagship of the Coast Guard Squadron. The Navy officer assisted in coordination and communications and the government officials were empowered to give their government's permission to board any suspect vessels encountered that might be flying the Colombian Flag.

The Dutch Antilles volunteered the use of two patrol aircraft on an "as available" basis and actually flew about twelve to fifteen patrols in support of Operation Wagon Wheel. The Venezuelans mainly patrolled internal waters to prevent their use by smugglers seeking alternate routes to avoid our forces.

PLANS FOR FUTURE

Sen. D'Amato: Do you plan to continue these patrols?

Adm. Yost: We have determined operations of this type to be a highly effectove answer to the problem of maritime drug smuggling. Given the resources and the cooperation, we will continue to use this approach. I look forward to the continued cooperation of the Navy in this regard.

RESOURCES USED

Sen. D'Amato: What resources is the American Government contributing to these patrols?

Adm. Yost: The American Government, of course, contributed the bulk of the resources devoted to Operation Wagon Wheel. Just to cover the direct participants, the Coast Guard had between six and ten cutters off the Coast of Colombia together with four to ten other vessels in such locations as the Bahamas, choke

points, and the Straits of Florida. As many as six Navy vessels, three large and three small, participated also.

As for aircraft, we had four aircraft patrolling the Caribbean with participation provided by Navy and Customs planes in the area. Some of the shoreside support personnel had to be forward deployed in Aruba and Curacao.

In addition, Wagonwheel is a part of a larger operation called Hat Trick run by the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. Many agencies including the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, the Navy, the Air Force and the State Department supported Hat Trick.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Sen. D'Amato: What problems have you encountered in your efforts to increase drug seizures this year?

Adm. Yost: First, let me say that the Coast Guard's objective has not been to increase drug seizures but rather to disrupt drug traffic. I would much rather have the fall crop of 13000 metric tons rot in the fields or be destroyed by spraying or burning in-country than for our forces to have to seize it at sea. At this time we can account for about 50% of the 13000 metric ton fall crop as having been destroyed. This intelligence comes from a combination of preliminary Colombian reports of their in-country successes and our at-sea interdiction results. The remainder of the crop is stockpiled and in danger from both natural spoilage and destruction by Colombian National Forces. The effectiveness of our at-sea interdiction forces will dictate what the traffickers do next.

As regards our interdiction efforts, we notice the smugglers are making increased use of territorial seas of other countries to avoid interdiction. With twelve mile territorial seas generally claimed by the twenty some nations in the Caribbean Basin, there is an awful lot of ocean that is "Out of Bounds" for our cutters. This trend was at least partially offset by the assistance we received from the Mexican Navy. We also observed evidence of increased air smuggling. This was an indication of success in terms of our maritime interdiction efforts. Of course, Customs has the primary responsibility for air interdiction and we assist them whenever we can.

Questions Submitted by Mr. Rangel

ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS

Cong. Rangel: Admiral Yost, I think you know that, speaking for myself and the members of the select Committee, we have the highest

regard for the efforts of the Coast Guard to stem the flow of narcotic drugs into the United States, particularly of marijuana and cocaine from Colombia, Jamaica and Belize.

Our problem is that we believe the Coast Guard has simply not been given the resources in the way of ships, aircraft, manpower and operating funds commensurate with the enormity of the smuggling activity it is asked to suppress.

As I understand it, you were the overall field commander of "Operation Hat Trick" placed in operation about November 1, 1984, and designed to tightly control the four passages, or "check points" between the Caribbean islands used by marine smugglers in their voyages from Colombia, Jamaica and Belize to the United States. The operation, as I understand it, was supposed to also in cooperation with Colombian, Venezuelan and Panamanian authorities patrol close to the "north coast" of Colombia.

What I believe was most laudatory was that for the first time, the Coast Guard was able to assemble a sufficient number of its own vessels, several U.S. Navy vessels and some DEA aircraft to mount an operation equal to the challenge posed by the smugglers. I hope the Coast Guard will be able working with the U.S. Navy and other governments to maintain this effort at its current level or very near it.

Cong. Rangel: Admiral YOST, What can you tell us about Operation Hat Trick? What has it achieved and what are its prospects for the future?

Adm. Yost: Hat Trick was the overall operation run by the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. It involved the Department of Defense and many other federal agencies. The maritime aspect, Wagon Wheel, was a Coast Guard operation with Navy participation.

The achievement of Hat Trick and Wagonwheel must be measured in terms of the disruption we caused to the smugglers operations. We concentrated our forces during the time of the smugglers peak shipping season. We put substantial pressure on the maritime traffickers forcing them to hold much of their marijuana in-country rather than risk its confiscation at sea. Ashore it has been subject to natural deterioration and seizure during raids by Colombian National Forces. As a result, preliminary unverified Colombian reports of in-country seizures and eradication efforts, coupled with our maritime interdiction success indicate that approximately half the 1984 fall crop of marijuana was destroyed.

We intend to continue such operations. Pulsing our forces down into the smuggling routes during the peak shipping seasons is a highly effective answer to the maritime drug smuggling problem. The corollary, However, is that at other times we will have less coverage in the choke points. This is one of the costs of such an operation. In the long term, However, I believe that concentrating our forces during peak shipping seasons will improve our overall interdiction efforts.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Questions Submitted by Senator D'Amato

Senator D'Amato: How strong is the link between terrorist groups and drug trafficking in South America and Asia?

Mr. Monastero: With increasing frequency, DEA is receiving intelligence which indicates that terrorist groups worldwide are becoming either directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking. Although terrorism, as such, is not a primary focus of DEA operations, because of the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism, DEA is involved in this arena. We believe that an alliance has developed between the traffickers and the terrorists because of the mutual benefits derived, rather than because of any sharing of ideological goals. We have reason to believe that groups from outside the United States are trafficking drugs to our country in order to finance their terrorist activities in other countries. Fortunately, to date, DEA does not have any information indicating that American terrorist groups have become involved in drug trafficking.

We remain cognizant that the criminal alliance of terrorists and narcotic traffickers is a potential threat to legitimate governments. The implications of such alliances have never been more relevant and must be addressed. This is certainly true in Asia as well as in South America.

Senator D'Amato: How serious is the risk that Colombian drug dealers may move their operations to Panama and other neighboring countries?

Mr. Monastero: Effective drug law enforcement measures in Colombia, including marihuana eradication, major laboratory seizures, and extradition of defandants, have increased pressure against drug traffickers in Colombia. As a result, Colombian traffickers have been seeking to establish production operations in Panama and other neighboring countries. In May, 1984, Panamanian authorities dismantled a large clandestine cocaine laboratory which was under construction in the Darien Province, near the Colombian border. There have also been recent seizures of cocaine laboratories in Venezuela. We are aware of Colombian traffickers' movements into bordering areas of Brazil and Ecuador for coca cultivation and processing. We believe that effective coordination and cooperation is taking place among the concerned governments so that the traffickers will find no safe haven in Colombia's neighboring countries.

Senator D'Amato: Did you see an increase in the amount of Mexican heroin coming into the United States in the latter part of 1984? Do you expect an increase between now and 1987? Has there been an increase in opium poppy cultivation in Mexico over the last year?

Mr. Monastero: Eradication statistics from Mexico reveal an increase in opium poppy cultivation from CY 1983 to 1984. In 1983, some 4,948 acres were sprayed as compared to 7,750 acres in CY 1984. Although most of the increased production was destroyed in the field, preliminary estimates made by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee for 1984 indicate that Mexico supplied from 1,600 kilograms to as much as 1,790 kilograms of heroin to the United States, representing a market share of from 36% to 40%, up from 33% in 1983.

Senator D'Amato: What are the major limits on your ability to gather reliable coca and poppy production statistics and information?

Mr. Monastero: With regard to gathering reliable opium poppy cultivation statistics in Mexico, the major impediments include the broad geographic area over which opium poppies might be grown since they are cultivated, in varying degrees, throughout numerous states. Additionally, field sizes are quite small, making it difficult to detect all fields under cultivation.

Fairly reliable coca surveys have been conducted in Colombia where an estimated 15,000-17,000 hectares were found. Plans have been made to survey Peru and Bolivia, but the task is not easy due to the need to address several cultivation zones in each country, all of which are located in remote areas and some of which are characterized as being populated by hostile populace. Additionally, the availability of technically qualified personnel, resources and a support mechanism in these countries is quite limited. We should bear in mind that many regions of these countries do not have such basic services as telephone or electrical service.

Senator D'Amato: Do you have any evidence that organized drug trafficking groups in different countries have begun working together?

Mr. Monastero: Yes. Organized drug trafficking groups in different countries working together is the rule rather than the exception. The cultivation and harvesting in one country, transshipment to another country for processing and smuggling to the United States for distribution of large quantities of illicit drugs are the efforts of organizations in many countries working together.

Senator D'Amato: Would you care to comment on Gary Liming's suggestion that we create a worldwide mobile drug eradication strike force?

Mr. Monastero: On a number of occasions DEA has proposed that the State Department undertake to construct what might be termed an enforcement module which could be provided to countries on a loan basis for the purpose of enforcement initiatives such as interdiction and eradication.

In the United States, when DEA regularly launches its annual eradication program, we are able to approach many state and local police agencies for assistance. These agencies already have the equipment and the capacity to support certain aspects of the eradication effort. As an example, which I often use, the State of

Illinois has eight single wing aircraft which are used principally for traffic monitoring and control. Obviously, they have the trained personnel, trained not only as pilots, but as observers as well to fly the aircraft, along with the necessary logistical support. DEA need only approach the Illinois authorities to arrange for their participation in the eradication program.

There are many agencies around the country who have the airplanes, helicopters, 4-wheel drive vehicles, etc., needed for such an endeavor. In most other countries, where illicit crop production is a problem, the same situation does not exist. It is virtually impossible to mount an effective campaign without this type of equipment. Therefore, what we have proposed is that enforcement modules consisting of a certain number of aircraft, helicopters, trucks and other vehicles be established along with the maintenance and operating funds to support the module for perhaps one year. After an assessment of the specific need, one or more modules would be made available to the country in question for up to a two year period on a loan basis only. The stipulation would be to the effect that all equipment must be returned intact, that is, without having been cannibalized, but need not otherwise be in useable condition. This stipulation would hopefully prevent parts from being diverted for use in other ways by the country involved. At the end of the time period a new assessment could be made as to whether the loan was to be extended.

It is unrealistic to think that many of the countries involved in coca production or opium production have the capacity to deal with the problem without this kind of support.

Senator D'Amato: How many nations have established working groups with the United States to address problems of drug enforcement?

Mr. Monastero: DEA Agents, who head our offices in foreign countries, meet regularly with their host country counterparts to discuss issues relating to the drug trafficking situation in their respective countries. This is a normal activity of our foreign staff.

On a more formal basis however, we have established conferences and working groups with several countries that meet on a regular basis and involve the heads of the enforcement agencies as well as other high ranking officials. Such meetings take place with Pakistan, Mexico, Italy, France and Canada. Also, due to a recent DEA initiative, an International Drug Enforcement Conference has been established in which formal meetings are held involving countries in the Western Hemisphere. Participants in this Conference have included Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.

Senator D'Amato: How many DEA Agents do we have working overseas? To what extent have your overseas operations recovered from the cuts of the 1970's. How many Agents do you have in Africa? In Pakistan? In Mexico? In South America?

Mr. Monastero: DEA has 195 Special Agent positions assigned to our offices in 41 foreign countries. We have fully recovered from the

decreases of the late 1970's. We have only one Agent assigned in Africa on a permanent basis but we presently have another there on temporary duty and we may soon make that a permanent position. At present we have ten Agents assigned to offices in Pakistan and this will increase to fourteen by summer. In Mexico we have 29 Agents and in Central and South America, 57 Agents.

Senator D'Amato: Do you have any information that the Soviet Union is encouraging drug trafficking between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Mr. Monastero: I am not aware of any information which would indicate that the Soviet Union is encouraging drug trafficking between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Senator D'Amato: The Pakistanis have been accused of knowing who the big traffickers are but of not going after them. Can you comment on whether that is true or not? Is it true that the Pakistanis have made no major seizures of large opium stocks?

Mr. Monastero: Within the last month the Pakistanis seized approximately 1,000 pounds of heroin and a working heroin conversion laboratory. It may well have been the largest heroin laboratory ever seized anywhere. The seizure and arrests were the result of their own information and initiatives. I think the seizure is indicative of increased enforcement activity by Pakistan. We have noted greatly increased cooperation with Pakistan in investigations of heroin trafficking which emanates from that country. We are optimistic that this positive trend of effective enforcement activity will continue.

Senator D'Amato: What is the average GS level for DEA Agents in New York City today? What was it in 1980?

Mr. Monastero: The average GS level for DEA Agents in New York City today is 11.3. The average level for 1980 was 12.3.

Questions Submitted by Mr. Rangel

Mr. Rangel: When I led a delegation of the Select Committee to Pakistan in January 1984 we were informed that substantial opium growing was still tolerated in several districts of the country and that no action is taken to control heroin manufacture and traffic in the tribal areas. We were also told that enforcement against the production and traffic of heroin and hashish throughout the country was ineffective. We were told more drug arrests and seizures should be made. Additionally a major problem was that following drug arrests and seizures the defendants are rarely prosecuted, also that often when seizures are made the traffickers escape. Can DEA cooperation in Pakistan be effective under such circumstances?

Mr. Monastero: Certainly the results of our program were limited under those conditions.

Mr. Rangel: Can you tell us if this situation has improved, and if not, what is required to correct this unsatisfactory situation?

Mr. Monastero: We believe that there has been significant improvement in this situation, especially during the last six months. Cooperative enforcement efforts by Pakistan, not only with the United States, but also with Persian Gulf countries and others, have resulted in successful investigations leading to arrests and seizures of heroin in transit. Most recently the Pakistanis seized what may well have been the largest heroin laboratory ever seized. Several arrests were made and we expect the defendants to be prosecuted. The seizure and arrests were the result of their own information and initiative. We are optimistic that their efforts and cooperation will continue.

The Pakistanis are aware that they must develop more expertise in drug law enforcement. With funding support from the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, DEA is planning with Pakistan to provide four Special Agents to work with the enforcement organizations of Pakistan to develop those organizations' expertise in drug law enforcement. We expect that this program will begin by this summer. The DEA Agents will be in addition to the present staffing of DEA offices in Pakistan.

There are other matters under discussion with the Government of Pakistan which we believe will enhance the effectiveness of our cooperative efforts. Certainly the serious and growing heroin addiction problem in Pakistan is spurring that country to take more effective action.

Mr. Rangel: Can you briefly inform us of some of the more significant drug arrests and seizures made during the past year in Pakistan with the assistance of DEA?

Mr. Monastero: The following is a short summary of typical cases which were the result of cooperative efforts of DEA and Pakistani agencies during 1984.

In Rawalpindi, five arrests and the seizure of 5 kilograms of heroin. In Lahore, seven arrests and the seizure of 10 kilograms of heroin. In Lahore, seven arrests and the seizure of 25 kilograms of heroin. In Lahore, three arrests and the seizure of six kilograms of heroin. In Nawankot, five arrests and the seizure of twelve kilograms of heroin. In Lahore, three arrests and the seizure of three kilograms of heroin. In Lahore, one arrest and the seizure of three kilograms of heroin.

Mr. Rangel: Has DEA been successful in having Pakistan prosecute Pakistani nationals in Pakistan for narcotics violations on the basis of evidence obtained in the United States.

Mr. Monastero: This matter is still under discussion with the Government of Pakistan. We are optimistic that an agreement will be reached.

Mr. Rangel: As you know, about one million dollars per year is provided by the State Department to the Turkish Police and Jandarma to support their manpower and equipment resources in narcotics enforcement. Are you satisfied that the extent of cooperation

extended by those services to DEA to mutually assist each other suppress the drug traffic affecting both countries is all that it should be?

Mr. Monastero: Yes. We are very satisfied with both the commitment of resources and the cooperation we receive from these agencies. I believe that the Turkish National Police now have approximately 1800 officers specializing in drug law enforcement throughout Turkey. That is very close to the number of DEA Special Agents in the United States.

Mr. Rangel: Can you give us a brief account of some of the more significant arrests and seizures made jointly by DEA with the Turkish Police and Jandarma?

Mr. Monastero: Cooperation with Turkish agencies, principally the Turkish National Police, resulted in numerous successful investigations. The following are typical examples of cases culminated in 1984.

In Istanbul, seven arrests and the seizure of a heroin laboratory and 130 kilograms of acetic anhydride. In Ankara, two arrests and the seizure of five kilograms of heroin. In Pazarcik, one arrest and the seizure of a heroin laboratory, two kilograms of heroin and four liters of acetic anhydride. In Adana, four arrests and the seizure of four kilograms of heroin. In Dogubeyazit, nine arrests and the seizure of six kilograms of heroin. In Istanbul, three arrests and the seizure of sixteen kilograms of heroin. In Istanbul, four arrests and the seizure of six kilograms of heroin. In Lice, nine arrests and the seizure of a heroin laboratory, 67 kilograms of heroin and 180 liters of acetic anhydride.

Mr. Rangel: It is my understanding that much of the heroin or opiate raw materials originating in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran affecting the United States reaches this country via Turkey. We are regularly informed of Turkish nationals being arrested by Western European authorities smuggling heroin from Turkey. We see very few reports of Turkish authorities arresting individuals smuggling drugs from Iran and Afghanistan or exiting Turkey. Since it is not possible for DEA agents to cooperate with Afghan and Iranian authorities it appears that strong and effective narcotics enforcement cooperation in Turkey is our only hope of preventing the movement of large quantities of heroin and raw materials from the producer countries to Europe and North America. What can be done to make a dramatic impact on this heroin traffic from Southwest Asia through Turkey? The latter country appears to be a key opportunity to strike at this traffic?

Mr. Monastero: I can certainly agree with you that Turkey is a key country for the transshipment of heroin from Southwest Asia to Europe and the United States. As I have said earlier. We are most pleased with the commitment of the Government of Turkey both in resources and the cooperation we receive. Their enforcement efforts have produced results. We are aware of no leakage from their licit opium production. As for arrests and seizures of transmitting opiates the latest complete year's statistics are for 1983. In that year Turkey effected over 2,900 arrests and seized approximately 750 lbs. of heroin or its equivalent in morphine base and opium. It is our

experience that the Government of Turkey is continuing its enforcement efforts at a high level of priority and dedication. I would expect that the results of their efforts in 1984, when they are available, will reflect comparable if not increased arrests and seizures.

Mr. Rangel: As you know, we believe the Colombian authorities have avoided and procrastinated in assuming their obligation under the Single Convention to eradicate illicit marijuana and coca production in their country. They use a variety of rhetorical arguments to excuse their inaction. We understand that Colombia's narcotics enforcement efforts in addition to eradication leaves much to be desired. The main complaint is that while arrests and drug seizures are made, few are ever prosecuted and fewer yet are convicted and incarcerated. How can this be corrected?

Mr. Monastero: With regard to eradication I believe that Colombia is conducting a vigorous program and with which we are very satisfied. Certainly Colombia has done more in eradication that the United States where our actions are severely restricted by the NEPA requirements. In 1984 Colombia eradicated 8,500 acres of marihuana, approximately 25% of the total crop. The herbicide glyphosate was utilized by Colombia in their eradication program. Colombia also manually eradicated 6,000 acres of coca cultivation, which we estimate at 15% of the total crop.

Colombia's judicial system is lacking in several aspects. Obscure laws and cumbersome legal procedures provide numerous loopholes that can be used by traffickers to avoid prosecution and conviction. The United States has provided Colombia with models of U.S. legislation, such as the R.I.C.O. statute and laws relating to a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. The United States will continue to support and encourage Colombia to reform their current judicial system.

Mr. Rangel: As you know, four Colombian nationals wanted for prosecution in the U.S. on narcotics violations were extradited last week. How many more defendants are under extradition to the U.S.?

Mr. Monastero: The United States has requested that Colombia arrest 89 Colombian citizens for extradition. Of these, 19 have been taken into custody and final Colombian approval has been given in six of these cases. In one case, the Colombian Government denied approval of the extradition.

Mr. Rangel: Have the Colombians ever developed the capability of prosecuting traffickers in Colombia on the basis of narcotics evidence and witnesses developed in the United States?

Mr. Monastero: No. Efforts are currently underway in Colombia to establish a mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Colombia. Through this treaty, Colombians could be prosecuted in Colombia based on evidence developed in the United States. The State Department or the legal section at Main Justice would have more information relative to the status of this treaty.

Mr. Rangel: Have the Colombian police services been effective in providing narcotics intelligence to DEA agents in Colombia which has resulted in significant cocaine and marijuana seizures in the United States?

Mr. Monastero: Yes. On a regular basis, the Colombian National Police has provided DEA with information that frequently has led to multi-ton marijuana seizures on the high seas, as well as numerous cocaine seizures in the United States. Colombian National Police units, working in the major cities of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla, utilized assets such as informants and Title III's to acquire information about narcotics trafficking operations. This information is passed on to DEA, who would in turn forwards the information to other appropriate DEA offices and other federal agencies.

Mr. Rangel: Why have the Colombian authorities been either unwilling or incapable of shutting down the clandestine airstrips and docking sites, particularly in the North Coast Region where respectively aircraft and vessels are loaded with marijuana and cocaine for smuggling to the United States?

Mr. Monastero: At the present time, there are approximately 196 landing strips in Northeastern Colombia. Many of these landing strips are strictly for clandestine use, but some also provide legitimate landing facilities. In a number of cases, the Colombian police and military have disrupted the activities at clandestine landing strips by digging trenches or by creating craters through the use of dynamite. These measures are only temporary, since these landing strips can usually be repaired in a short period of time. In some cases there are legal complications. Some owners of airstrips that have been destroyed have taken the police or military to court.

Docking sites along the North Coast are difficult to pinpoint since these sites do not involve a permanent docking structure, but are rather a beach site that is used to load small boats that ferry the drugs to motherships that sit off the coast. These sites may change from operation to operation and involve an extensive amount of coastline.

Mr. Rangel: With reference to Bolivia, have DEA Special Agents assigned there ever been provided cooperation leading to narcotic arrests, seizures and prosecution in the traffic affecting the U.S. Could you describe the current status of cooperation being provided DEA in Bolivia?

Mr. Monastero: In a recent example of cooperation between DEA and Bolivian authorities, a shipment of cocaine was allowed to leave Bolivia and a controlled delivery was made to the United States. Once in the United States, the cocaine was seized and arrests were made. Within Bolivia, DEA has worked closely with both the Bolivian police and military. Operations recently conducted in the Chapare and the Beni areas of Bolivia involved the cooperation of the Bolivian police, military and DEA resulting in the seizure of over 500 kilos of cocaine HCL and base. DEA has provided training to a 30 man investigative unit, which in turn has provided valuable

investigative leads to DEA. Often, these leads evolve into successful cases in the United States and other countries.

Mr. Rangel: We understand, notwithstanding Peru's abject failure to eradicate the constantly increasing volume of coca leaf production, the P.I.P. and Guardia Civil does provide reasonable effective narcotic enforcement cooperation. Can you tell us what form this cooperation takes and some significant examples in the way of major arrests and seizures in either Peru or the U.S. that have resulted?

Mr. Monastero: During 1984, approximately 7,950 acres of coca were eradicated. Although this is a small part of Peru's total estimated coca cultivation, it is significant when the adverse conditions under which eradication took place are considered. These conditions have been brought about due to the serious terrorist situation which exists in Peru and persistent security problems which have resulted in the assassination of some eradication workers. It is anticipated that in 1985, the use of herbicides will increase the number of acres eradicated.

Both the P.I.P. and the Guardia Civil have a good working relationship with DEA in Peru. In April 1984, the P.I.P., the Guardia Civil, and the Peruvian military initiated an operation in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This operation was given the name "Operation Bronco", and involved DEA coordination and U.S. funds. The main focus of this operation was clandestine airstrips and coca laboratories. The operation resulted in the destruction of 28 clandestine airstrips and the seizure of large amounts of coca paste and base.

Mr. Rangel: When we visited Mexico in August 1983 we learned that for the last 18 months of the Portillo Lopez administration from about June 1981 to December 1982 no cooperation was provided DEA by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. Beginning in early 1983 cooperation was reestablished. It is now effective?

Mr. Monastero: The administration of Lopez-Portillo suffered serious economic setbacks, due to a decrease in oil prices leading to a series of devaluations of the Mexican peso. There were also numerous allegations of corruption directed against Mexican Government officials during the Lopez-Portillo administration. As a result, public confidence in the administration of President Lopez-Portillo and the economy of Mexico lessened. During 1982 the Mexican Government decreased its emphasis on the eradication of opium poppy and marijuana plants resulting in a decrease in the total number of poppy and marijuana fields destroyed. Under these conditions, the amount of joint investigations involving DEA and the Mexican Federal Judicial Police diminished.

The De la Madrid administration, anxious to improve Mexico's image as a government riddled with corruption and graft, has undertaken a program for "Moral Renewal" in an attempt to reduce traditional self enrichment by government officials. A greater emphasis has been placed on the eradication of illicit narcotics and cooperation between the MFJP and DEA. In November 1984 information developed by the DEA Hermosillo office and provided the Mexican Attorney General's office resulted in the seizure of a reported 10,000 gross tons of

marihuana in Chihuahua, Mexico, estimated to be equal to 1900-2400 metric tons of net marketable material, which constitutes the single largest marijuana seizure in history. In cooperation with the MFJP, DEA is again playing a role as an integral part of the Mexican Eradication Program.

Mr. Rangel: During this period of cooperation breakdown the quantity and quality of the heroin from Mexico increased. Is this trend continuing? What is the current status of illicit heroin manufacture and traffic affecting the United States?

Mr. Monastero: Heroin seizures at the U.S./Mexico border from January through September 1984 reveal approximately 6 kilograms pure were seized compared to 5.1 kilogram seized in the whole of 1983. Average purity levels rose from 18.6 percent in 1983 to 60 percent from January through September 1984.

The DEA Heroin Signature Program estimated that in 1983, Mexican heroin comprised approximately 33 percent of the U.S. market share of heroin availability, compared to 34 percent for the first three quarters of 1984. It should be noted that these percentages of Mexican heroin availability in the U.S. are still significantly lower than the 89 percent and 82 percent U.S. availability levels estimated in 1977 and 1978 respectively.

Preliminary estimates of opium production in Mexico indicate an increase from 17 metric tons in 1983 to 21 metric tons in 1984, a 24 percent increase. It is likely that this increased production of opium in Mexico will also produce continued availability and high purity levels of heroin in the United States.

Mr. Rangel: Has DEA been able to reestablish the Janus or joint narcotics prosecution program with Mexico? Are Mexican violators being prosecuted in Mexico on the basis of evidence and witnesses from the U.S. provided by DEA?

Mr. Monastero: The Janus or joint narcotics prosecution program is still in effect in Mexico. There has been little emphasis placed on the program by the Mexican Government. Approximately seven defendants have been prosecuted in Mexico on the basis of evidence and witnesses from the U.S. provided by DEA since its inception. However, no major violators have been prosecuted under the program.

Mr. Rangel: What can you tell us of the startling development that has occurred during the last two years where New Delhi and Bombay, India; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Lagos, Nigeria, have become major transit centers for the smuggling of Southwest Asian heroin to the United States and worldwide?

Mr. Monastero: Many factors have contributed to the development of India as a major transiting center for illicit drugs. Particularly important are India's geographic location between two major illicit opium production areas, excellent international sea and air routes, minimal resources for drug law enforcement, lax laws and lengthy adjudication process, increasing domestic demand and sanctuary for

South Asian refugees fleeing oppression in their own countries. Special interest groups, such as the Sikhs and Tamils, are expected to continue to significantly impact India's role in international drug trafficking.

Although some heroin transits Sri Lanka, Colombo is not considered a major transit center. Most Sri Lankans who have become involved in international heroin trafficking are associated with Pakistani or Indian smuggling organizations and rarely transit Colombo on their smuggling runs.

Lagos, Nigeria is the only known significant heroin transshipment point in sub-Saharan Africa. Political and economic conditions within Nigeria likely contributed to the emergence of Nigerian heroin smuggling groups. The year-old Buhari administration has addressed the problem with increased penalties and anti-corruption initiatives. The pressure on the smuggling groups both within Nigeria and at destination points is expected to result in changes in their methods of operation, some of which have already taken place.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Questions Submitted by Senator D'Amato

FBI NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY

Sen. D'Amato: Colombia destroyed 25 tons of cocaine and cocaine base last year. Did that have any impact on the cocaine supply in New York? If not, can you estimate how much would have to be destroyed for the effects to be felt on supplies here? 100 tons?

Mr. Sheer: The destruction of 25 tons of cocaine and cocaine base last year by the Colombian government has not shown an impact on the supply in New York. As the SAC of the FBI in New York, I am not in a position to estimate how much would have to be destroyed for the effects to be felt on supplies in the U.S.

Sen. D'Amato: What success have you had in arresting and prosecuting upper level drug dealers in the New York area over the last two years?

Mr. Sheer: As an example of what has been accomplished during the last two years, I would like to cite the Dominic Tufaro Case. Tufaro was the leader of a multikilo heroin distribution network and, following a 14-month investigation with DEA, 22 individuals were indicted and tried in Federal court. Tufaro was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Another is the Filipo Ragusa Case which was worked in conjunction with the DEA and the NYPD. The NYPD's undercover expertise served as a basis for court authorized electronic surveillances and as a result, eight individuals were arrested, two of whom were Italian nationals. Thirty-nine pounds of heroin were seized at a stash location. U.S. Customs was utilized at the importation stage of this case, which resulted in the conviction of the main defendants who recently received substantial sentences.

The most recent success is the network alleged to have been run by Gaetano Badalamenti, a fugitive from Italy. This network has been labeled by the media as the "Pizza Connection." Forty-three individuals including Badalamenti were arrested in the cities of New York, Philadelphia and Detroit, the State of New Jersey, and the countries of Switzerland, Spain and Italy. This case, which is awaiting trial, utilized the expertise of virtually every Federal and local law enforcement agency and, at times, foreign police agencies.

I cite these as examples of what can be accomplished, and I can assure you that similar cases are currently being worked.

Sen. D'Amato: To what extent are new groups getting involved in drug trafficking in New York? Pakistanis? Nigerians?

Mr. Sheer: Recent cases and intelligence reports indicate the emergence of several new groups becoming involved in narcotics trafficking. They include Pakistanis, Nigerians, Israelis, Indians, and Lebanese. Their methods of trafficking have not reached the sophistication of the Sicilian networks, however, if left unchecked, a dominant group will emerge and will rapidly develop methods which will make enforcement more difficult.

Sen. D'Amato: Is the FBI involved in any working groups with law enforcement agencies in other nations?

Mr. Sheer: The FBI in New York has developed an excellent working relationship with several Italian police agencies which include the Guardia De Finanza, Criminalpol (State Police), central antidrug service and the local police in Palermo, Sicily. In addition, working relationships have been developed with the police of several cantons in Switzerland and the Spanish national police.

Sen. D'Amato: Do you have any evidence that agents of foreign nations are involved in drug trafficking in this country?

Mr. Sheer: I have no evidence of agents of foreign nations involved in drug trafficking in New York.

Questions Submitted by Mr. Rangel

FBI NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY

About 10 years ago because of the great number of Federal, State and City drug enforcement officers operating in the same geographic area to avoid conflicts and duplication and to achieve better inter-agency coordination and a better exchange of narcotics intelligence, a "Unified Intelligence Division" (UID) was established in the DEA regional headquarters at New York City.

It is my understanding that following the Attorney General's granting of concurrent jurisdiction in drug enforcement to the FBI in January 1982 that for some reason the New York office of the FBI which would have been expected to join the UID did not do so. I understand this failure to participate continues.

Cong. Rangel: Could you tell us why your office does not participate in the UID? Does not this create a

serious gap in preventing the FBI from becoming involved in conflicts and duplications with other narcotics enforcement officers in the New York area investigating suspected narcotics violators?

Mr. Sheer: Since February 1972, the New York Office of the FBI has actively participated in the intelligence gathering functions of the Unified Intelligence Division (UID) at the DEA New York office. At that time, direct liaison was established with UID through the assignment of an FBI narcotics coordinator who is responsible for the timely dissemination to DEA of all narcotics and drug-related information that the New York Office receives from informants, complaints, anonymous sources and as a result of ongoing FBI investigations. In fact, each Agent is mandated by FBI headquarters to debrief his informants regarding those informants' knowledge of narcotics activity and disseminate all positive information to DEA.

As a result of this program, hundreds of pieces of narcotics information were disseminated annually to DEA and the New York City Police Department prior to the FBI receiving concurrent jurisdiction in drug enforcement. In addition, informants who had a value to DEA were at times turned over to DEA for handling. One such example was an informant whose information directly led to the arrest and prosecution of Nicky Barnes, a notorious Harlem drug dealer in 1976.

Since the FBI received concurrent jurisdiction, the intercourse with UID has increased. The FBI's New York drug enforcement program was developed based on input from UID and most information not relating to our program continues to be disseminated at the rate of 100 pieces of information annually. In addition, when two groups of DEA Agents joined two squads of FBI Agents at 26 Federal Plaza as part of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force in August, 1983, an analyst from UID accompanied the two groups. This on-site presence gave UID the opportunity to review ongoing FBI drug-related cases from an intelligence aspect. In addition, the FBI instituted a procedure whereby a technical information specialist makes weekly visits to UID to exchange information.

The FBI New York is also an associate member of the Drug Enforcement Coordinating System (DECS) which is a component of UID. DECS attempts to preclude duplication of investigation by use of a centralized indices system maintained by DEA. The FBI became a member in January 1984 and continues to insure that target cases are indexed. To date, this system has proven effective. Potential conflicts have been avoided as a result of the DECS system which has caused management meetings early on in the course of an investigation and the FBI intends to continue to be a participant.

Cong. Rangel: Could you inform me of the number of cases referred for prosecution to the U.S. Attorney Offices in the Southern and Eastern Districts for violation of the Federal Narcotic laws by your office?

Mr. Sheer: Before answering this question, I would like to note the FBI's philosophy of combatting the drug problem in New York which is consistent with the national approach. Several years ago, the FBI developed a quality over quantity concept in addressing the most significant criminal problems and this holds true for the drug problem. The application of the techniques that have proven successful against traditional organized crime in New York are now being applied to what we have identified as the most significant drug problem, the importation and distribution of heroin by Sicilian organized crime.

This disciplined approach is now showing results but they did not come overnight. The application of limited resources to Title III telephone and microphone surveillances, long-range undercover operations and sophisticated surveillances means fewer cases; but, as I have already testified, higher quality defendants and the neutralization of major networks such as those controlled by Tufaro, Ragusa, and Badalamenti. With this in mind, there have been 23 cases referred for prosecution in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York for violations of Federal narcotic laws.

Cong. Rangel: Could you provide me with the total number of defendants prosecuted as a result of drug investigations by your office in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York in FY 82, FY 83 and FY 84? Also the quantity of cocaine, heroin and marijuana seized during the same period by your office.

Mr. Sheer: The total number of defendants prosecuted as a result of these cases in FY 82, 83 and 84 is 118. An additional 19 defendants, all members of the same Sicilian heroin distribution network were arrested in FY 85 as a result of investigation conducted in FY 84.

The FBI has seized 44 kilos of heroin, 9 kilos of cocaine, and 58 lbs. of marijuana. This was incidental to the cases and not our primary objective, which is the identification and neutralization of organized heroin importation/distribution networks through conspiracy investigations. For example, the arrest of Gaetano Badalamenti, a Sicilian mafia boss in the "Pizza Connection," case along with his 38 subordinates in the United States, Italy, and Switzerland and their anticipated successful prosecution will impact significantly on the amount of heroin coming into the United States.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., Thursday, January 10, 1985, the hearing was concluded and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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